Comment author:Ritalin
21 February 2014 02:50:39PM
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Anyone seen that 'her' film yet, the one with Joaquin Phoenix in the lead and directed by Spike Jonze? It's a film about a guy falling in love with an AI. Is it any good?
Edit: to summarize, Robin Hanson thinks it works very well as a Pixar-ish whimsical sentimental movie, but not as a realistic interpretation of how a world with that kind of AI would work, despite getting a couple of things right. Other posters, having seen other Spike Jonze projects, and knowing the lead actor's antecedents, suspect the film might be a bit of a prank.
Comment author:Ritalin
21 February 2014 06:22:55PM
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Well he's beng a rather aloof and unhelpful friend right now; I've done site searches for 'Joaquin Phoenix' and 'Spike Jonze' and neither turned up anything. If you know it has been discussed here several times, could you be so kind as to direct me to them? 'Samantha' is likewise useless, mostly because we have a user who has 'Samantha' for a handle, and because it's a rather generic name. As for 'her', I didn't even bother.
Arthur Chu was discussed here previously for his success with Jeopardy using careful scholarship to develop strategies that he knew had worked in the past for other people.
In the comments section here he makes a much more extreme case against LessWrong's policy of not censoring ideas than Apophemi did a while back. Frankly he scares me*. But on a more concrete note, he makes a number of claims I find disturbing:
1) Certain ideas/world-views (he targets Reaction and scientific racism) are evil and therefore must be opposed at all costs even if it means using dishonest arguments to defeat them.
2) The forces that oppose social justice (capitalism, systematic oppression) don't play nice, so in order to overcome those forces it is necessary to get your hands dirty as well.
3) Sitting around considering arguments that are evil (he really hates scientific racism) legitimizes them giving them power.
4) Carefully considering arguments accomplishes nothing in contrast to what social justice movement is doing which at least is making progress. Hence considering arguments is contrary to the idea of rationality as winning. (This seems extreme, I hope I am misreading him)
5) Under consequentialism, if intellectual dishonesty and rhetoric (the dark arts) are capable of advancing the causes of people that are good and opposing the forces of evil, then intellectual dishonesty and rhetoric are good.
There is some redundancy there but whatever.
*I mean this literally, I am actually physically frightened.
Comment author:Ritalin
22 February 2014 11:07:05AM
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Frankly, he has my sympathies, and I say this speaking as one who is now officially and technically a fucking scientific racist, and is hating every minute of it. The increase in knowledge doesn't even seem worth the sacrifice; we're talking about differences in average IQ between 95, 105, 110, 115. For one such as I, who's got an IQ of 168, this degree of difference seems unimpressive, and, frankly, worth ignoring/not worth knowing.
"You're telling me all these massive groups of people have these slight differences in average between them? About one standard deviation? Of what use could this information possibly be?" "Let's forbid entrance to my particular country to immigrants from the inferior races, namely, people of 'african' and 'hispanic' ancestry; it's cheaper than giving everyone an IQ test. Is this not a clever idea that advances my nation's interest and saves taxpayer money?"
And then I sigh at the stupidity of people with high IQ's, myself included.
Nevertheless, pianoforte, you're definitely overreacting. Do give your friend Arthur some references on Ethical Injunctions and remind him of our Litanies. Even if you did nothing, I do not expect Arthur, or any lesswronger for that matter, to present a level of threat worth having actual cold sweats over.
Here's another argument you can give him; social justice seeks to achieve just ends, and to do so requires just means, an image of justice as well as a just system. To seek social justice is to seek righteousness, and to seek to be right; it demands that you be scrupulously rational. Since You Provably Can't Trust Yourself, you should not, cannot allow yourself to employ the methods of evil, of which irrationality, stupidity and incoherence are the very essence. Throughout my life, I have been in contact with all kinds of people who invested huge amounts of effort in struggling for the betterment of mankind, and, whenever they started thinking in martial terms, of Us Versus Them (see Robbers-Cave experiment), of a struggle where one allows oneself all dirty tricks because so does "the other side", Arguments Are Soldiers, and they lose themselves and their ability to identify the truth when it doesn't fit their narrative. And that's a huge handicap.
Keeping a clear mind and remaining open to the truth, no matter how inconvenient, is, I think, the only way to live through one's life, and remain sane to the very end. Once you forfeit your sanity, no matter your successes, you have lost.
I don't actually know him (I didn't comment on that thread), and I'm not claiming my fear is rational. Yes, the result of blinding yourself is that you run the risk of making the world worse and hurting people in the process, including the people that were trying to help.
If you're unhappy with being a scientific racist (I hate that term - if it describes the way the world is then its just science) then maybe you should take a look at the other side of the debate. Then again, some people might accuse Kees Jan Kan of being racist for acknowledging the IQ differences, even if he argues against genetic causes.
The knowledge matters because people have been trying for decades to equalize outcomes for different groups - in terms of achievement and crime. If this is not possible, and there are casualties in the cross fire (say teachers getting fired for not getting minorities to perform at the same level) then we need to change our approach. If you could acknowledge that the causes of violent crime are biological in nature and then suggest biological interventions (someone on LessWrong recently suggested fish pill oils to correct for micronutrient deficiencies), how many lives would be saved? How many people would be spared a life of crime? If you could acknowledge that culture problems and social multipliers have huge effects on adult criminality and success, and make policy decisions based on that (although this problem is very difficult) how many more lives could be saved? If the political climate only allows you to say that different outcomes are the result of the discriminatory schooling system, those nasty racists and the prejudiced authorities - then your interventions aren't going to work and there will be needless casualties. The knowledge certainly does matter.
Comment author:Ritalin
22 February 2014 05:01:59PM
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the causes of violent crime are biological in nature and then suggest biological interventions
For a moment there, I feared you'd speak of genetics and eugenics, but then
(someone on LessWrong recently suggested fish pill oils to correct for micronutrient deficiencies)
if you mean something as prosai as dietetics, I can totally get behind that; I find it easy to believe that crappy food induces cranky mood (and that, in the US, crappy cheap food is remarkably deleterious).
If you could acknowledge that culture problems and social multipliers have huge effects on adult criminality and success, and make policy decisions based on that (although this problem is very difficult) how many more lives could be saved?
Is this not acknowledged? Nay, is this not common knowledge?
If the political climate only allows you to say that different outcomes are the result of the discriminatory schooling system, those nasty racists and the prejudiced authorities
Putting the full blame on them is as absurd as fully absolving them. What insane political climate do you live in, that you'd have to settle for either fallacy?
if it describes the way the world is then its just science
I remain unconvinced that this is exactly the case, and, even though I can accept its provisional validity, with many caveats and reservations, I'm pretty sure the actual reality is more interesting than "blacks and latinos are born dumber, White-Jews and White-Asian nerds are born smarter, and White-Christians are born a little bit smarter than average".
Assuming this particular piece of knowledge matters, what are we supposed to do about it? Be more forgiving of teachers' inability to enable black students to reach some average standard? Allocate Jewish and Asian kids less resources and demand that they meet higher standards? Should we treat kids differently, segregating them by race or by IQ? What practical use do we even have for scientific racism?
Comment author:[deleted]
23 February 2014 09:36:46AM
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The question he literally asked may well be stupid, but I think it's charitable to interpret it as asking what practical use we have for scientific racism that wouldn't violate some ethical injunctions. Likewise, if someone asked how to kill all the fleas on a cat I'd assume they mean that the cat must remain alive and in good health (example taken from here).
Comment author:Lumifer
23 February 2014 04:43:35PM
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The question he literally asked may well be stupid, but I think it's charitable to interpret it as asking what practical use we have for scientific racism that wouldn't violate some ethical injunctions.
It would be a long stretch.
In any case, I would have normally let it slide if not for a particular sentence in a {grand}parent post...
...we're talking about differences in average IQ between 95, 105, 110, 115. For one such as I, who's got an IQ of 168, this degree of difference seems unimpressive, and, frankly, worth ignoring/not worth knowing.
Comment author:Ritalin
23 February 2014 01:59:59AM
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Generics are great. We need more of those. Patented drugs are way overpriced.
As for eugenics, depends on what we're talking about. Is it "eugenics" as in "let's genome-test embryos for horrible congenital diseases" or is it "eugenics" as in "let's castrate every physically and mentally handicapped person whose disease is inheritable"? When I said "I feared you'd speak of genetics and eugenics", I meant "I feared that you'd suggest the latter as policy".
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
23 February 2014 02:02:44AM
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Is it "eugenics" as in "let's genome-test embryos for horrible congenital diseases" or is it "eugenics" as in "let's castrate every physically and mentally handicapped person whose disease is inheritable"
Isn't the latter the "right thing to do" (tm) according to a utilitarian calculation? (Disclaimer, I am not a utilitarian.)
Comment author:Ritalin
23 February 2014 02:07:36AM
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I wouldn't know; neither am I. I tend to find that utilitarian calculations are above my competence. As Dr. Manhattan said to Ozymandias, when he asked him if he did the right thing in the end; "Nothing ever ends."
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
23 February 2014 01:47:34AM
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Assuming this particular piece of knowledge matters, what are we supposed to do about it? Be more forgiving of teachers' inability to enable black students to reach some average standard? Allocate Jewish and Asian kids less resources and demand that they meet higher standards? Should we treat kids differently, segregating them by race or by IQ? What practical use do we even have for scientific racism?
For starters we can stop concluding that an outcome that correlates with race means that the process was racially biased. In particular, eliminate affirmative action and disparate impact.
Comment author:Ritalin
23 February 2014 02:03:29AM
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What's desperate impact? And not all affirmative action is racial. The kind I'm familiar with consists basically of scholarships for smart kids from poor families to go to prestigious schools and reach their full potential, regardless of racial background. And women's parity quotas, which are a clumsy-as-heck-policy that annoys everyone, women included. What kind are you familiar with?
Comment author:asr
23 February 2014 03:27:22AM
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The kind I'm familiar with consists basically of scholarships for smart kids from poor families to go to prestigious schools and reach their full potential, regardless of racial background.
In US political debates about affirmative action, the term usually is meant to imply an overt lower admissions or hiring standard for the group that the affirmative action is supposedly helping.
