Eugine_Nier comments on No Universally Compelling Arguments in Math or Science - Less Wrong
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I don't see a good alternative to not believing in modus ponens. Not believing that my moral values are also objective truths works just fine: and does so without the absurd free-floating beliefs and other metaphysical baggage.
But as it happens, I think the arguments we do have, for Bayesian epistemology, Occam-like priors, and induction are already much stronger than the arguments we have that anyone's moral beliefs are objective truths.
Really? I'd love to see them. I suspect you're so used to using these things that you've forgotten how weak the arguments for them actually are.