You are a random observer.
That's very different from saying "you are a random observer-moment" as you did before.
I suppose if you consider it intrinsically important to be part of a long line of observers, then that matters.
I consider it intrinsically important to have a personal future. If I am now a specific observer - I've already observed my present - then I can drastically narrow down my anticipated future observations. I don't expect to be any future observer existing in the universe (or even near me) with equal probability; I expect to be one of the possible future observers who have me in their observer-line past. This seems necessary to accept induction and to reason at all.
If "you" are a random person, and this includes the entire lifespan, then the best universe would be one where the average person has a long and happy life, but adding more people wouldn't help.
But in the actual universe, when making decisions that influence the future of the universe, I do not treat myself as a random person; I know which person I am. I know about the Rawlsian veil, but I don't think we should have decision theories that don't allow to optimize the utility of observers similar to myself (or belonging to some other class), rather than all observers in the universe. We should be allowed to say that even if the universe is full of paperclippers who outnumber us, we can just decide to ignore their utilities and still have a consistent utilitarian system.
(Also, it would be very hard to define a commensurable 'utility function' for all 'observers', rather than just for all humans and similar intelligences. And your measure function across observers - does a lizard have as many observer-moments as a human? - may capture this intuition anyway.)
I'm not sure this is in disagreement with you. So I still feel confused about something, but it may just be a misunderstanding of your particular phrasing or something.
If you're saying that it's more likely to be a person who has a longer life,
I didn't intend that. I think I should taboo the verb "to be" in "to be a person", and instead talk about decision theories which produce optimal behavior - and then in some situations you may reason like that.
That's very different from saying "you are a random observer-moment" as you did before.
I meant observer-moment. That's what I think of when I think of the word "observer", so it's easy for me to make that mistake.
If I am now a specific observer - I've already observed my present - then I can drastically narrow down my anticipated future observations.
If present!you anticipates something, it makes life easy for future!you. It's useful. I don't see how it applies to anthropics, though. Yous aren't in a different reference class than...
Haven't had one of these for awhile. This thread is for questions or comments that you've felt silly about not knowing/understanding. Let's try to exchange info that seems obvious, knowing that due to the illusion of transparency it really isn't so obvious!