Scholarships for smart kids from poor families are uncontroversial, and therefore don't come up much in political discourse.
Comment author:Ritalin
23 February 2014 01:26:15AM
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Hardly. I myself change colour all the time, depending on how much sun I get. But it would appear that the races "scientific racism" as I understand it classifies as smarter, are all of paler disposition overall; "whites" in the traditional sense, european jews, and east asians. Calling them all White-X is a way of drawing attention to this strange fact. Is there something about sunlight deprivation that sharpens the mind?
Comment author:Lumifer
23 February 2014 04:37:04PM
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I would hardly consider places like the valley of the Congo or Australia or the Sahara to be evolutionarily soft.
Evolution can push development into different directions. Winters promote long-term thinking and planning. The Congo basin probably promotes resistance to parasites and infections....
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
23 February 2014 04:14:15AM
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Perhaps, on the other hand the places where civilizations first developed, i.e., Egypt, the Fertile Crescent, the Indus Valley, Central America, don't have harsh winters; I'm not sure about the Yellow River, but my brief Googling suggested their winters aren't that harsh either.
Comment author:Lumifer
23 February 2014 04:45:39AM
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The best geography/climate to develop a civilization is not necessarily the best geography/climate to produce high intelligence. Early civilizations arose in places where agriculture was productive enough to generate significant surplus.
Comment author:Username
22 February 2014 07:59:03PM
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Assuming this particular piece of knowledge matters, what are we supposed to do about it? Be more forgiving of teachers' inability to enable black students to reach some average standard? Allocate Jewish and Asian kids less resources and demand that they meet higher standards? Should we treat kids differently, segregating them by race or by IQ? What practical use do we even have for scientific racism?
It's not even that we would need to use it, just that denying it would be harmful.
Without taking sides on the object-level debate of whether it's true or not, let me sketch out some ways that, if scientific racism were true, we would want to believe that it was true. In the spirit of not making this degenerate further, I'll ignore everything to do with eugenics, and with partisan issues like affirmative action.
(1) Racial differences tend to show up most starkly on IQ tests. This has led to the cultural trope that IQ is meaningless or biased or associated with racism. This has led to a culture in which it is unacceptable (borderline illegal depending on exactly how you do it) to use IQ tests in situations like employment interviews. But employers continue to want highly intelligent employees.
This encourages credentialism - the use of prestigious college degrees as a marker for intelligence. This means everyone needs to get a prestigious college degree. This means someone who wants to practice Law or Marketing needs to go $120,000 in debt and waste four years of their life getting a degree in Art History to present at their interview.
This decreases social mobility since poor people aren't going to be able to get into Harvard at the same rate as rich people.And it leaves everyone hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt, forcing them to optimize for high-paying jobs like finance rather than socially productive ones. And it sticks our economy precariously on top of an even bigger mountain of debt than before.
(2) If scientific racism is true but everyone insists violently that it is false, we can't explicitly describe this state of affairs: "Psssst, all that racist stuff we're attacking is actually true, but you're not supposed to talk about it. Pass it on."
But we would expect smart and intellectually honest people who study science and understand statistics to eventually figure out it is true. For whatever reason, smart and intellectually honest people seem unusually bad at picking up non-explicit social norms, so they're likely to respond with "HEY! GUYS! ALL THAT SCIENTIFIC RACISM WE'VE BEEN VIOLENTLY ATTACKING AS ACTUALLY TRUE! WEIRD, ISN'T IT?" Everyone will then violently attack them as racist and they will be traumatized.
The end result is that a lot of the smartest and most intellectually honest people hate the rest of society and are hated by them in turn. The dumber and less intellectually honest you are, the more likely you are to remain unostracized and end up being a "thought leader".
(3) If scientific racism were true, we would expect the fields of academic intelligence research and population genetics to know about it and generally believe it. We would then expect those fields to either be loathed and discredited by the general population for this reason, or else retreat to a hedgehogesque defensive posture, or else exist in a constant low-grade civil war.
All of these things seem to be true to a degree. Just to give one example, Arthur Jensen, whom everyone including his enemies agrees was smart and nice and intellectually honest, who helped pioneer the intelligence research field - got literally burned in effigy, had people threaten to kill his children, and eventually had to hire bodyguards just to go around campus. This seems like it might disincentivize people to study intelligence.
But I think intelligence research and associated areas are some of the most important fields that exist! These are the people who discovered we could increase IQ five to ten points by iodizing salt! These are the people who noticed that lead decreases IQ and very likely also executive function and so probably was responsible for like the entire giant crime wave of the latter half of this century which we successfully reversed by banning lead. These are people so awesome that I strongly suspect if we took a billion dollars away from the physicists and gave it to the intelligence researchers, then in thirty years we would have more intelligence research and probably also more physics.
And so we should be trying encourage them to continue doing good work, and one way we might do this is by not threatening to kill their children.
If scientific racism is true, then believing it is true will make us less likely to do things like threaten to kill the children of intelligence researchers because they are engaged in disproving it.
(You may say "But we could argue with them without using violence!" But how exactly do you think you are going to prevent a true thing from coming out, for all time, without using desperate measures?)
(4) Tiny advantages in mean or variance magnify with every standard deviation you go from the center of the bell curve. So if scientific racism were true, we would expect high-IQ communities to come from disproportionately high-IQ groups. The Southern Baptist Church would be laudably diverse, but the atheist community would be full of nerdy white/Asian/Jewish/Indian men, easily abbreviate to "nerdy white dudes".
If it is assumed that all differences in group membership are because groups are racist, exclusionary, or bullying, this means that all high-IQ groups will be accused of racism, exclusion, and bullying and be considered bad people. No doubt there will be some genuine incidents of such in these groups (as there are in all groups) and these will be seized upon as proof.
So high-IQ groups will once again end up either loathed by the general population, in defensive hedgehog postures, or in a state of low-grade civil war (cf: the modern atheist movement)
But presumably high-IQ groups are smart and have ideas worth listening to. When they get ignored and marginalized, that either gives comfort to false or harmful ideas like evangelical religion, or creates this really creepy situation where very powerful people who help shape the world are suspected by, and suspicious of, everyone else (like what seems to be developing with Silicon Valley tech culture).
(5) If scientific racism is true, then we need to use dark side epistemology to deny it.
For example, a lot of people's chosen strategy is to just deny that race exists or that genes can differ systematically across human populations. But the drug carbamazepine is a safe and effective anticonvulsant in white and black people, but has a significant risk of causing a fatal skin reaction in Asian people.
So we have to manage this complicated balancing act where we must get everybody to intone that Genes Cannot Differ Systematically Across Human Populations, except doctors, whom we tell For God's Sake Genotype All Your Asian Patients Before Giving Them Carbamazepine. One hopes this works.
Other people's chosen strategies to deny scientific racism are to make bringing up problems involving certain races taboo. For example, my experience (is it yours?) is that if someone talks about "inner city crime" or "urban decay", someone else will interject "You're just using 'inner city' and 'urban' as euphemisms for black people, you racist!"
But inner city crime and urban decay are real problems, and ones that disproportionately victimize poor people and minorities.
The most convincing explanation I have heard for these problems is that inner cities massively overconcentrate lead, which is neurotoxic and causes crime/impulsivity. This is a highly solvable problem. But solving it would require us to say things like "the population of inner cities is neurologically disturbed", which would require discussing the problem, which is something that we have to prevent people from doing in order to discourage scientific racism.
One final Dark Side strategy people use is to say "If we admitted scientific racism, we would have to commit genocide against these supposedly inferior populations, which we don't want to do."
Never mind that this wouldn't actually happen. Think about people with Down Syndrome.
Our culture's not perfect at tolerating them, but it's as good as it is at tolerating any other group, and this success didn't require claiming they had exactly equal IQ or were exactly equal along any other dimension except basic human dignity, which is not and shouldn't be a scientifically testable claim.
The truth is robust. Lies are flimsy. If we go with lies, we might accidentally back ourselves into a corner where our stated position commits us to thinking people with Down Syndrome are inferior human beings without any basic human rights.
If we honestly and openly declare we really think - "We can leave the field of small population differences to the scientists, but everyone deserves to be treated compassionately regardless of what they find" - then we are freed from the complicated task of keeping our lies straight, and we might find it has some knock-on benefits somewhere down the line.
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
23 February 2014 01:37:56AM
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The most convincing explanation I have heard for these problems is that inner cities massively overconcentrate lead, which is neurotoxic and causes crime/impulsivity.
That's one explanation, I'm curious why you find it the most convincing.
Edit: if it is just lead, how come the correlation between race and IQ seems to persist across countries?
Comment author:fubarobfusco
23 February 2014 01:24:32AM
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Your comment seems to make many good points. However, I identified a few evident falsehoods in areas I know something about, which leads me to suspect a similar laxity with the truth in areas I know less about.
For instance:
This means someone who wants to practice Law or Marketing needs to go $120,000 in debt and waste four years of their life getting a degree in Art History to present at their interview.
If you want to practice law, you're best served by studying lab sciences, math, or government in undergrad. (Those are the undergraduate majors with the highest admittance rate to law school.) Then you go to law school, which is where you incur the goatloads of debt.
The fact that you can't get admitted to the bar (in most of the U.S.) without going to law school is not a result of anyone's ideology about intelligence. This policy change was adopted explicitly by states in response to pressure by the American Bar Association beginning in the 1890s. IQ testing didn't even exist then. (And for what it's worth, scientific racism was at that time deemed progressive.)
Comment author:Ritalin
23 February 2014 01:10:52AM
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This means someone who wants to practice Law or Marketing needs to go $120,000 in debt and waste four years of their life getting a degree in Art History to present at their interview.
Wait, what?
And it leaves everyone hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt, forcing them to optimize for high-paying jobs like finance rather than socially productive ones.
Are you blaming the exorbitant cost of prestigious private education in the US, the crippling student debt system, and the unequal access to social advancement opportunity, on employers being unable to test prospective employees' IQ?
I have to ask, are you pulling my leg here?
The end result is that a lot of the smartest and most intellectually honest people hate the rest of society and are hated by them in turn. The dumber and less intellectually honest you are, the more likely you are to remain unostracized and end up being a "thought leader".
