This does not accurately describe what most people mean when they talk about consciousness. It may turn out that conscious experience can be reduced to certain neuronal interactions, but such a reduction (even establishing the existence of such a reduction) would count as a major empirical advance. If all our talk about consciousness was in fact merely a matter of convenience, then the existence of the reduction wouldn't be an empirical question. It would be true by definition. Analogy: we now understand that heat is simply molecular motion, but that doesn't mean that when people were talking about heat in the 18th century, it was merely a convenient way for them to talk about certain molecular motions. They were talking about a phenomenon with which they had direct experience, that subsequently turned out to be reducible to molecular motion.
When most people talk about consciousness, they are referring to phenomenal experience (the fact that it feels like something to be awake and observing the universe). Now it may turn out that this phenomenon is completely reducible to neuronal interactions, but to simply say "consciousness" is a convenient label for a set of neuronal interactions is to elide an important and substantive problem. Dualists aren't confused about what "consciousness" means, they disagree with you on the possibility of a reduction. It's generally not a good idea to settle a debate by mere definition.
but such a reduction (even establishing the existence of such a reduction) would count as a major empirical advance.
I think Eliezer makes the point that the specificity of the various neurological disorders and breakdowns forms some very strong evidence for how stuff happens in the brain.
to simply say "consciousness" is a convenient label for a set of neuronal interactions is to elide an important and substantive problem.
No, because you're here, talking about phenomenal experience, and it feeling like things. Imagine following that causal ...
In Zombies! Zombies? Eliezer mentions that one aspect of consciousness is that it can causally affect the real world, e.g. cause you to say "I feel conscious right now", or result in me typing out these words.
Even if a generally accepted mechanism of consciousness has not been found yet are there any tentative explanations for this "can change world" property? Googling around I was unable to find anything (although Zombies are certainly popular).
I had an idea of how this might work, but just wanted to see if it was worth the effort of writing.