Even a token effort to steelman the "universally" in "universally compelling arguments" yields interesting results.

Consider a mind that thinks the following:

• I don't want to die
• If I drink that poison, I'll die
• Therefore I should drink that poison

But don't consider it very long, because it drank the poison and now it's dead and not a mind anymore.

If we restrict our observations to minds that are capable of functioning in a moderately complex environment, UCAs come back, at least in math and maybe elsewhere. Defining "functioning" isn't trivial, but it isn't impossible either. If the mind has something like desires, then a functioning mind is one which tends to get its desires more often than if it didn't desire them.

If you cleave mindspace at the joints, you find sections for which there are UCAs. I don't immediately see how to get anything interesting about morality that way, but it's an avenue worth pursuing.