Smarties and stupids hate each other because smarties blurt out inconvenient truths? "When a true genius appears in the world, you may know him by this sign, that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.", huh, Ignatius?
Arthur Jensen, whom everyone including his enemies agrees was smart and nice and intellectually honest, who helped pioneer the intelligence research field - got literally burned in effigy, had people threaten to kill his children, and eventually had to hire bodyguards just to go around campus.
Please source this. Give me the whole story.
If scientific racism is true, then believing it is true will make us less likely to do things like threaten to kill the children of intelligence researchers because they are engaged in disproving it.
So Jensen was disproving scientific racism?
But I think intelligence research and associated areas are some of the most important fields that exist!
Wow! Much enthusiasm! So keen!
These are the people who discovered we could increase IQ five to ten points by iodizing salt!
These are the people who noticed that lead decreases IQ and very likely also executive function and so probably was responsible for like the entire giant crime wave of the latter half of this century which we successfully reversed by banning lead.
Now you completely lost me. What crime wave? Also, are you telling me intelligence prevents rather than enables crime? What kinds of crime?
So high-IQ groups will once again end up either loathed by the general population, in defensive hedgehog postures, or in a state of low-grade civil war (cf: the modern atheist movement)
How is atheism a matter of IQ?
Other people's chosen strategies to deny scientific racism are to make bringing up problems involving certain races taboo. For example, my experience (is it yours?) is that if someone talks about "inner city crime" or "urban decay", someone else will interject "You're just using 'inner city' and 'urban' as euphemisms for black people, you racist!"
But inner city crime and urban decay are real problems, and ones that disproportionately victimize poor people and minorities.
The most convincing explanation I have heard for these problems is that inner cities massively overconcentrate lead, which is neurotoxic and causes crime/impulsivity. This is a highly solvable problem. But solving it would require us to say things like "the population of inner cities is neurologically disturbed", which would require discussing the problem, which is something that we have to prevent people from doing in order to discourage scientific racism.
This seems to make sense.
"If we admitted scientific racism, we would have to commit genocide against these supposedly inferior populations"
I would have said
"If we admitted scientific racism, some idiots out there would sugget we would have to commit genocide against these supposedly inferior populations. Also black kids would get mocked and bullied at school, or would further interiorize the dumb thug role, and Asians and Jews would be even more pressured to succeed."
If we go with lies, we might accidentally back ourselves into a corner where our stated position commits us to thinking people with Down Syndrome are inferior human beings without any basic human rights.
I can't say I follow this reasoning.
For example, a lot of people's chosen strategy is to just deny that race exists or that genes can differ systematically across human populations. But the drug carbamazepine is a safe and effective anticonvulsant in white and black people, but has a significant risk of causing a fatal skin reaction in Asian people.
Well, in my experience race seems to be a vague and unreliable concept, mostly a tool of privileged groups to keep themselves apart from the rest (the asymmetrical One Drop Laws left me frankly aghast). Of course, if it is actually a useful heuristic in helping people, then by all means it should be used for that in the relevant context.
Comment author:[deleted]
23 February 2014 09:47:45AM
1 point
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(0
children)
Comment author:[deleted]
23 February 2014 09:47:45AM
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Are you blaming the exorbitant cost of prestigious private education in the US, the crippling student debt system, and the unequal access to social advancement opportunity, on employers being unable to test prospective employees' IQ?
I'm not sure that the whole story (but then again I've never been within a couple thousand miles of the US, so what do I know), but tuitions in the US are one order of magnitude more expensive than in continental Europe and this one is the only thing I've heard that even begins to explain that.
Comment author:gwern
23 February 2014 03:25:29AM
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These are the people who discovered we could increase IQ five to ten points by iodizing salt!
Iodine deficicency makes you stupid, among other horrible things, but I'd like a surce for excess iodine making you smarter.
Wow. I was thinking of providing some sources for you since I assumed you were commenting in good faith, but then you pulled this little gem. So nope, I'm just going to downvote and snark.
Comment author:Username
23 February 2014 01:46:51AM
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Are you blaming the exorbitant cost of prestigious private education in the US, the crippling student debt system, and the unequal access to social advancement opportunity, on employers being unable to test prospective employees' IQ?
For a more complete explanation of the theory, see Half Sigma here (warning: post is more racist and sarcastic than I would personally endorse) and Bryan Caplan's response here.
Smarties and stupids hate each other because smarties blurt out inconvenient truths? "When a true genius appears in the world, you may know him by this sign, that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.", huh, Ignatius?
Not sure what you're saying here, but it seems sufficiently sarcastic that I should reply.
Suppose scientific racism is true. Presumably, smart people will figure this out. Some will have the social skills to stay quiet about it. What do you expect to happen to the rest of them?
Please source this. Give me the whole story.
I will signal the overabundance of sources I could use for this fact by limiting myself to only ones with "Times" in the title. Here's New York Times, here's The Times of Higher Education, and here's the Los Angeles Times which adds the fact, previously unknown to me, that bomb squads had to open his mail.
So Jensen was disproving scientific racism?
Sorry, typo. He found support for some aspects of it, nonsupport for other aspects of it, but was generally classified as a supporter.
Iodine deficicency makes you stupid, among other horrible things, but I'd like a surce for excess iodine making you smarter.
I wasn't claiming that excess iodine makes you smarter, just that deficiency makes you stupider (and so relieving that deficiency can raise IQ several points)
Now you completely lost me. What crime wave? Also, are you telling me intelligence prevents rather than enables crime? What kinds of crime?
It isn't directly, but I expect that just as Less Wrong has an average IQ of 138, so most atheist groups will select from people with IQs at least a standard deviation above average.
Well, in my experience race seems to be a vague and unreliable concept, mostly a tool of privileged groups to keep themselves apart from the rest (the asymmetrical One Drop Laws left me frankly aghast). Of course, if it is actually a useful heuristic in helping people, then by all means it should be used for that in the relevant context.
Race is, like all categories, a set of artificial discontinuous labels being forced upon natural continuous variation. On the other hand, the same sort of lossy-but-nonuseless generalizing ability that allows me to say "Black people are more likely to have so-called 'nappy' hair than white people" allows scientific racists to say "black people are more likely to have certain mental characteristics than white people". We could certainly improve accuracy further from there by better subdividing groups ("black people" becomes "Bantu", "San", et cetera; "white people" becomes "Scandinavian", "Mediterranean", etc) but we will lose accuracy by refusing to even make that first subdivision at all.
Comment author:Ritalin
23 February 2014 01:55:15AM
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I wasn't claiming that excess iodine makes you smarter, just that deficiency makes you stupider (and so relieving that deficiency can raise IQ several points)
Let's be perfectly honest here; If that was the meaning you were trying to convey, you could have phrased that better than "we could increase IQ five to ten points by iodizing salt!"
I'll be some time before I can properly examine your sources. Until then, I bid you farewell for now.
Comment author:[deleted]
23 February 2014 09:51:37AM
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It isn't directly, but I expect that just as Less Wrong has an average IQ of 138, so most atheist groups will select from people with IQs at least a standard deviation above average.
ITYM “most atheist groups in the US”; I wouldn't assume the same to be true in northern Eurasia, for example.
Comment author:pragmatist
23 February 2014 01:33:53AM
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The most convincing explanation I have heard for these problems is that inner cities massively overconcentrate lead, which is neurotoxic and causes crime/impulsivity. This is a highly solvable problem. But solving it would require us to say things like "the population of inner cities is neurologically disturbed", which would require discussing the problem, which is something that we have to prevent people from doing in order to discourage scientific racism.
The lead-crime link was brought to public attention by a prominent liberal journalist, writing in a prominent liberal/progressive magazine. As far as I'm aware, there was no huge outcry about this. In fact, the article was widely linked and praised in the liberal blogosphere. I am pretty sure that Drum and the editors at Mother Jones would denounce scientific racism quite vigorously if asked about it. So I think you are overestimating the "chilling effect" produced by a taboo against scientific racism.
Comment author:James_Miller
23 February 2014 02:12:19AM
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6 points
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One final Dark Side strategy people use is to say "If we admitted scientific racism, we would have to commit genocide against these supposedly inferior populations, which we don't want to do." Never mind that this wouldn't actually happen. Think about people with Down Syndrome.
"About 92% of pregnancies in the United Kingdom and Europe with a diagnosis of Down syndrome are terminated. In the United States termination rates are around 67%" Wikiepdia
No analogy with respect to voluntary (via the mom) abortions, but one with many members of society being comfortable with significantly reducing the population size of the group.
Comment author:bramflakes
22 February 2014 12:44:40PM
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8 points
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The increase in knowledge doesn't even seem worth the sacrifice; we're talking about differences in average IQ between 95, 105, 110, 115. For one such as I, who's got an IQ of 168, this degree of difference seems unimpressive, and, frankly, worth ignoring/not worth knowing.
Come now, you know how normal distributions work. Small differences in means cause over-representation at the extreme ends of the scale. From your IQ I can predict a ~30-40% chance of you being Ashkenazi, despite them being a global minority, just because of a "slightly" higher mean of 110. This is an important thing.
(EDIT: This calculation uses sd=15, which may or may not be a baseless assumption)
Plus, maybe there's a reverse-"Level above mine" effect going on here. The difference between someone at 90 and someone at 110 might not seem big to you, but it might just be your provincialism talking.
(Agreed about the immigration rationalization though)
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
23 February 2014 01:35:48AM
3 points
[-]
(Agreed about the immigration rationalization though)
Um, as far as immigration. You may have noticed that some countries are much nicer places to live then others, i.e., some have low crime and highly functioning economies and others are poor crime filled hell-holes. Why is that? Is it that something about being north of the Rio Grande magically makes people more productive and less prone to commit violent crimes? <\sarcasm>
The main reason is the people and culture of those countries. Thus if you import too many people from a different country, the pleasantness of the country to live will depend on the the nature of the new people. Notice that this argument assumes nothing about the role of nature versus nurture.
The main reason is the people and culture of those countries.
Both Koreas are ethnically and culturally the same. What makes one a SF near-utopia and the other a starving disgrace is the accident of having fallen within opposite spheres of influence during the Cold War and the subsequent development of radically different political systems. One could argue something similar happened with pre-unification Germany. I've read somewhere that the relative poverty in rural Southern Italy and wealth in industrial Northern Italy mirror the North-South dynamics of Reconstruction USA.
