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kokotajlod comments on Weighting the probability of being a mind by the quantity of the matter composing the computer that calculates that mind - Less Wrong
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Comments (23)
I think it depends on how you do the identification, right? If your identification is simply "Find the simplest set of directions that takes the universe as input and outputs the computer," then what you will get might look like a bunch of coordinates and dimensions, in which case a smaller object would actually be easier to describe, and having copies elsewhere would be irrelevant.
If you imagine a universe tiled with computers, it's easier to identify any individual one the bigger the computers are, right?
I think this generalizes to more usual universes, but I could be wrong.
Still depends on how you do the identification. If you have to describe not just the location of the computer but the collection of fundamental entities that form it, then the more fundamental entities form it, the harder it (may) be to describe it.
Also, we aren't talking about a universe tiled with computers; we are talking about a single 2kg computer or two 1kg computers. We leave it unspecified what the rest of the world looks like. EDIT: Rather, what I should say is: I'm not so sure it generalizes.