fubarobfusco comments on Is the orthogonality thesis at odds with moral realism? - Less Wrong
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It's a fact that my height is less than six feet. It's also a fact that I disapprove of torture. These are objective facts, not opinions or one person's suspicions. It's not just that I object to claims that I'm seven feet tall; such claims would be false. And if someone says of me that I approve of torture, they're in error, as surely as if they said grass is red and ponies have seventeen hooves.
However, if when I say 'torture is wrong', I mean the fact that I disapprove of torture, I am using relativism. The statement "torture is wrong" is saying something about the speaker. But it's also saying something about the listener; I expect the listener to react in some way to the idea I'm expressing. I don't go around saying "torture is flooble"; I expect that listeners don't assign any significance to floobleness, but they do to wrongness.
Relativism does not mean that moral claims become mere matters of passing fancy; it means that moral claims express preferences of particular minds (including speakers' and listeners'); understanding them requires understanding something about the minds of those who make them.
Consider: As an English-speaker, you might find it distasteful if your neighbor named her daughter "Porn". You might even think it was wrong, especially if you had concerns about how other English-speakers would react to a little girl named Porn. If you were a Thai-speaker living in a Thai language community, you probably wouldn't see a problem, because "Porn" means "Blessing" in Thai and is a common female name. Understanding why the English-speaker is squicked by the idea of a little girl named Porn, but the Thai-speaker is not, requires knowing something about English and Thai languages, as well as about cultural responses to different sorts of mental imagery involving children.
But suppose that when I say "torture is wrong", I mean "Any intelligent mind, no matter its origin, if it is capable of understanding what 'torture' means, will disapprove of torture." That is, a relativisty-preferencey sort of "wrongness" follows from some fact that is true about all intelligent minds. That's a very different claim. It's a lot closer to what people tend to think of as "absolute, objective morality".
Understanding their content, understanding why the speaker considers them true, or understanding why they are true-for_speaker?
Is the more general principle "don't give your children embarrassing names" equally relative? How about "don't embarass people in general "? Or "don't do unpleasant things to people in general"?