Comment author:[deleted]
23 February 2014 10:13:11AM
-1 points
[-]
Notice that this argument assumes nothing about the role of nature versus nurture.
Well, if productivity and proneness to commit violent crimes depended only of nurture, the children of those people would resemble people from the country where they're growing up, rather than their parents, so the problem would only exist for first-generation immigrants.
Comment author:[deleted]
01 March 2014 03:58:20PM
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-1 points
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I took “nurture” to refer to socialization, and it turns out that parents are much less important than same-age peers (e.g. people who grow up in a different place than their parents did end up with the accent of the former), but I had forgotten that of course literal nurture also matters.
Comment author:drethelin
23 February 2014 05:52:12PM
4 points
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This is only true if we enforce strict integration of immigrant families, but where there are large populations of immigrants they tend to form enclaves where their social circles consist of other immigrants. Hence little tokyo, chinatowns, and whatnot.
Comment author:Vulture
23 February 2014 01:42:57AM
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-4 points
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I had to read your comment about three times before it became clear to me that you're not talking about inborn racial inferiority. You might want to put that last sentence in bold or something.
Comment author:Ritalin
22 February 2014 01:32:21PM
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4 points
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As it turns out, I'm a green-eyed, pale-skinned but tan-capable Arab from North Africa. I've got several uncles that look downright East Asian (round face, slanted eyes, pale-skinned), and another side of my family looks south-asian, and another looks downright black, and we have blue-eys blondes, an the traits skip generations and branches, and I find the whole notion of "race" to be laughably vague.
If, like in the US, you put a bunch of Scandinavians, Southwest Africans, and East Asians right next to each other, without miscegenation between their descendants, and with a very distinct social stratification between them, I can see how words like "Hispanic" might sound like they might be meaningful, but in lands like Brazil or Morocco where everyone got mixed with everyone and you got a kaleidoscope of phenotypes popping up in the most unexpected places, the "lines" start looking decidedly more blurry, and, in particular, no-one expects phenotype to be in any way correlated with personality traits, or intelligence, or competence.
And let us not get started on the whole notion of "Ashkenazi" from a genetic standpoint; in fact, the very result that they get the highest IQ results makes me place my bet on a nurture rather than nature cause for the discrepancy. I'm willing to bet actual money on this outcome.
Comment author:bramflakes
22 February 2014 02:54:17PM
4 points
[-]
Fair enough. I would still contest that the "nurture" component of these outcomes is smaller than is commonly suggested (Ashkenazim in particular) and that I too would bet money on it.
Comment author:bramflakes
22 February 2014 03:41:33PM
2 points
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I don't know how exactly to translate two difference subjective probabilities to a bet structure, but before that we ought to agree on what exactly we're disagreeing over and what the correct answer would look like to determine who wins.
I think that this would necessarily have to be a long-term thing - maybe the scientific consensus X years from now?
Comment author:Username
22 February 2014 02:08:25PM
7 points
[-]
Come now, you know how normal distributions work. Small differences in means cause over-representation at the extreme ends of the scale. From your IQ I can predict a ~30-40% chance of you being Ashkenazi, despite them being a global minority, just because of a "slightly" higher mean of 110. This is an important thing.
I think we have to be careful with our mathematics here.
By definition IQ is distributed normally. But if we use this definition of IQ then we don't know how IQ is distributed within each population. In particular even if we assume each population is normal, we don't know they all have the same variance. So I think there's little we can say without looking at the data themselves (which I haven't done).
In this instance it might be better to try to measure intelligence on an absolute scale, and do your comparisons with that scale. I don't know how well that would go.
(I'm using the anonymous account (Username and password are "Username" and "password") since I just want to make a statistical point and not associate myself with scientific racism.)
Comment author:bramflakes
22 February 2014 02:45:56PM
2 points
[-]
Yeah that's the tricky part that I forgot to add, we don't know the variance. I used sd=15 but for all I know it could be smaller or larger. Edited to amend.
Comment author:[deleted]
22 February 2014 04:49:58PM
2 points
[-]
(I'm using the anonymous account (Username and password are "Username" and "password") since I just want to make a statistical point and not associate myself with scientific racism.)
Oh. I always assumed that was a pseudonymous account of one specific individual.
Comment author:Username
22 February 2014 08:39:45PM
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3 points
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About 75% of the posts on this account from the past year are from one user (me). I can't decide on a good moniker for a username so I've been putting off creating a main account.
Comment author:Ritalin
24 February 2014 01:10:00AM
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-8 points
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On the back of a matchbox, according to my mama. She always be like, "If y'all so so smart, why aintchoo makin me prouder? You ain' nuthn' but a big useless bag of hot air and fancy talk!"
Comment author:bogus
22 February 2014 06:10:08PM
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-2 points
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Frankly, he has my sympathies, and I say this speaking as one who is now officially and technically a fucking scientific racist
Unless you just stepped out of a time machine, I highly doubt that you are actually a scientific racist. You might be a race realist, but "scientific racism" specifically refers to the views one usually finds e.g. in 19th century and early 20th century sources, that were clearly plagued by massive ingroup/outgroup biases. Just because it had "scientific" in the name does not mean it was actually science-based in any real sense, any more than Karl Marx's socialism was.
Comment author:Ritalin
22 February 2014 07:03:56PM
-2 points
[-]
So it's like rationalism in the Carthesian sense as opposed to the Yudkowskian? That's a relief. Now how do I stop people from confusing me with those balls back a measuring phrenologists?
Comment author:pragmatist
23 February 2014 01:45:31AM
5 points
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"Race realism" is what proponents of the view call it. Opponents don't call it that, for obvious reasons. Many of them do actually refer to the view as "scientific racism".
Comment author:Ritalin
22 February 2014 05:06:12PM
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0 points
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Why? Besides enabling my enemies to call me a racist in much the same way a segregationist would call MLK a criminal, it leaves me right where I started. The initial emotional turmoil is offset by the anecdote utility: "Would you believe that I was once talked into becoming a freaking racist? Me?" This goes straight on my "hilarious misadventures" files, right next to "almost drowned in a lake"' "fell in love with a one-night-stand, suffered horribly, now we're BFF's"' and "that one time I was slipped ecstacy".
Comment author:Ritalin
23 February 2014 01:46:29AM
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7 points
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Eugine, at the risk of stating the obvious, I don't like that being known to have those true beliefs lowers my status and gets in the way of me doing good. I think it's unfair, and I find it frustrating.
Comment author:RowanE
23 February 2014 06:02:08PM
0 points
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Your holding these beliefs is not entirely in the past, and it doesn't seem like there's any reason to think the consequences of holding these beliefs are entirely in the past, making it impossible for you to have gotten over them.
Comment author:Ritalin
23 February 2014 11:44:51PM
1 point
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I've gotten over my emotional distress over acquiring them, and am now dealing with them and the consequences of holding them in a more practical manner. The anguish is gone, replaced with mild annoyance.
Comment author:fubarobfusco
23 February 2014 01:03:24AM
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-3 points
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If you haven't already, I'd suggest reading this Tim Wise essay. It isn't entirely compatible with modern-rationalist epistemology, notably in that Wise seems to reject (or at least resist) the idea that science has much to say about ethics. But Wise does make a strong case for distinguishing the possibility of biological racial differences from a defense of racial inequality.
Comment author:bogus
22 February 2014 06:02:59PM
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5 points
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The clearest statement of Chu view (from the comment thread) seems to be: "As a very tentative general heuristic ... major ideologies that attempt to validate some form of the just-world fallacy should be terminated with extreme prejudice." He correctly names sexism ("Men have all the power because they're just better!") and racism ("Europeans have all the power because they're just better!") as examples.
But the obvious problem is, if you buy the neo-reactionary model of how "the Cathedral" works, then social-justice progressivism is a clear-cut example of a massive just-world-fallacy in action! What's more, I'd hardly expect Moldbug or other neo-reactionaries to take the view that "the world is inherently fair" seriously, even as hidden, low-level implication. And whether Moldbug's worldview is right about the Cathedral is an empirical question that would seem to require serious, rational investigation, not just faith-based political commitment.
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
23 February 2014 01:02:24AM
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1 point
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The clearest statement of Chu view (from the comment thread) seems to be: "As a very tentative general heuristic ... major ideologies that attempt to validate some form of the just-world fallacy should be terminated with extreme prejudice." He correctly names sexism ("Men have all the power because they're just better!") and racism ("Europeans have all the power because they're just better!") as examples.
This is not just world fallacy, in fact for specific values of "better" these are empirical statements. Or would he (and/or you) consider statements along the lines of "I defeated him in the fight because I was stronger" an example of "just world fallacy". What about "being rational helps me achieve my goals"?
Comment author:bogus
23 February 2014 02:46:34AM
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3 points
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This is not just world fallacy, in fact for specific values of "better" these are empirical statements.
No, the "just world fallacy" is a belief that the world always reaches morally "fair" outcomes. So "better" here has to mean that they deserve such outcomes in a moral sense. My guess is that many people here would reject these claims and find them quite objectionable, but it's hard to deny that some followers of the Dark Enlightenment (albeit perhaps a minority) seem to be motivated by them. The just world fallacy (in addition to other biases, such as ingroup tribalism) provides one plausible explanation of this.
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
23 February 2014 02:51:15AM
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1 point
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No, the "just world fallacy" is a belief that the world always reaches morally "fair" outcomes. So "better" here has to mean that they deserve such outcomes in a moral sense.
Ok, so which moral theory are we using to make that determination?
Someone who behaves more rationally is more likely to achieve his goals. Do you consider this a "fair" or "unfair" outcome?
I'm not quite sure how they work, but the last 4 characters seem to give the index of the last comment on the page before (i.e. later than) the one it shows you (in base 36 or something), so you can try binary searching through these.
I think the link I gave is your earliest comments.
Comment author:ciphergoth
19 February 2014 03:40:23PM
2 points
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I need new T-shirts. I can never find ones I like, so I'm resorting to making my own slogan T-shirts on the usual design sites. So far I've ordered "NO POEMS FOR YOU, GNOMEKILLER!". What shall I get next?
