That's not the meaning of the word 'consciousness' that Elezier talks about. He's talking about the hard problem of consciousness i.e. the 'hearer'.
The Zombie Argument is that if the Zombie World is possible—not necessarily physically possible in our universe, just "possible in theory", or "imaginable", or something along those lines—then consciousness must be extra-physical, something over and above mere atoms. Why? Because even if you somehow knew the positions of all the atoms in the universe, you would still have be told, as a separate and additional fact, that people were conscious—that they had inner listeners—that we were not in the Zombie World, as seems possible.
You're talking, instead, about reductionism (EDIT: I previously said it was dualism, which is incorrect) i.e. the idea that consciousness resuts naturally from the firing of neurons.
EDIT: If you're trying to answer the question "how can Zombies write about consciousness", then you are absolutely correct.
I'm not talking about dualism - my explanation is fully explained by the neurons alone. The "hearer" is nothing more than certain patterns of neuron firing, with absolutely zero mysteriousness left over (given sufficient detail on those neuron firing patterns).
Taking conciousness out of a person means physically changing their responsible neural patterns - which means at least something as severe as a lobotomy. Taking a person, leaving their brain alone, and removing 'conciousness' is physical nonsense.
In Zombies! Zombies? Eliezer mentions that one aspect of consciousness is that it can causally affect the real world, e.g. cause you to say "I feel conscious right now", or result in me typing out these words.
Even if a generally accepted mechanism of consciousness has not been found yet are there any tentative explanations for this "can change world" property? Googling around I was unable to find anything (although Zombies are certainly popular).
I had an idea of how this might work, but just wanted to see if it was worth the effort of writing.