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Coscott comments on L-zombies! (L-zombies?) - Less Wrong
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Yes, but I think most people think l-zombies and p-zombies are impossible for different reasons.
If you think "All minds exist in Tegmark 4 with different amounts of reality fluid, and therefore logical zombies do not exist," that seems categorically different from saying, "Philosophical zombies are a meaningless concept."
My current position is that L-zombies are just as meaningless as P-zombies, because there is no "existence" we are all just computations that would be thinking what we are thinking if run, but none of us are ever run.
I'm either extremely confused or parsing your post wrong: You appear to be saying that everyone is an L-zombie ("none of us are ever run").
I am saying that.
I tried not to say everyone is an L-zombie, because Benja's definition said that L-zombies are not conscious.
I believe that L-zombie is meaningless like P-zombie, because something with the traits of L-zombie gets consciousness for free (just like with P-zombie).
Everyone is whatever the conscious version of an L-zombie is.
I wrote a post to try to put my neck out on this claim. It looks like you consider this an extreme claim, so please help me out and let me know what you think.
http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/jn2/preferences_without_existence/
I'm extremely confused in this whole area. My intuition doesn't like your claim, but I don't trust my intuition here.
I doubt this holds even for LW regulars. (I feel confident it does not hold for all visitors.)
To my way of thinking, we have no reason to believe in a mathematical macrocosm. Naive Tegmark 4 gives false predictions. Now this could reflect our confusion about anthropic probabilities or "reality fluid", but the same confusion could make Tegmark 4 seem more attractive than it actually is. (I don't think that last point applies to MWI, which I more-or-less believe because it seems like the natural reading of a successful theory.)