Comment author:eggman
20 February 2014 06:37:59AM
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3 points
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Does anyone have heuristics for when it's worthwhile to upvote, or downvote, a post? I've had an account on Less Wrong for a while now, but it's only recently that I've started using it on more than a weekly basis, so I suspect I'll be engaging with this online community more. So, I'm wondering what is the up-and-up on, i.e., courteous method of, upvoting/downvoting. I'm aware that this might be a controversial issue, so let's not use this thread for debates. I'm only looking for useful, or appropriate, heuristics for (understanding) voting I might have missed. For the record, as of this comment, I've never downvoted anyone.
This is what I've surmised so far:
Users downvote posts or comments which are about signaling value of their particular monkey tribe. This often seems to be newcomers, or people who don't interact with the Less Wrong community very communally, bragging about who they identify their in-group as. They state things like "I've finally found a community committed to reason. Incidentally, this ideology is totally reasonable, so you should get on board with it. Trust me, I've read lots of stuff about it, so it checks out. It is not unlike [my ideological opponents], who are unreasonable/stupid/crazy/whatever. I hope you guys aren't like [my ideological opponents], because then you're unreasonable, too".
Users who, in one way or another, are ignorant of topics the Less Wrong community believes they've already reached a consensus conclusion on in a straightforward, slam-dunk manner, receive downvotes. These types of posts which seem to have an agenda which the Less Wrong community would also find disagreeable seem to be less well-received. Ignorant posts where the submitter seems to be genuinely trying to start, or add to, a conversation in good spirit still get downvoted, but also tend to have comment which attempt to helpfully correct the submitter.
How Less Wrong as a community which polices itself by dishing out downvotes, it works efficiently a majority of the time. By the time I get to wreckage of a flame war to catch the juicy details, there isn't much point to myself as an individual actor dishing out further downvotes.
I upvote a comment on at least one of two bases. The first basis is if I believe the comment provides information which answers a question, or clarifies a problem I have. Partial answers and solutions also work as well. This is a proxy for my interlocutor increasing the epistemic quality of the conversation. The second basis is if I believe the comment of my interlocutor provides information which is instrumentally valuable. This is a proxy for instrumental rationality. I also do this for comments in conversations I'm not a part of. If I perceived an inverse of either of the two cases I've presented occurring, I would consider that grounds for downvoting the comment in question.
I'm not confident with how to proceed in upvoting posts that already have lots of karma. By the time a post of decent quality already has several upvotes by the time I read it, I tend not to upvote it, so as not to give it undue importance. If I believe a post, or comment, is exceptionally well-written, or -executed, I might upvote it regardless of however many votes it has now to increase its visibility.
I'm sometimes worried about my votes being biased in the sense that they go to posts, or comments, which increase the visibility of things I only value personally, rather than being reflective of how much a given post, or comment, increases, or decreases, the quality of the discourse on Less Wrong. I'm especially worried these biases in my voting patterns might be, or could become, unconscious.
So, have I missed anything? Additionally, what are the reasons for, or against, keeping my own record of liked/upvoted, and disliked/downvoted, posts, and comments, hidden?
Comment author:Ishaan
21 February 2014 07:48:42AM
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0 points
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Gurkenglas & ShardPhoenix are correct, and the reason the distinction is practically important is because it will not alter your eye-glass prescription or function as a replacement for glasses.
No academic question is ever “free” from political realities. If our university community opposes racism, sexism, and heterosexism, why should we put up with research that counters our goals simply in the name of “academic freedom”?
Instead, I would like to propose a more rigorous standard: one of “academic justice.” When an academic community observes research promoting or justifying oppression, it should ensure that this research does not continue.
This already describes the reality on the ground, though to see it announced explicitly as a good and noble goal, by the upcoming generation, is disturbing. And people like Steven Pinker let are getting old. I'm now updating my trust for the conclusions of academic institutions and culture when they happen to coincide with their political biases downward further.
Comment author:Ishaan
21 February 2014 06:14:52PM
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1 point
[-]
Ironically enough, it's somewhat surprising that The Crimson didn't censor this article, as it was bound to attract negative press.
I'm hoping the fact that this is just an opinion piece, and that the article is currently in circulation on the internet as an example of what's wrong with academia, and that all the comments are opposed to it, is a sign that this is just the internet bringing the worst things to my attention, and that such thinking will never actually be reflected in any formal policy...if not, I've got some updating to do.
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
22 February 2014 01:18:52AM
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5 points
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Well, in many ways what this article describes is already the informal policy in many places.
Also, a lot of the bad ideas currently implemented in universities started out as widely mocked editorials and proposals, for example, the currant moral panic about rapists with its ever widening definition of "rape" and "sexual harassment" and its ever shrinking protections for the accused started out as widely mocked proposals.
Comment author:asr
20 February 2014 07:54:57PM
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14 points
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I think "from the Harvard Crimson" is a misleading description.
One of their undergraduate columnists had a very silly column. Undergraduates do that sometimes. Speaking as a former student newspaper columnist, often these columns are a low priority for the authors, and they're thrown together in a hurry the night before they're due. The column might not even represent what the author would think upon reflection, let alone what the editorial board of the Crimson as a whole believes. So I wouldn't read too much into this.
(For non-US readers: The Harvard Crimson is the student-produced newspaper of Harvard University. The editors and writers are generally undergraduates and they don't reflect any sort of institutional viewpoint.)
Well, the observation is that the Crimson is willing to print crazy left-leaning articles. They are certainly not willing to print crazy right-leaning articles. Or even non-crazy right-leaning articles. That tells you something about the overall sociopolitical climate at the university.
Comment author:asr
21 February 2014 07:02:48PM
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4 points
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Well, the observation is that the Crimson is willing to print crazy left-leaning articles. They are certainly not willing to print crazy right-leaning articles.
Are you sure they don't? I can tell you from personal experience that their peer papers, the Cornell Sun and the Daily Princetonian definitely have some right wing cranks to offset the left-wing ones. For the Sun in particular, I think the political spectrum of opinion columnists was a pretty fair proxy for the campus as a whole. And every so often there's a barnburner of an opinion piece in the Prince about how premarital sex is the devil's work.
Now it is certainly true that conservative writers are the minority, just as conservatives are a minority in the college as a whole. But the Crimson doesn't discriminate on the basis of political orientation when approving writers.
I feel like those articles are very weak counterevidence to my argument. They're more like token, limp-wristed right-leaning contributions that the Crimson has to trot out every now and then to give the impression that they're impartial.
Comment author:Viliam_Bur
20 February 2014 01:51:45PM
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20 points
[-]
When an academic community observes research promoting or justifying oppression, it should ensure that this research does not continue.
By the way, this is stupid even from the "we only care about the 'good' people (women, black, trans, etc.)" viewpoint, because the consequences sometimes look like this:
2) Medical research done on volunteers (the expendable males) finds a new cure.
3) It appears that the cure works better for men, and may be even harmful for women (because it was never tested on women separately, and no one even dared to suggest it should be). Angry screams again -- unfortunately no reflection of what actually happened; instead the usual scapegoat blamed again.
More meta lessons for the LW audience: The world is entangled, you can't conveniently split it into separate magisteria. If you decide to remove a part of reality from your model, you don't know how much it will cost you: because to properly estimate the cost of X you need to have X in your model.
Comment author:Vulture
20 February 2014 11:08:34PM
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10 points
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A side note to your otherwise excellent comment:
"we only care about the 'good' people (women, black, trans, etc.)"
As someone from the other side of the fence, I should warn you that your model of how liberals think about social justice seems to be subtly but significantly flawed. My experience is that virtually no liberals talk or (as far as I can tell) think in terms of "good" vs. "bad" people, or more generally in terms of people's intrinsic moral worth. A more accurate model would probably be something like "we should only be helping the standard 'oppressed' people (women, black, trans, etc.)". The main difference being that real liberals are far more likely to think in terms of combating social forces than in terms of rewarding people based on their merit.
I don't think he's surprised to hear that claim. How would you distinguish the hypotheses? Perhaps you should hold the question in mind for a week as you think as a liberal and listen to liberals.
Comment author:Viliam_Bur
21 February 2014 09:57:27AM
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14 points
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My model is that it's: "we want to help everyone who is suffering" but also: "the only real suffering is the suffering according to our definitions".
Or more precisely: "the suffering according to our definitions influences millions of people, and anything you said (assuming you are not lying, which is kinda dubious, considering you are not one of us) is merely one specific weird exception, which might be an interesting footnote in an academic debate, but... sorry, limited resources".
I understand that with given model of reality, this is the right thing to do. But unfortunately, the model seems to suffer horribly from double-counting the evidence for it and treating everything else (including the whole science, if necessary) as an enemy soldier. A galaxy-sized affective death spiral. -- On the other hand, this is my impression mostly from the internet debates, and the internet debates usually show the darker side of humanity, in any direction, because the evaporative cooling is so much easier there.
(Off-topic: Heh, I feel I'm linking Sequences better than a Jehovah's Witness could quote the Bible. If anyone gets a cultish vibe from this, let me note that I am translating the whole thing these days, and I have just finished the "Politics is the Mindkiller" part, so it's all fresh in my memory.)
Comment author:Vulture
21 February 2014 04:16:08PM
0 points
[-]
Since "politically incorrect" in this context basically means "most views that liberals disagree with", it's hardly surprising that they're repulsed by views in that category.
Comment author:pragmatist
22 February 2014 08:46:37AM
8 points
[-]
Most people, independent of political faction, can't have civil political disagreements. This effect tends to be exacerbated when they are surrounded by like-minded people and mitigated when they are surrounded by political opponents. Conservatives in elite academic environments are usually in the latter category, so I do think they will tend to be more civil in political disagreements than their liberal counterparts. However, I suspect that this situation would be reversed in, say, a military environment, although I have no experience with the military.
You could look at Fox News, where conservative contributors are generally far more bombastic and partisan than their liberal counterparts. Many liberals allege that Fox News deliberately hires milquetoast liberals in order to make liberalism look bad, but I don't think we need to posit a top-down agenda to explain the "Fox News liberal" phenomenon. It's simply the case that people are much less comfortable expressing their political views vigorously when they see themselves as being in enemy territory, especially if they need to make a home in that territory, rather than just briefly visiting it.
