Background:
On the most recent LessWrong readership survey, I assigned a probability of 0.30 on the cryonics question. I had previously been persuaded to sign up for cryonics by reading the sequences, but this thread and particularly this comment lowered my estimate of the chances of cryonics working considerably. Also relevant from the same thread was ciphergoth's comment:
By and large cryonics critics don't make clear exactly what part of the cryonics argument they mean to target, so it's hard to say exactly whether it covers an area of their expertise, but it's at least plausible to read them as asserting that cryopreserved people are information-theoretically dead, which is not guesswork about future technology and would fall under their area of expertise.
Based on this, I think there's a substantial chance that there's information out there that would convince me that the folks who dismiss cryonics as pseudoscience are essentially correct, that the right answer to the survey question was epsilon. I've seen what seem like convincing objections to cryonics, and it seems possible that an expanded version of those arguments, with full references and replies to pro-cryonics arguments, would convince me. Or someone could just go to the trouble of showing that a large majority of cryobiologists really do think cryopreserved people are information-theoretically dead.
However, it's not clear to me how well worth my time it is to seek out such information. It seems coming up with decisive information would be hard, especially since e.g. ciphergoth has put a lot of energy into trying to figure out what the experts think about cryonics and come away without a clear answer. And part of the reason I signed up for cryonics in the first place is because it doesn't cost me much: the largest component is the life insurance for funding, only $50 / month.
So I've decided to put a bounty on being persuaded to cancel my cryonics subscription. If no one succeeds in convincing me, it costs me nothing, and if someone does succeed in convincing me the cost is less than the cost of being signed up for cryonics for a year. And yes, I'm aware that providing one-sided financial incentives like this requires me to take the fact that I've done this into account when evaluating anti-cryonics arguments, and apply extra scrutiny to them.
Note that there are several issues that ultimately go in to whether you should sign up for cryonics (the neuroscience / evaluation of current technology, estimate of the probability of a "good" future, various philosophical issues), I anticipate the greatest chance of being persuaded from scientific arguments. In particular, I find questions about personal identity and consciousness of uploads made from preserved brains confusing, but think there are very few people in the world, if any, who are likely to have much chance of getting me un-confused about those issues. The offer is blind to the exact nature of the arguments given, but I mostly foresee being persuaded by the neuroscience arguments.
And of course, I'm happy to listen to people tell me why the anti-cryonics arguments are wrong and I should stay signed up for cryonics. There's just no prize for doing so.
Not Dentin, but since I gave the same answer above I figured I'd weigh in here.
I expect to experience both futures, but not simultaneously.
Somewhat similarly, if you show me a Necker cube, do I expect to see a cube whose front face points down and to the left? Or a cube whose front face points up and to the right? Well, I expect to see both. But I don't expect to see both at once... I'm not capable of that.
(Of course, the two situations are not the same. I can switch between views of a Necker cube, whereas after the duplication there are two mes each tied to their own body.)
I will stay on Earth, with a probability that doesn't change.
I will also appear repeatedly on Mars.
Well, sure, in the real world it seems very odd to take this possibility seriously. And, indeed, it never seems to happen, so I don't take it seriously... I don't in fact expect to wake up on Mars.
But in the hypothetical you've constructed, it doesn't seem odd at all... that's what a nondestructive teleporter does.
(shrug) In ten minutes, someone will take over my life on Earth. They will resemble me extremely closely, though there will be some small differences. I, as I am now, will no longer exist. This is the normal, ordinary course of events; it has always been like this.
I'm comfortable describing that person as me, and I'm comfortable describing the person I was ten minutes ago as me, so I'm comfortable saying that I continue to exist throughout that 20-minute period. I expect me in 10 minutes to be comfortable describing me as him.
If in the course of those ten minutes, I am nondestructively teleported to Mars, someone will still take over my life on Earth. Someone else, also very similar but not identical, will take over my life on Mars. I'm comfortable describing all of us as me. I expect both of me in 10 minutes to be comfortable describing me as them.
That certainly seems odd, but again, what's odd about it is the nondestructively teleported to Mars part, which the thought experiment presupposes.
It will travel along with my body, via whatever mechanism allows that to be transferred. (Much as my subjective experience travels along with my body when I drive a car or fly cross-country.)
It would be odd if it did anything else.