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Tyrrell_McAllister comments on No Universally Compelling Arguments in Math or Science - Less Wrong
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Except that "sufficiently sane/intelligent" here just means, it seems, "implements modus ponens, has inductive priors, etc." We can, like Nick Tarleton, simply define as "not a mind" any entity or process that doesn't implement these criteria for sufficient sanity/intelligence...
... but then we are basically saying: any mind that is not convinced by what we think should be universally compelling arguments, is not a mind.
That seems like a dodge, at best.
Are there different criteria for sufficient sanity and intelligence, ones not motivated by the matter of (allegedly) universally compelling arguments?
"Sufficiently sane/intelligent" means something like, "Has a sufficient tendency to form true inferences from a sufficiently wide variety of bodies of evidences."
Now, we believe that modus ponens yields true inferences. We also believe that a tendency to make inferences contrary to modus ponens will cause a tendency to make false inferences. From this you can infer that we believe that a sufficiently sane/intelligent agent will implement modus ponens.
But the truth of this inference about our beliefs does not mean that "sufficiently sane/intelligent" is defined to mean "implements modus ponens".
In particular, our definition of "sufficiently sane/intelligent" implies that, if A is a sufficiently sane/intelligent agent who lives in an impossible possible world that does not implement modus ponens, then A does not implement modus ponens.