I don't think this is the LW consensus. This view implies that "consciousness" is a property of neurons, rather than a property of programs or agents. Surely the LW view is that uploads can be conscious.
I also don't think this is straightforward. Where I get confused is when I try to formalize the sense that it's about programs. This implies that there's such a thing as a conscious Turing machine. Is it still conscious if it stops executing? If I implement it on paper?
I may have not been explicit enough about this: it's not the neurons, but the patterns of neural activity. Implement the patterns using not-neurons, and you still have consciousness.
In Zombies! Zombies? Eliezer mentions that one aspect of consciousness is that it can causally affect the real world, e.g. cause you to say "I feel conscious right now", or result in me typing out these words.
Even if a generally accepted mechanism of consciousness has not been found yet are there any tentative explanations for this "can change world" property? Googling around I was unable to find anything (although Zombies are certainly popular).
I had an idea of how this might work, but just wanted to see if it was worth the effort of writing.