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HoverHell comments on Building Phenomenological Bridges - Less Wrong
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I always get confused by these articles about "experience", but this is a good article because I get confused in an interesting way, (and also a less condescending way).
Normally, I just shrug and say "well, I don't have one". In regards to "human-style conscious experience" my answer is probably still "well, I don't have one". However, clearly even if imperfect there is have some sort of semi functional agency behavior in this brain, and so I must have some form of bridge hypothesis and sensory "experience"... but I can't find either. I can track the chain of causality from retina to processing to stored beliefs to action, but no point seems privileged or subjective, and yet it doesn't feel like there's anything missing or anything mysterious the way other people describe.
Thus, a seeming discrepancy; I can't find any flaw in your argument that any agent must have feature X, but I have an example of an agent in which I can not find X. In at least one of the objects I've examined, i must have missed something.
Note: while this may appear as insulting, that is not the intent and I simply do not have any better wordings.
That means you don't know of one. That means you cannot (behaviourally) speak of one. Which, for example, could mean that the concept of “own experience” is not part of your experience (and not mean that you don't have said “experience”); which would be a claim about your introspective abilities.
Tha being said, there are some assumed properties of intelligence that are not critically required for highly-apparently-intelligent behaviour (for example, a notion of physical model that involves physical particles; or an explicit notion of the said bridge – which could be built-in as implicit and even work correctly in most cases, with built-in patches to avoid the anvil problem).
Well yea that possible, and given that I do generally suck at introspection even plausible. However, is it relevant? If I don't experience experiencing something, then in what sense is it me experiencing it and not some other entity that may or may not be residing in the same brain?
There is a bit of relevance; however, you are also touching the topic of “personal identity” which is too undeveloped yet to go in.
As a side note, it seems likely that bridge hypotheses can be built for some other entity (other than self), but there are inevitably less constraints on validity of them and, thus, less concentration of probability over them, and, thus, multiple hypotheses can easily be comparably plausible, basically making the situation into “multiple [possibly overlapping or non-overlapping] experiencing entities in any brain”.
The ethical implications can be funny but, at this point, are all too far-fetched.