Comment author:pragmatist
23 February 2014 01:11:04AM
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2 points
[-]
Are you claiming that there is a significant proportion of liberals who declare that their opponents have no right to express their opinion? I'm pretty sure that's false.
Comment author:Vulture
23 February 2014 01:36:43AM
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5 points
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Maybe not a significant portion, but it happens more often than you might think. On the other hand, I highly doubt that this kind of disruptive rhetorical behavior is more common on one side of the left-right spectrum than on the other.
Comment author:James_Miller
24 February 2014 10:43:56PM
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8 points
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Yes, but I don't believe it. As a test, imagine someone offers to give $1 billion to a city if it makes one public water fountain white's only. I bet most liberals would be horrified at the idea of the city accepting the offer.
Comment author:shminux
24 February 2014 11:08:12PM
2 points
[-]
I imagine that most people in the US would find such a transaction rather unnerving, regardless of political leanings, so this is not a good test of liberal views. Do you have a better example of a correlation between valuing political correctness and liberal views?
Comment author:[deleted]
03 July 2014 02:07:32PM
0 points
[-]
I don't think it matters of it's racial. The general principle of having someone try to buy out a government's espoused moral principles sounds Very Bad. The reasoning is that if the government can be bought once, it can be bought twice, and thus it can be bought in general and is in the control of moneyed donors rather than the voting populace, proof by induction on the naturals -- so to speak.
Lobbyists and their money already have massive influence over governments. Plus, whether it's a good or bad idea, my claim is that most liberals would find the idea disgusting.
Comment author:Nornagest
24 February 2014 11:26:14PM
0 points
[-]
Economics being what it is, this is evidence that your hypothetical segregationist throwback is expecting to get more than a billion dollars of value out of the deal. That doesn't quite establish that someone's trying to screw the city, but it does gesture pretty emphatically in that direction; actual political sentiments hardly enter into it, except insofar as they provide exploitable tensions.
(If I were the mayor, I'd take the money and then build the fountain as part of a practical exhibit in a civil rights museum.)
Comment author:badger
24 February 2014 11:27:02PM
1 point
[-]
Haidt acknowledges that liberals feel disgust at racism and that this falls under purity/sacredness (explicitly listing it in a somewhat older article on Table 1, pg 59). His claim is that liberals rely on the purity/sacredness scale relatively more often, not that they never engage it. Still, in your example, I'd expect the typical reaction to be anger at a fairness violation rather than disgust.
Comment author:Mestroyer
07 March 2014 04:54:21AM
0 points
[-]
You're familiar with the idea of anthropomorphization, right? Well, by analogy to that, I would call what you did here "rationalistomorphization," a word I wish was added to LessWrong jargon.
This reaction needs only scope insensitivity to explain, you don't need to invoke purity. Though I actually agree with you that liberals have a disgust moral center.
Comment author:badger
24 February 2014 11:38:18PM
8 points
[-]
Haidt's claim is that liberals rely on purity/sacredness relatively less often, but it's still there. Some of the earlier work on the purity axis put heavy emphasis on sex or sin. Since then, Haidt has acknowledged that the difference between liberals and conservatives might even out if you add food or environmental concerns to purity.
Comment author:Viliam_Bur
25 February 2014 03:17:31PM
8 points
[-]
Maybe it's about rationalization. The same feeling could be expressed by one person as: "this is a heresy" (because "heresy" is their party's official boo light) and by another person as: "this could harm people" (because "harming people" is their party's official boo light). But in fact both people just feel the idea is repulsive to them, but can't quickly explain why.
Comment author:ErikM
27 February 2014 09:47:53AM
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5 points
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I think this could be generalized into a model with predictions: If we suppose that it's easier to get people to nominally than actually abandon one of Haidt's moral axes (from Wikipedia, to save people some lookups: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Liberty/oppression, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation), we should expect that people who disclaim one of the axes will find ways to relabel violations of that axis to make it sound like it's violating a professed axis.
To be specific, if you have a group that officially disclaims the fairness/cheating axis, I expect they'll be quick to explain how cheating is a form of harm. Or drop the care/harm axis, and we'll probably hear about how harm is a form of oppression. And so forth.
Comment author:Nornagest
24 February 2014 11:50:04PM
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12 points
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Yeah, environmentalist attitudes towards e.g. GMOs and nuclear power look awfully purity-minded to me. I'm not sure whether I want to count environmentalism/Green thought as part of the mainline Left, though; it's certainly not central to it, and seems to be its own thing in a lot of ways.
(Cladistically speaking it's definitely not. But cladistics can get you in trouble when you're looking at political movements.)
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
22 February 2014 01:17:14AM
10 points
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By the way, here is a recent example of just such a bad consequence for women. Basic summery:
1) Latest extreme sport added to olympics.
2) The playing field and obstacles will be the same for men and women; otherwise, it would be sexist and besides its cheaper to only build one arena. (We will of avoid thinking about why we have separate women's and men's competitions.)
3) Women wind up playing on the area designed for men and frequently get seriously injured at much higher rates.
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
22 February 2014 09:19:48PM
8 points
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1) How do you reliably measure potential? You could have leagues based on ability (similar to the way major/minor league baseball works today). But notice that no one cares about the minors.
2) You do realize the practical effect of this in most sports would be that all the levels above amateur would be massively male dominated?
3) In more violent sports you'd have to deal with the cultural taboo against male on female violence. (You could eliminate that taboo, but somehow I'd don't think the feminists would be happy with that outcome.)
4) The feminists are likely to cry bloody sexism over (2) and (3) above.
You can't reliably measure potential, though there's been some work on genes and sports.
Weight (and possibly height) classes would be a start. Not the gender issue, but I think there should be an anti-dehydration standard for sports with weight classes.
Comment author:Viliam_Bur
20 February 2014 09:59:46AM
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6 points
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I'm not even sure if the article is serious or just a linkbait.
Going more meta: I think the students should have the right to fire professors whose political opinions they dislike. The customer is always right.
The problem is separating the "customer" aspects of the situation from the "non-customer" aspects, so the customer does not exercise more rights than they should have as a customer. For example in teaching, the student is a customer; in research they are not. Therefore students should have a right to prevent professors from teaching; not necessary university-wide, because other students may have different preferences; they should just have a right to avoid their lessons. But students shouldn't have a right to prevent professors from doing research. As a logical consequence, teaching and research should be separated. Because it seems that having the same person doing both research and teaching is a good idea for various reasons, I would just make both parts optional (and if the professor does less of one part, they have to do more of the other part).
The idea is: students saying "I don't want to hear this" shouldn't affect research. Although the students should have a right not to hear what they don't want to hear. And the university should have a right to choose how much of this "not hearing" is acceptable with getting a diploma there; again, each university should be freee to chose differently.
Comment author:asr
20 February 2014 07:52:32PM
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6 points
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Going more meta: I think the students should have the right to fire professors whose political opinions they dislike. The customer is always right.
Harvard isn't primarily funded by tuition. The large majority of students receive some aid, and most receive a lot of aid. The real customers are the alumni who build up the endowment. And those people are quite effectively represented in institutional governance, via the board of trustees ("the Harvard Corporation").
I'm also not sure quite how you would envision changing things. The students are perfectly free to take whatever courses and attend whatever lectures they want. However, if they want a Harvard degree, they need to meet the requirements of the College and of their department, and that might mean passing a required course with a professor the student dislikes.
I can't quite picture a "customer is always right" university. I could imagine a system in which a university has no degree requirements that a student would find objectionable, but I don't think the students would want or benefit from such a thing. Part of the signaling value of a degree is that subject experts are attesting that the student has acquired a breadth and depth of knowledge.
Comment author:Lumifer
20 February 2014 08:02:01PM
6 points
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I can't quite picture a "customer is always right" university.
That's pretty easy -- imagine a fourth-rate university the only interest of which is extracting as much money from students (and the federal government) as they can.
Comment author:asr
21 February 2014 07:18:07AM
0 points
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Yes, fair enough. I was being hyperbolic about "can't imagine" -- I should have said, "a university run purely for the preferences of the students would be very far from modern American universities, which are accountable to accreditors and donors, and which have a long tradition of faculty governance.."
Comment author:[deleted]
03 July 2014 02:12:30PM
2 points
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The idea is: students saying "I don't want to hear this" shouldn't affect research. Although the students should have a right not to hear what they don't want to hear. And the university should have a right to choose how much of this "not hearing" is acceptable with getting a diploma there; again, each university should be freee to chose differently.
I would put it much more simply: students have a right to refuse to attend lecture, and professors have a right to give students a failing grade for doing so. And employers and grad-schools have a right to filter for students who actually learned something at school.
Comment author:Lumifer
20 February 2014 07:25:05PM
15 points
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announced explicitly as a good and noble goal, by the upcoming generation
Undergrad publications print the craziest shit imaginable and sometimes even mean it. I wouldn't expect them to "think" the same way a few years after graduation, though.
Comment author:Eugine_Nier
22 February 2014 02:28:49AM
-2 points
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Depends on what they do after graduation. If they go out into the real world, they will generally get over it. On the other hand, if they stay in academy, they're likely to become even crazier. (Unfortunately, it is the latter who will set future university policy.)
Comment author:shminux
20 February 2014 09:23:56PM
6 points
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Can one detect intelligence in retrospect?
Let me explain. Let's take the definition of an intelligent agent as an optimizer over possible futures, steering the world toward the preferred one. Now, suppose we look at the world after the optimizer is done. Only one of the many possible worlds, the one steered by the optimizer, is accessible to retrospection. Let's further assume that we have no access to the internals of the optimizer, only to the recorded history. In particular, we cannot rely on it having human-like goals and use pattern-matching to whatever a human would do.
Is there still enough data left to tell with high probability that an intelligent optimizer is at work, and not just a random process? If so, how would one determine that? If not, what hope do we have of detecting an alien intelligence?
Comment author:drethelin
20 February 2014 10:04:57PM
0 points
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I found a watch upon the heath.
Anyway, I think there are enough instrumental goals that even without human-like goals we should be able to recognize crafted tools like watches, hammers, and whatnot.
