novalis comments on Is the orthogonality thesis at odds with moral realism? - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (118)
I don't think you have to be a moral anti-realist to believe the orthogonality thesis but you certainly have to be a moral realist to not believe it.
Now if you're a moral realist and you try to start writing an AI you're going to quickly see that you have a problem.
Doesn't work. So you have to start defining "morality" any you figure out pretty quickly that no one has the least idea how to do that in a way that doesn't rapidly lead to disastrous consequences. You end up with the only plausible option looking like : "Examine what humans would want if they were rational and had all the information you have". Seems to me that that is the moment you should just become a moral subjectivist -- maybe of the ideal observer theory variety.
Now you might just believe the orthogonality thesis because you are a moral realist who doesn't believe in motivational internalism-- they're lots of ways to get there. But you can't be an anti-realist and ever even come close to making such a mistake.
No, because it's possible that there genuinely is a possible total ordering, but that nobody knows how to figure out what it is. "No human always knows what's right" is not an argument against moral realism, any more than "No human knows everything about God" is an argument against theism.
(I'm not a moral realist or theist)
I wasn't making an argument against moral realism in the sentence you quoted.