Personal identity may not exist as an ontological feature on the low level of physical reality, but it does exist in the high-level of our experience and I think it's meaningful to talk about identities (lines of observer-moments) which may die (the line ends).
I don't think that's relevant in this context. You are a random observer. You live.
I suppose if you consider it intrinsically important to be part of a long line of observers, then that matters. But if you just think that you're not going to have as much total happiness because you don't live as long then either you're fundamentally mistaken or the argument I just gave is.
I'm not sure I understand what you mean
If "you" are a random person, and this includes the entire lifespan, then the best universe would be one where the average person has a long and happy life, but adding more people wouldn't help.
weighted by the probability of those time-lines?
If you're saying that it's more likely to be a person who has a longer life, then I guess our "different" views on identity probably are just semantics, and you end up with the form of average utilitarianism I was originally suggesting.
You are a random observer.
That's very different from saying "you are a random observer-moment" as you did before.
I suppose if you consider it intrinsically important to be part of a long line of observers, then that matters.
I consider it intrinsically important to have a personal future. If I am now a specific observer - I've already observed my present - then I can drastically narrow down my anticipated future observations. I don't expect to be any future observer existing in the universe (or even near me) with equal probability; I expec...
Haven't had one of these for awhile. This thread is for questions or comments that you've felt silly about not knowing/understanding. Let's try to exchange info that seems obvious, knowing that due to the illusion of transparency it really isn't so obvious!