My sequence-superseded interests include the nature of free will, self-improvement (in the sense of luminosity, not productivity), and general interest in rational thinking.

Three areas where I disagree with the Sequences:

• Fake Selfishness. EY mistakenly treats "selfishness" as something like wealth maximization, or at least something that excludes caring about others. Selfishness means acting in one's self-interest. There are three major philosophical views as to what people's interests are: hedonism (pleasure), preference satisfaction, and objective-list (i.e. if a person has the things on this list, their interests are being fulfilled). Wealth maximization is only a plausible manifestation of self-interest for a person with very atypical preferences or for an unusual list. There is no reason why egoism would automatically exclude caring about others - in fact, caring about others often makes people happy, and fulfills their preferences. As for the assumption in the sentence "Shouldn't you be trying to persuade me to be more altruistic, so you can exploit me?", that ignores virtue ethical egoism, as in the Epicurean tradition - that is, exploiting people (in the sense in which exploitation is bad) is not conducive to happiness, and that being honest, just, benevolent, etc, is actually in one's self-interest.

• Not for the Sake of Happiness Alone. EY fails to apply reductionism to human values. He says, "I care about terminal values X, Y, and Z", but when it comes down to it, people would really like pleasure more than anything else, and the distinction between wanting and liking is irrelevant. To indulge in a bit of psychologizing, I think that trying to depict multiple values as irreducible comes from an aversion to wireheading - because if you conclude that all values reduce to happiness/pleasure, you must also conclude that wireheading is the ideal state. But I don't share this aversion - wireheading is the ideal state.

• Because of the above, I disagree with basically the entirety of the Fun Theory sequence. It seems to be an attempt to reconcile Transhumanism as Simplified Humanism with not wanting to wirehead, and the two really aren't reconcilable - and Transhumanism as Simplified Humanism is correct.