MrMind comments on Understanding and justifying Solomonoff induction - Less Wrong

1 Post author: gedymin 15 January 2014 01:16AM

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Comment author: MrMind 15 January 2014 05:30:14PM 0 points [-]

Sure, now that you've pointed it out I see that my conjecture was trivially true :)

I guess on the same line of thought you can informally deconstruct Occam's razor:

  • every finite-complexity state of affair can be equivalently explained by longer and longer hypothesis;
  • one of them must be true;
  • for any explanation, the list of longer explanations is infinite, but only grabs the finite remaining portion of probability mass;
  • so, besides for a finite number of instances, all of them must have lower and lower probabilities.

Might be worth a post to informally deduce Occam's razor.

Comment author: cousin_it 15 January 2014 05:51:08PM 4 points [-]

It's a well known argument, I learned it from Shalizi's note. There's other work trying to justify Occam's razor when the set of hypotheses is finite, e.g. Kevin Kelly's work.

Comment author: MrMind 15 January 2014 06:27:04PM *  0 points [-]

Thanks for the very interesting papers.

In Kelly's page, this

Bayesian explanations of Ockham’s razor are based on a circular appeal to a prior bias toward simple possibilities.

I think it is possible to appeal to simpler principles, modifying some of the points I made above.

Indeed, I think it is possible to non-circularly explain why

the Razor is the rule which says "among the theories compatible with the evidence, chose the simplest", and the question is why this leads to the truth better than a rule like "among the theories compatible with the evidence, chose the one whose statement involves the fewest occurrences of the letter 'e'", or even "the one which most glorifies Divine Providence".