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SaidAchmiz comments on No Universally Compelling Arguments in Math or Science - Less Wrong
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Except that "sufficiently sane/intelligent" here just means, it seems, "implements modus ponens, has inductive priors, etc." We can, like Nick Tarleton, simply define as "not a mind" any entity or process that doesn't implement these criteria for sufficient sanity/intelligence...
... but then we are basically saying: any mind that is not convinced by what we think should be universally compelling arguments, is not a mind.
That seems like a dodge, at best.
Are there different criteria for sufficient sanity and intelligence, ones not motivated by the matter of (allegedly) universally compelling arguments?
"Sufficiently sane/intelligent" means something like, "Has a sufficient tendency to form true inferences from a sufficiently wide variety of bodies of evidences."
Now, we believe that modus ponens yields true inferences. We also believe that a tendency to make inferences contrary to modus ponens will cause a tendency to make false inferences. From this you can infer that we believe that a sufficiently sane/intelligent agent will implement modus ponens.
But the truth of this inference about our beliefs does not mean that "sufficiently sane/intelligent" is defined to mean "implements modus ponens".
In particular, our definition of "sufficiently sane/intelligent" implies that, if A is a sufficiently sane/intelligent agent who lives in an impossible possible world that does not implement modus ponens, then A does not implement modus ponens.
"sufficiently sane/intelligent" means "effective enough in the real world to pose a threat to my values". Papercillper qualifies, flue virus qualifies, anti-inductive AI does not qualify.
So, how is the project to teach mathematics to the flue virus going?
Why, it hasn't been wrong about a single thing so far, thank you!
That doesn't follow. For one thing, we can find out how the Mind works by inspecting its code, not just by black box testing it If it seems to have all that it needs and isn't convinced by arguments that convince us, it may well be we who are wrong.
We can?
So I have all these minds around me.
How do I inspect their code and thereby find out how they work? Detailed instructions would be appreciated. (Assume that I have no ethical restrictions.)
That (only slightly-joking) response aside, I think you have misunderstood me. I did not mean that we are (in the scenario I am lampooning) saying:
"Any mind that is not convinced by what we think should be universally compelling arguments, despite implementing modus ponens and having an Occamian prior, is not a mind."
Rather, I meant that we are saying:
"Any mind that is not convinced by what we think should be universally compelling arguments, by virtue of said mind not implementing modus ponens, having an Occamian prior, or otherwise having such-and-such property which would be required in order to find this argument compelling, is not a mind."
The problem I am pointing out in such reasoning is that we can apply it to any argument we care to designate as "this ought to be universally compelling". "Ah!" we say, "this mind does not agree that ice cream is delicious? Well, that's because it doesn't implement <whatever happens to be required of a mind in order for it to find ice cream delicious>, and without said property, why, we can hardly call it a mind at all."
A rationality quote of sorts is relevant here:
(Roadside Picnic, Arkady and Boris Strugatsky)
What we have here is something similar. If a mind is sufficiently sane/intelligent, then it will be convinced by our arguments. And the reverse: if it is convinced by our arguments, then it is sane/intelligent...
In yet other words: we can hardly say "we expect all sane/intelligent minds to be convinced by these arguments" if we have in the first place defined sanity and intelligence to require the ability to be convinced by those very arguments.
No, it's not viciously circular to argue that an entity that fulfills all the criteria for being an X is an X.
That's not what is happening here. Is what I wrote actually unclear? Please reread my comment, starting with the assumption that what you responded with is not what my intended meaning was. If still unclear, I will try to clarify.