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Jiro comments on Stranger Than History - Less Wrong
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First even 1901 atheists would consider gay marriage absurd. Also, in order to establish that this constitutes a lower level of rationality, you need to do more then show that their beliefs differ from ours, after all they looking at us would conclude that we are being irrational for not considering it absurd. What argument would you present to them for why they are wrong?
It only does any good to present an argument to someone for why he is wrong if he is rational. If someone believes something for non-rational reasons, there may not be any argument that you could present that would convince him.
Well, people changed their mind about this issue, and since you consider this a rational change, you presumably believe they changed their mind based an a rational argument. Or are you using "rational" as a 2-place function?
Hold on there. That doesn't follow. It is possible to do the same thing either for rational or irrational reasons.
Nobody who was an adult in 1901 is alive today, but for people who changed their mind and were adults many decades ago, I'd suggest that either
the influence of religion on them went down, so they were susceptible to a rational argument recently, but no rational argument could have convinced them in the earlier time period, or
they changed their mind about the issue for a reason that was not rational (such as their preacher telling them that God says gay marriage is okay)
"many decades ago" was long enough after 1901 that there wasn't as much religious influence on them in the first place, so they were susceptible to rational argument, but only because they were not from 1901
First as I explain in more detail here your claim that it was religious influence that kept people from believing gay marriage was a reasonable thing, appears highly dubious upon closer examination. Second, since you presumably believe that the arguments that convinced them to be less religious were also rational, you could presumably convince them using the rational arguments to be less religious followed by the rational arguments for gay marriage.
I do not believe that the arguments that convinced them to be less religious were rational (and probably weren't even, strictly speaking, arguments).
Then in want sense did you mean "people in 1901 had much lower levels of rationality than people from the 20th century"?
Since 1901 is in the 20th century, I think you need to be a bit more charitable and figure out that that's a typo.
Once you correct that, there are two things going on here:
People from 1901 and people from the 21st century aren't the same people. The people from 1901 didn't become people from 2014 and get more rational in the process; they died off and were replaced by different people who were more rational from the start.
Even limiting it to a shorter timespan, people who became rational didn't do so for rational reasons. In fact, they couldn't--it would be logically contradictory. If they became rational for rational reasons they would already be rational.
So what is the basis for your claim that these changes constitute becoming more as opposed to less rational?
What would it even mean for support or opposition to gay marriage to be rational or irrational? The utility function isn't up for grabs.
It would be an odd utility function which had an explicit term for gay marriage specifically. Arguments for it tend to be based on broader principles, like fairness and the fact of its non-harmfulness to others.
An irrational opposition might be something like having a term for fairness but failing to evaluate that term in some particular case, or becoming convinced of harmfulness despite the absence of evidence for such.