I tend to interpret "Is X real?" more or less as "Is X a part of the best predictive theory of the relevant domain?" This doesn't require an object/property to be ontologically fundamental, since our best (all things considered) theories of macroscopic domains include reference to macroscopic (non-fundamental) properties.
According to this standard, Atran is arguing that IQ is not real, I think. Temperature would be real (as far as we know), but maybe BMI wouldn't? I don't know enough about the relevant science to make that judgment.
Anyway, given my preferred pragmatist way of thinking about ontology, there isn't much difference between the reality, validity and usefulness of a concept.
I tend to interpret "Is X real?" more or less as "Is X a part of the best predictive theory of the relevant domain?"
It seems excessive to me to define real as a superlative. Isn't it enough to be part of some good predictive theory? Shalizi explicitly takes this position, but it seems insane to me. He says very clearly says that he rejects IQ because he thinks that there is a better model. It's not that he complains that people are failing to adopt a better model, but failing to develop a better model. To the extent that Atran means ...
Haven't had one of these for awhile. This thread is for questions or comments that you've felt silly about not knowing/understanding. Let's try to exchange info that seems obvious, knowing that due to the illusion of transparency it really isn't so obvious!