The person who wakes up remembers all that good old Eliezer did and seems to act like you would expect an enhanced Eliezer to act. However, if you examine things closely the difference between 2014!Eliezer and 2094!Eliezer is actually bigger than the difference between 2014!Eliezer and let's say 2014!Yvain due to having all the new standard enhancements.

I'm not convinced that that's possible, at least according to my idea of what count as big differences.

Further: I think the usual opinion around here is that questions of the form "is this the same person as this?" generally don't have well-defined answers, and that if you find yourself asking one you should figure out what thing it is you really care about. (And, yes, that "does this have cognitive structure and memories very similar to this?" is often quite close to what you really care about when asking that question. But that's not the same as endorsing any particular positive theory of personal identity.) If so, then saying

I don't care if anything that looks like me or thinks it's me is expereincing stuff - I want me (whatever that is) to continue living and doing stuff.

may be a preference that's no more meaningful than, e.g., "I want my immortal soul to continue living and doing stuff".

[EDITED to fix a typo.]