Nothing you say is false, and yet it strikes me as somewhat confused. For one thing, I'm not aware that anybody has ever said that only the actual consequences of an action matter for its moral status. That's is not what consequentialism means.
The thing is that consequentialism and deontology are fundamentally about the moral status of actions, whereas virtue ethics is about the formal status of persons. They're not formally equivalent.
If you have a system for actions, then you can derive the status of the person (by looking at the actions they are, by habit, predisposed to perform). Maybe an action that is not particularly good, viewed in isolation, is excusable because it was done out of a habit that is generally good. But you have to start with the actions, because if you want to start with the person and try to derive the value of actions from that - how do you do that? You have no way of assessing the moral status of a person independently of their actions.
This is why you can and should build virtue ethics on top of an ethical system for actions, and why it's meaningless in isolation.
The thing is that consequentialism and deontology are fundamentally about the moral status of actions, whereas virtue ethics is about the formal status of persons. They're not formally equivalent.
I think they can be made formally equivalent, in the sense that you can write a {consequentialist, virtue ethics, deontological} statement that corresponds to any given ethical statement in some other formalism.*
For a given virtue-ethics view, you can say "act as a virtuous person would act", or "act in a way that achieves the same consequences a...
Disclaimer: I am not a philosopher, so this post will likely seem amateurish to the subject matter experts.
LW is big on consequentialism, utilitarianism and other quantifiable ethics one can potentially program into a computer to make it provably friendly. However, I posit that most of us intuitively use virtue ethics, and not deontology or consequentialism. In other words, when judging one's actions we intuitively value the person's motivations over the rules they follow or the consequences of said actions. We may reevaluate our judgment later, based on laws and/or actual or expected usefulness, but the initial impulse still remains, even if overridden. To quote Casimir de Montrond, "Mistrust first impulses; they are nearly always good" (the quote is usually misattributed to Talleyrand).
Some examples:
I am not sure how to classify religious fanaticism (or other bigotry), but it seems to require a heavy dose of virtue ethics (feeling righteous), in addition to following the (deontological) tenets of whichever belief, with some consequentialism (for the greater good) mixed in.
When I try to introspect my own moral decisions (like whether to tell the truth, or to cheat on a test, or to drive over the speed limit), I can usually find a grain of virtue ethics inside. It might be followed or overridden, sometimes habitually, but it is always there. Can you?