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Coscott comments on Preferences without Existence - Less Wrong
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If I have have a world containing many people, I can say that the world is more morally significant than any of the individual people.
I'm not following you here. I think Raiden has a valid point: we should shape the utility function so that Boltzmann brains don't dominate utility computations. The meta-framework for utility you constructed remains perfectly valid, it's just that the "local" utility of each universe has to be constructed with care (which is true about other meta-frameworks as well). E.g. we shouldn't assigned a utility of Graham's number of utilons to a universe just because it contains a Graham's number of Boltzmann brains: it's Pascal mugging.
Maybe we should start with a bounded utility function...
I am not sure if Raiden's intended point is the same as what you are saying here. If it is, then you can just ignore my other comment, it was arguing with a position nobody held.
I absolutely agree. The local utility of each universe does have to be constructed with care.
I also have strong feelings that all utility functions are bounded.
I was imagining one utility function for the multiverse, but perhaps that does not make sense. (since the collection of universes might not be a set)
Perhaps the best way to model the utility function in my philosophy might be to have a separate utility function for each universe, and a simplicity exchange rate between them.