Certainly some of the fun stuff believed fun at our current level of intelligence or ability will not be considered fun at a higher level of intelligence or ability. So bloody what?
Consider that there is an optimal way for you to enjoy existence. Then there exists a program whose computation will make an emulation of you experience an optimal existence. I will call this program ArisKatsaris-CEV.
Now consider another program whose computation would cause an emulation of you to understand ArisKatsaris-CEV to such an extent that it would become as predictable and interesting as a game of Tic-tac-toe. I will call this program ArisKatsaris-SELF.
The options I see are to make sure that ArisKatsaris-CEV does never turn into ArisKatsaris-SELF or to maximize ArisKatsaris-CEV. The latter possibility would be similar to paperclip maximizing, or wireheading, from the subjective viewpoint of ArisKatsaris-SELF, as it would turn the universe into something boring. The former option seems to set fundamental limits to how far you can go in understanding yourself.
The gist of the problem is that a certain point you become bored of yourself. And avoiding that point implies stagnation.
You're mixing up different things:
(A)- a program which will produce an optimal existence for me
(B)- the actual optimal existence for me.
You're saying that if (A) is so fully understood that I feel no excitement studying it, then (B) will likewise be unexciting.
This doesn't follow. Tiny fully understood programs produce hugely varied and unanticipated outputs.
If someone fully understands (and is bored by) the laws of quantum mechanics, it doesn't follow that they are bored by art or architecture or economics, even though everything in the universe (includ...
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