TheAncientGeek comments on No Universally Compelling Arguments in Math or Science - Less Wrong
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What if you try to hardwire in friendliness and fail? Out of the two, the latter seems more brittle to me -- if it fails, it'll fail hard. A merely irrational AI would be about as dangerous as David Icke.
If you phrase it, as I didn't, in terms of necessity, yes. The actual point was that our probability of hitting a point in mindspace will be heavily weighted by what we are trying to do, and how we are doing it. An unweighted mindspace may be populated with many Lovercraftian horrors, but that theoretical possibility is no more significant than p-zombies.
Possibly , but with low probability, is a Pascal's Mugging. MIRI needs significant probability.
I see. Well, that reduces to the earlier argument, and I refer you to the mounds of stuff that Eliezer et al have written on this topic. (If you've read it and are unsatisfied, well, that is in any case a different topic.)
I refer you to the many unanswered objections.