Comment author:shminux
20 February 2014 10:12:08PM
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0 points
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That's pattern-matching to humanity, something I explicitly asked not to rely upon. Unless you can show that instrumental goal convergence is inevitable and independent from terminal goal or value convergence. Can you?
Comment author:Brillyant
19 February 2014 05:37:52PM
18 points
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I've lost 30 pounds since September 17th, 2013*. Interestingly, I've noticed doing so caused me to lose a lot of faith in LW.
In the midst of my diet, discussion in the comments on this series of posts confounded me. I'm no expert on nutrition or dieting(I do know perhaps more than the average person), but my sense is that I encountered a higher noise-to-signal ratio on the subject here at LW than anywhere else I've looked. There seemed to be all sorts of discussion about everything other than the simple math behind weight loss. Lots of super fascinating stuff—but much of it missing the point, I thought.
I learned a few interesting things during the discussion—which I always seem to do here. But in terms of providing a boost to my instrumental rationality, it didn't help at all. In fact, it's possible LW had a negative impact on my ability to win at dieting and weight management.
I notice this got me wondering about LW's views and discussions about many other things that I know very little about. I feel myself asking "How could I rationally believe LW knows what they are talking about in regard to the Singularity, UFAI, etc. if they seem to spin their wheels so badly on a discussion about something as simple as weight loss?"
I'm interested to hear others' thoughts on this.
Have you ever lost confidence in LW after a similar experience? Maybe something where it seemed to you people were "talking a big game" but failing to apply any of that to actually win in real life?
(*Note: To be clear, I've lost 30 pounds since Sept 17th, but only ~15-18 lbs since my "diet" began on Jan 1, 2014. I'm not really bragging about losing weight—I wish it weren't the case. I injured my neck and could no longer use my primary method of exercise (weightlifting) to stay in shape. After eating poorly and lying around for a couple months, I started—on Jan 1—to do consistent, light treadmill work & light core work, as well as cutting my calorie consumption pretty dramatically.)
Comment author:drethelin
19 February 2014 10:14:16PM
2 points
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That explains why when I tried cutting calories I had headaches and tiredness constantly and no weight loss but somehow magically was able to cut calories once I decided to cut carbs
OH WAIT NO IT DOESN'T. Even if you're correct that the way the diet works is by functionally cutting calories, SOMETHING is needed to explain why it works better for people than trying to cut calories. don't pretend it's the same thing.
Comment author:jimmy
19 February 2014 07:01:40PM
7 points
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[...]something as simple as weight loss?"
Weight loss isn't as simple as you think.
Sure it's all about burning more than you eat, but for a lot of people "just eat less and exercise more!" isn't advice they can follow. You seem to have "lucked out" on that front.
The far more interesting and useful question is "what factors determine how easy it is to eat less and exercise more?". This is where it gets nontrivial. You can't even narrow it down to one field of study. I've known people to have success from just changing their diet (not all in the same way) as well as others who have had success from psychological shifts - and one from surgery.
I don't consider LW to be the experts on how to lose weight either, but that doesn't signal incompetence to me. Finding the flaws in the current set of visible "solutions" is much easier than finding your own better solution or even grasping the underlying mechanisms that explain the value and limitations of different approaches. So if you have a group of people who are good at spotting sloppy thinking who spend a few minutes of their day analyzing things for fun, of course you're going to see a very critical literature review rather than a unanimously supported "winner". Even if there were such a thing in the territory waiting to be found (I suspect there isn't), then you wouldn't expect anyone on LW to find it unless they were motivated to really study it.
Comment author:Brillyant
19 February 2014 07:43:11PM
1 point
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Sure it's all about burning more than you eat, but for a lot of people "just eat less and exercise more!" isn't advice they can follow. You seem to have "lucked out" on that front.
Yes, and no.
There are significant differences between some individuals' BMR. And some people are just better at managing will power. And some likely people experience much greater physiological responses to food than others.
In those ways, you're exactly right. I'm apparently wired to be able to white knuckle my way to a successful ~6 week diet where some others cannot.
But that wasn't really the thrust of the argument in the discussion I linked. Rather, it was all sorts of back and forth about the viability of popular dieting methods.
I agree dieting isn't easy to do for all sorts of reasons. But it is simple. And that seemed to be completely lost on a group of people that are way smarter than me.
It made me think twice about LW's views on all sorts of things that aren't easy or simple.
Comment author:Yvain
19 February 2014 10:36:02PM
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28 points
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Consider the following story:
I was feeling a little blue. I looked at the psychiatric literature, and they were saying all this weird stuff about neurotrophic factors and cognitive-behavioral therapy. But then that night I had dinner with some friends, went to the gym for an hour, and sure enough I felt a lot better afterwards!
I would have at least three qualms with such an attitude:
First, there are different kinds of low mood. Some differences are obvious; some people are less depressed than others, or depressed for much shorter time periods. But it could also be that there are no visible differences between two people, but that for hidden reasons one person's depression will respond to some quick exercise and social activity, and another person's won't.
Second, even interventions that are known to always work can be hard to task-ify. Exercise is indeed often a very effective treatment for depression, but when you tell a depressed person "just go and exercise", they usually won't do that because they're too depressed. Having a good social support network can be helpful in depression, but depressed people can be unable to make friends because deep down they assume everyone hates them. Part of treating depression is bringing people to the point where they're able to do the simple interventions. If you get a depressed person who does have the motivation to exercise and make friends, great, but it's not a point against psychiatry that they sometimes discuss how to help people who don't.
A third problem is general anti-scientificness. Yeah, sure, you don't need to understand exactly how neurogenesis occurs in order to treat depression. But it's neat to know. And in fact exercise may treat depression by increasing neurotrophic factors, so you're not disagreeing with the scientists, just looking at it from a different angle. And for certain people it might be, in a weird way, sort of inspirational to know the science and help them figure out why they're doing what they're doing. If they want to study it, why complain?
I think most of the same issues generalize to your comment.
I would also add one more, which is that it is generally much easier to lose weight on a diet than to keep the weight off for more than a year or two. For example, of people who lost (hey, look at that!) thirty pounds on a diet, one year later they had on average gained back fifteen of them. Longer followups usually find even more of the weight regained; see for example Mann 2007. So you're declaring something simple before you've even started the hard part.
Comment author:Brillyant
20 February 2014 04:22:04PM
1 point
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I like the analogy, because I can personally relate to depression. I don't know that it is a great one, though.
We know very well how to cause weight loss. It's a calorie deficit issue, and we could force it to occur. That is, we can will weight loss.
It has not been my experience that people can will happiness—not even for a short time. They can (sometimes) will themselves to be productive, and smile, and go to work, and even drudge through exercise. But willing happiness is not a possibility I am aware of.
It isn't my argument that we should "force" weight loss, only that we can. We should be as sciency as we can be in order to come up with more convenient and reasonable ways to help be lose weight. I gamified it. I used some LW-ish principles.
Questions:
I assume you do not consider depression a choice. That is, depressed people cannot chose to become undepressed. They may choose to engage in behaviors that alleviate depression, but certain people are so severely depressed that they cannot summon the will to even engage in the depression-alleviate behaviors. Is this an accurate summary?
If someone's caloric balance were 100% controlled so that they had a 300 kcal daily deficit, what would happen to that persons weight over the course of 30 days? 90 days? 1 year? What would happen to their appetite? Metabolism? BMI? Assume they are given a careful balance adequate nutrients. Assume they are given freedom to exercise and be active to their heart's content. An exact 300 kcal deficit is alwasy 100% enforced. What would result?
Comment author:Yvain
21 February 2014 02:43:06AM
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13 points
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I think you've rescued the rule that depressive people can't just decide to feel happy. But by your theory, they should still be able to go to work, maintain all their relationships, and otherwise behave exactly like a non-depressed person in every way. In practice this seems very hard for depressed people and a lot of the burden of depression is effects from not being able to do this. The metaphor that just as this is a hard problem and worthy of scientific attention, so weight loss can be a hard problem and worthy of scientific attention still holds.
But why stick with depression? I could just as easily move to obsessive-compulsive disorder. Can't they just "force" not washing their hands too often? Or social phobia - can't they just "force" themselves to go out and socialize when appropriate?
Probably the best example is substance abuse - can't people just "force" themselves not to drink alcohol? And yet not only do therapy-type interventions like Alcoholics Anonymous appear to work, but purely biological interventions like Vivitrol seem to work as well. I am pretty happy that these exist and the more of them people can think up for weight loss, the better.
It isn't my argument that we should "force" weight loss, only that we can.
I didn't interpret your original point that way. You said "There seemed to be all sorts of discussion about everything other than the simple math behind weight loss. Lots of super fascinating stuff—but much of it missing the point, I thought...they seem to spin their wheels so badly on a discussion about something as simple as weight loss" It sounded to me like you had negative opinions about the tendency to discuss non-forcing strategies for weight loss. Am I misinterpreting?
But my main objection here would be the word "can". This word is useful in everyday speech but horrible in subtle philosophical discussions about willpower because it imports a series of assumptions that are exactly what we should be trying to discuss.
It is written: "It's easy to run a marathon. All you have to do is start running, and not stop until you've gone 26.2 miles." As far as I know this could be correct - whenever I've stopped running before reaching a goal, it hasn't been because my body has literally collapsed, it's been because I felt really tired and uncomfortable and so decided to stop. I guess it's possible that if I could ignore that, my body would literally shut down before the 26.2 mark, but I've never been able to get that far and my bet is neither have you.
So is it true that I "can" run a marathon but I just don't "want to"? My guess is that a lot of how inability works is that when your body is getting upset about something, it makes doing that thing more and more unpleasant until doing it passes beyond anyone's conceivable pain/willpower threshold and that person stops. If that's true, then looking at things in terms of "could have kept running" is going to totally fail to capture what's going on.
This answers your first question.
The answer to your second question is that their body would become upset because it's not getting the calories it needs. It might respond by limiting physical activity, either by making the person involved so tired that they don't exercise as much as they used to, and thus cutting their caloric expenditure by 300. It might decrease invisible metabolic things to make up for some of the deficit, like making the person fidget less and decreasing body temperature. Between these two things it might be able to balance its caloric budget again.
