But the value of your life in comparison to other persons lifes doesn't change by this. You'd have to inflation-adjust the value of other persons lifes accordingly.

Only if you are not valuing other persons lifes can you get away with this, but the OP made sufficiently clear that this wasn't the case.

It's reasonable to believe that the area under the curve with "QALYs of life" on the X axis and "Probability of having a life this good or better, given cryonics" is finite, even if there is no upper bound on lifespan. Given a chance of dying each year that has a lower bound, due to accident, murder, or existential hazard, I think that it is provable that the total expected lifetime is finite.

You make a good point that the expected lifetime of a successfully revived cryonicist might be more valuable than the life of someone who didn't sign up.