TheAncientGeek comments on No Universally Compelling Arguments in Math or Science - Less Wrong

30 Post author: ChrisHallquist 05 November 2013 03:32AM

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Comment author: TheAncientGeek 06 November 2013 05:32:51PM -2 points [-]

..or at least no worse off. But if you can solve the foundational problems of rationalism, I'm all ears.

Comment author: Jack 06 November 2013 05:51:50PM 2 points [-]

I don't see a good alternative to not believing in modus ponens. Not believing that my moral values are also objective truths works just fine: and does so without the absurd free-floating beliefs and other metaphysical baggage.

But as it happens, I think the arguments we do have, for Bayesian epistemology, Occam-like priors, and induction are already much stronger than the arguments we have that anyone's moral beliefs are objective truths.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 06 November 2013 06:27:27PM *  -1 points [-]

Not believing that my moral values are also objective truths works just fine:

  1. Works at what?

  2. That depends how hard you test it: Albert thinks Charlie has committed a heinous sin and should be severely punished, Brenda thinks Charlie has engaged in a harmless pecadillo and should be let go. What should happen to Charlie?

Comment author: Jack 06 November 2013 08:18:53PM 2 points [-]

Works at what?

The same way morality works for everyone else. I'm not biting any bullets.

That depends how hard you test it: Albert thinks Charlie has committed a heinous sin and should be severely punished, Brenda thinks Charlie has engaged in a harmless pecadillo and should be let go. What should happen to Charlie?

Objectively; there is no fact of the matter. Subjectively; you haven't given me any details about what Charlie did.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 07 November 2013 03:06:01AM -2 points [-]

I think the arguments we do have, for Bayesian epistemology, Occam-like priors, and induction are already much stronger than the arguments we have that anyone's moral beliefs are objective truths.

Really? I'd love to see them. I suspect you're so used to using these things that you've forgotten how weak the arguments for them actually are.

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