"Sufficiently sane/intelligent" means something like, "Has a sufficient tendency to form true inferences from a sufficiently wide variety of bodies of evidences."

Since clippy fails to form true inferences about morality, doesn't it also count as "insufficiently sane/intelligent"?

So, how is the project to teach mathematics to the flue virus going?

For one thing, we can find out how the Mind works by inspecting its code

We can?

So I have all these minds around me.

How do I inspect their code and thereby find out how they work? Detailed instructions would be appreciated. (Assume that I have no ethical restrictions.)

That (only slightly-joking) response aside, I think you have misunderstood me. I did not mean that we are (in the scenario I am lampooning) saying:

"Any mind that is not convinced by what we think should be universally compelling arguments, despite implementing modus ponens and having an Occamian prior, is not a mind."

Rather, I meant that we are saying:

"Any mind that is not convinced by what we think should be universally compelling arguments, by virtue of said mind not implementing modus ponens, having an Occamian prior, or otherwise having such-and-such property which would be required in order to find this argument compelling, is not a mind."

The problem I am pointing out in such reasoning is that we can apply it to any argument we care to designate as "this ought to be universally compelling". "Ah!" we say, "this mind does not agree that ice cream is delicious? Well, that's because it doesn't implement <whatever happens to be required of a mind in order for it to find ice cream delicious>, and without said property, why, we can hardly call it a mind at all."

A rationality quote of sorts is relevant here:

"Well, let's put it like this. A human has encountered an extraterrestrial lifeform. How do they each discover, that they are both intelligent?"

"I have no idea," said Valentine merrily. "All that I have read on this subject reduces to a vicious circle. If they are capable of contact, then they are intelligent. And the reverse: if they are intelligent, then they are capable of contact. And in general: if an extraterrestrial lifeform has the honor of possessing a human psychology, then it is intelligent. Like that."

(Roadside Picnic, Arkady and Boris Strugatsky)

What we have here is something similar. If a mind is sufficiently sane/intelligent, then it will be convinced by our arguments. And the reverse: if it is convinced by our arguments, then it is sane/intelligent...

In yet other words: we can hardly say "we expect all sane/intelligent minds to be convinced by these arguments" if we have in the first place defined sanity and intelligence to require the ability to be convinced by those very arguments.

I don't see how that makes any difference. You could convince “agents that value rationality terminally, for its own sake” that killing people is evil, but you couldn't necessarily convince them not to kill people, much like Pebblesorters could convince them that 15 is composite but they couldn't necessarily convince them not to heap 15 pebbles together.

Measuring optimization power requires a prior over environments. Anti-inductive minds optimize effectively in anti-inductive worlds.

(Yes, this partially contradicts my previous comment. And yes, the idea of a world or a proper probability distribution that's anti-inductive in the long run doesn't make sense as far as I can tell; but you can still define a prior/measure that orders any finite set of hypotheses/worlds however you like.)

Paperclipper has an optimizing power.

You left out the stage of the argument where it is explained that optimising power is rationality.

Obsessively, and even efficiently, pursuing completely arbitrary goals isn't unusually seen as a pinacle.of sanity and rationality. It tends to get called names like "monomania", "OCD", and so on.