army1987 comments on No Universally Compelling Arguments in Math or Science - Less Wrong

30 Post author: ChrisHallquist 05 November 2013 03:32AM

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Comment author: [deleted] 11 November 2013 01:18:51PM * 3 points [-]

Do you mean a paperclip maximizer mistakenly believing that the English word moral means ‘optimizing paperclips’ rather than ‘optimizing life, consciousness, etc.’, or a paperclip maximizer who knows that that the English word moral means ‘optimizing life, consciousness, etc.’ but mistakenly believes that optimizing paperclips would optimize life, consciousness, etc.?

And neither is like a paperclip maximizer who knows that that the English word moral means ‘optimizing paperclips’ rather than ‘optimizing life, consciousness, etc.’, and knows that optimizing paperclips doesn't optimize life, consciousness, etc., but doesn't give a damn about optimizing life, consciousness, etc.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 11 November 2013 02:50:52PM * 0 points [-]

Or a paperclip maximiser who correctly believes that "moral" doesn't refer to an arbitrary set of preferences?

Comment author: [deleted] 11 November 2013 06:34:35PM 1 point [-]

http://lesswrong.com/lw/t3/the_bedrock_of_morality_arbitrary/

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 12 November 2013 01:04:44AM -1 points [-]

You do realize the argument in that post applies equally well to physics?

Comment author: Eugine_Nier comment score below threshold [+] (23 children)

Comment author: Tyrrell_McAllister 12 November 2013 06:03:28PM * 3 points [-]

Wow, it appears you don't know what the English word "moral" means either. It roughly means "that which one should do".

Clippy knows what it should do. It just doesn't care. Clippy cares about what it clippyshould do, which is something else.

Comment author: nshepperd 12 November 2013 01:30:10AM 1 point [-]

And what does "should" mean?

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 12 November 2013 01:49:54AM 0 points [-]

Congratulations, we've run into the fact that repeatedly asking to define terms results in an infinite regress.

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 12 November 2013 02:08:58AM * 7 points [-]

When you said that "moral" is "that which one should do" you simply failed to delve into a more fundamental level that would describe what the terms 'moral' and 'should' both refer to.

My own view, for example, is that our moral sense and our perception of what one 'should' do are an attempted calculation of what our preferences would be about people's behaviour if we had no personal stakes on the matter -- imagining ourselves unbiased and uninvolved.

Assuming the above definition is true (in the sense that it accurately describes what's going on in our brains when we feel things like moral approval or moral disapproval about a behaviour), it's not circular at all.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 19 November 2013 11:47:48AM * 1 point [-]

When you said that "moral" is "that which one should do" you simply failed to delve into a more fundamental level that would describe what the terms 'moral' and 'should' both refer to.

One can only fail to do what one is trying to do. If what one is trying to do is refute a putative definition of "morality" one doesn't need a full reduction. AFIACT, that was in fact the context -- someone was saying that Clippy could validly define "morality" as making paperpclips.

My own view, for example, is that our moral sense and our perception of what one 'should' do are an attempted calculation of what our preferences would be about people's behaviour if we had no personal stakes on the matter -- imagining ourselves unbiased and uninvolved.

I like that idea too -- although It isn't new. Also, it is a theory, not a definition.

Assuming the above definition is true (in the sense that it accurately describes what's going on in our brains when we feel things like moral approval or moral disapproval about a behaviour), it's not circular at all.

Does physics shave to describe what we think the behaviour of objects is, or can we improve on that?

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 16 November 2013 01:14:37AM -1 points [-]

My own view, for example, is that our moral sense and our perception of what one 'should' do are an attempted calculation of what our preferences would be about people's behaviour if we had no personal stakes on the matter -- imagining ourselves unbiased and uninvolved.

That is not a definition of morality, that is a theory of morality. (It's one of the better theories of morality I've seen, but not a definition). To see that that is not a definition consider that it appears to be a non-trivial statement in the way that a simple statement of definition shouldn't be.

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 16 November 2013 03:55:46PM * 3 points [-]

I'm not quite sure what is the distinction you're making. I'm a programmer -- if I define a function public int calculateMoralityOf(Behaviour b), what exactly is the definition of that function if not its contents?

Would a definition of "morality" be something like "An attribute assigned to behaviors depending on how much they trigger a person's sense of moral approval/support or disapproval/outrage", much like I could define beauty to mean "An attribute assigned to things that trigger a person's sense of aesthetics"?

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 19 November 2013 11:58:19AM 3 points [-]

I'm not quite sure what is the distinction you're making. I'm a programmer -- if I define a function public int calculateMoralityOf(Behaviour b), what exactly is the definition of that function if not its contents?

There are perhaps a lot of programmers on this site, which might explain why the habit of associating definitions with exhaustive specifications (which seems odd to those of us who (also) have a philosophy background) is so prevalent.

But it is not uniformly valid even in computing: Consider the difference between the definition of a "sort function" and the many ways of implementing sorting.

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 20 November 2013 10:03:45PM 1 point [-]

Consider the difference between the definition of a "sort function" and the many ways of implementing sorting.

That's a good example you bring -- the same function F:X->Y can be specified in different ways, but it's still the same function if the same X leads to the same Y.

But even so, didn't what I offer in regards morality come closer to a "definition", than an "implementation"? I didn't talk about how the different parts of the brain interact to produce the result (I wouldn't know): I didn't talk about the implementation of the function; only about what it is that our moral sense attempts to calculate.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 21 November 2013 05:45:30PM * 0 points [-]

But even so, didn't what I offer in regards morality come closer to a "definition", than an "implementation"?

The original point was:

That is not a definition of morality, that is a theory of morality. (It's one of the better theories of morality I've seen, but not a definition). To see that that is not a definition consider that it appears to be a non-trivial statement in the way that a simple statement of definition shouldn't be.

People offer differing theories of the same X, that is X defined in the same way. That is the essence of a disagreement. If they are not talking about the same X, they are not disagreeing, they are talking past each other.

There might be reasons to think that, in individual cases, people who appear to be disagreeiing are in fact talking past each other, But that is a point that needs to be argued for specific cases.

To claim that anything someone says about X is part of a definition of X , has the implication that in all cases, automatically, without regard to the individual details, there are no real diagreementss about any X but only different definitions. That is surely wrong, for all that it is popular with some on LW

Would a definition of "morality" be something like "An attribute assigned to behaviors depending on how much they trigger a person's sense of moral approval/support or disapproval/outrage", much like I could define beauty to mean "An attribute assigned to things that trigger a person's sense of aesthetics"?

That would be a theory. If falls heavily on the side of subjetivism/non-cognitivism, which many disagree with.

continue this thread »

Comment author: [deleted] 13 November 2013 12:23:25AM 3 points [-]

Unless you eventually switch to an extensional definition.

army1987 comments on No Universally Compelling Arguments in Math or Science - Less Wrong

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