Dentin comments on I Will Pay $500 To Anyone Who Can Convince Me To Cancel My Cryonics Subscription - Less Wrong

33 Post author: ChrisHallquist 11 January 2014 10:39AM

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Comment author: [deleted] 12 January 2014 07:38:54PM -1 points [-]

Let's say that tomorrow instead of decohering via MWI physics, I'll split into 2 versions of me, version U via uploading, and version P via ordinary physics. Can you tell me in advance why now I should only be caring about version (P) and not about version (U)?

Yes, you'd care about P and not U, because there's a chance you'd end up on P. There's zero chance you'd end up as U.

Seems to me that like in the first example I can't know which of the two branches "I'll end up on". So now I must care about the two future versions equally.

Now tomorrow has come, and you ended up as one of the branches. How much do you care about the others you did not end up on?

Comment author: Dentin 14 January 2014 12:25:02AM 0 points [-]

Now tomorrow has come, and you ended up as one of the branches. How much do you care about the others you did not end up on?

In the case of MWI physics, I don't care about the other copies at all, because they cannot interact with me or my universe in any way whatsoever. That is not true for other copies of myself I may make by uploading or other mechanisms. An upload will do the same things that I would do, will have the same goals I have, and will in all probability do things that I would approve of, things which affect the universe in a way that I would probably approve of. None of that is true for an MWI copy.