HoverHell comments on Building Phenomenological Bridges - Less Wrong
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Note: while this may appear as insulting, that is not the intent and I simply do not have any better wordings.
That means you don't know of one. That means you cannot (behaviourally) speak of one. Which, for example, could mean that the concept of “own experience” is not part of your experience (and not mean that you don't have said “experience”); which would be a claim about your introspective abilities.
Tha being said, there are some assumed properties of intelligence that are not critically required for highly-apparently-intelligent behaviour (for example, a notion of physical model that involves physical particles; or an explicit notion of the said bridge – which could be built-in as implicit and even work correctly in most cases, with built-in patches to avoid the anvil problem).
Well yea that possible, and given that I do generally suck at introspection even plausible. However, is it relevant? If I don't experience experiencing something, then in what sense is it me experiencing it and not some other entity that may or may not be residing in the same brain?
There is a bit of relevance; however, you are also touching the topic of “personal identity” which is too undeveloped yet to go in.
As a side note, it seems likely that bridge hypotheses can be built for some other entity (other than self), but there are inevitably less constraints on validity of them and, thus, less concentration of probability over them, and, thus, multiple hypotheses can easily be comparably plausible, basically making the situation into “multiple [possibly overlapping or non-overlapping] experiencing entities in any brain”.
The ethical implications can be funny but, at this point, are all too far-fetched.