If that didn't happen, in healthy people where everything is working properly it would start making adipose tissue release fat to make up the shortfall (I am going to assume these people's diets are perfectly balanced other than the caloric deficit). I have heard many smart people claim that in some people, this process is deranged, adipose tissue does not release fat effectively, and the body would be forced to go to its backup plan of cannibalizing muscle and vital organs, which over long periods is not compatible with life. I have not investigated this thoroughly enough to see if it is true. In either case they would lose weight.
So by the end of [time period], my current best understanding is that the subjects would either be the same weight, lower weight, or dead, depending on whose theories are correct, what diet they were put on, individual differences, and what the time period was. Sorry I can't be more specific.
Comment author:Brillyant
21 February 2014 03:23:36AM
3 points
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But by your theory, they should still be able to go to work, maintain all their relationships, and otherwise behave exactly like a non-depressed person in every way. In practice this seems very hard for depressed people and a lot of the burden of depression is effects from not being able to do this.
I think you missed my point, or I threw it by you poorly. I don't think they "should", I think they sometimes can. I sometimes can, and though I know from LW that not all minds are alike, it's safe to assume I'm also not wholly unique in my depression.
As you go on to point out, there is some baseline threshold for which people cannot will themselves out of depression or other psychological issues, just as there are weight loss diets and exercise programs they cannot succeed at.
To your analogy of the marathon: There is a right answer to whether you can run X miles in Y minutes and not physically injure yourself. I'd imagine the majority of people never come close to knowing that answer because they do not posses the ability to refrain from rationalizing themselves out of the optimal result as discomfort begins during their run. I'm aware that I'm personally really bad at this—my first .5 mile I'm telling myself I'm Usain Bolt; by mile 2 I'm coming up with manifold reasons to stop pushing. No doubt some are good and rational reasons, but others are bullshit that I need only train my mind to recognize as such in order to push through and be successful.
The answer to your second question is that their body would become upset because it's not getting the calories it needs...etc...
That's not really what I was asking. Maybe I asked poorly.
Can you instead imagine a scenario where a controlled calorie deficit was administered to a person where they received a balanced diet with all the nutrients they needed? 300 kcal was arbitrary. Pick any number. Isn't there some number that would be negligible in terms of the utility of its nutritional value and yet provide a calories deficient sufficient to lead to weight loss?
My point was that depression seems to have no such scenario. You cannot engineer a situation to "make" people be happy. Without excess food, or alcohol, you cannot get to obesity or alcohol addiction, right? Depression has no such outside variable.
Comment author:Yvain
21 February 2014 04:17:41AM
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8 points
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I think you missed my point, or I threw it by you poorly. I don't think they "should", I think they sometimes can. I sometimes can, and though I know from LW that not all minds are alike, it's safe to assume I'm also not wholly unique in my depression.
I agree that they sometimes can. I also agree people can sometimes lose weight. As far as I was concerned, our disagreement here (if one exists) isn't about whether it's possible in some cases.
Are you willing to agree to a statement like:
"Weight loss is possible in some cases, and in fact very easy in some cases. In other cases it is very hard, bordering in impossible given the marathon-analogy definition of impossible below. This can be negated by heroic measures like locking them in a room where excess food is unavailable and ignoring their appetite and distress, but in the real world you cannot do this. Because of these difficult cases, it is useful to explore the science behind weight loss and come up with more effective strategies.
If so, we agree, but then I'm confused why you were criticizing the Less Wrongers in your original statement. If you don't agree, please let me know which part we disagree about.
To your analogy of the marathon: There is a right answer to whether you can run X miles in Y minutes and not physically injure yourself. I'd imagine the majority of people never come close to knowing that answer because they do not posses the ability to refrain from rationalizing themselves out of the optimal result as discomfort begins during their run. I'm aware that I'm personally really bad at this—my first .5 mile I'm telling myself I'm Usain Bolt; by mile 2 I'm coming up with manifold reasons to stop pushing. No doubt some are good and rational reasons, but others are bullshit that I need only train my mind to recognize as such in order to push through and be successful.
If we are debating the extremely academic point of whether someone with your muscular structure can complete a marathon in X hours, okay. But suppose we find that of a thousand people who in theory are anatomically capable of completing the marathon, zero actually finish the marathon, due to discomfort. If our goal is to get them to successfully complete marathons, what percent of our resources do you think should be invested in proving they are physically capable of doing so right now and exhorting them to do this, versus coming up with things like training schedules and better diets and better shoes that will make it easier for them?
I felt like your original point was a complaint that we are trying the equivalent of coming up with training schedules rather than the equivalent of telling people they should be able to just keep going 26.2 miles unless their legs collapse, whereas I think this is probably a better strategy. Am I interpreting your complaint correctly, and do you disagree that the former strategy is better?
Can you instead imagine a scenario where a controlled calorie deficit was administered to a person where they received a balanced diet with all the nutrients they needed? 300 kcal was arbitrary. Pick any number. Isn't there some number that would be negligible in terms of the utility of its nutritional value and yet provide a calories deficient sufficient to lead to weight loss?
I think we're definitely misunderstanding each other somewhere. I think we may be working off some different assumptions about how the biology here works.
I weigh 185 pounds - plugging this into a metabolism calculator, my weight will stay stable at 2200 calories per day. Suppose I weighed 500 pounds. My weight would stay stable at about 4500 calories per day.
If the 500 pound guy got only 4200 calories per day, it doesn't matter how balanced the diet is or how many nutrients he has, his body has a caloric deficit and doesn't have enough energy to live. Hopefully it takes care of that by burning some of his stored fat. If it can't do that, he's going to be in big trouble.
I may be wrong about this, but I don't think the body can actually operate a a true caloric deficit. It WILL make up the deficit (or die, which also technically resolves the deficit). All it can do is do so in more or less problematic ways. The less problematic ways are things like burning fat. The more problematic ways are things like increasing appetite, decreasing exercise, and catabolizing organs.
I think your question corresponds to "But what if the body did just operate at a caloric deficit?", and I am really getting out of my knowledge comfort zone here but I don't think that's possible. Our analogy to economics here fails - we're not talking money where you can run a loss for a while and just have to worry about the bank coming after you, we're talking thermodynamics where it's physically impossible.
Weight loss is caused not by operating at a caloric deficit per se, but by the body avoiding caloric deficit by burning fat or other bodily tissues.
Comment author:shminux
19 February 2014 07:33:48PM
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18 points
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"How could I rationally believe LW knows what they are talking about in regard to the Singularity, UFAI, etc. if they seem to spin their wheels so badly on a discussion about something as simple as weight loss?"
Dieting is one of many topics discussed on this forum where the level of discourse is hardly above dilettante. Applied rationality and AGI friendliness research is done by several people full-time, which brings the discussion quality up in these areas, mostly. So it would not be fair to judge those by the averages. Everything else is probably subreddit-level, only more polite and on-topic.
Comment author:Brillyant
19 February 2014 07:52:05PM
0 points
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Sure. That makes really good sense.
But couldn't it also be said that dieting is pretty simple subject matter? (It also happens to be a pretty integral part of life—so it makes sense for people interested in "winning" and optimizing their rationality to have a solid understanding of how to maintain a top-flight diet.)
It's hard for me to grasp how people could be at "subreddit-level" understanding af something that is so simple while making such bold assertions about hyper-complex stuff in the cosmologically distant future.
With no disrespect, your reply reads to me a bit like this: "You can't expect a graduate-level philosophy professor to know how to long divide...it's not his area of expertise."
Comment author:shminux
19 February 2014 08:08:17PM
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13 points
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Dieting is anything but simple. It is still an open problem. Human body and mind is an extremely complicated system. What works for one person doesn't work for another. Eliezer put in some significant time into figuring out his weight issues, to no avail, and is apparently desperate enough to resort to some extreme measures, like consuming home-made gloop. Many people are lucky to be able to maintain a healthy weight with only a few simple tweaks, and you might be one of them. If you want a more fair comparison, "You can't expect a graduate-level philosophy professor to know how to design a multi-threaded operating system". No, that's not quite enough. "...how to solve an unsolved millennium problem" is closer.
Comment author:Brillyant
19 February 2014 09:08:15PM
0 points
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I think we have a misunderstanding in regard to the definiton of "simple". Likely my fault for adding this aside:
(It also happens to be a pretty integral part of life—so it makes sense for people interested in "winning" and optimizing their rationality to have a solid understanding of how to maintain a top-flight diet.)
I'm not saying actually executing a good diet is easy. I'm saying understanding what needs to be done to lose weight is simple.
Consuming fewer calories is very challenging—it can lead to fatigue, mood changes, etc., etc. Likewise, exercising consistently is easier said than done.
Add to that that some people have slow metabolisms, the fat-shaming that overweight people deal with in many cultures, the availabity of superstimulus foods everywhere. Maintain a healthy weight isn't easy.
But the fundamental causal mechanism at play is very simple.
Comment author:shminux
19 February 2014 09:47:15PM
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7 points
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But the fundamental causal mechanism at play is very simple.
Sure, calories in vs calories out... Except it is not helpful when you cannot effectively control one or both without reducing the real or perceived quality of life to the level where people refuse to exercise this control. This is where most diets eventually fail. And you seem to agree with that, while still maintaining that "understanding what needs to be done to lose weight is simple", where it is anything but, since it includes understanding of the actual doable actions one has to perform and still enjoy life. And this all-important understanding is sorely lacking in a general case.
Comment author:jsteinhardt
22 February 2014 09:41:58AM
5 points
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Have you ever lost confidence in LW after a similar experience? Maybe something where it seemed to you people were "talking a big game" but failing to apply any of that to actually win in real life?
As a stats / machine learning person, a lot of the "Bayesian statistics" talk around here is pretty cringe-inducing. My impresion is that physicists probably feel similarly about "many-worlds" discussions. I think LessWrong unfortunately causes people to believe that being a dilettante is enough to merit a confident opinion on a subject.
Comment author:drethelin
22 February 2014 04:52:36PM
1 point
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One of the most annoying things to me about Eliezer is how much is writing style is bombastic and hyperconfident and how it's encouraged here to talk like that despite the entire point of probabilistic reasoning being to NEVER be 100 percent certain of things.
Comment author:linkhyrule5
19 February 2014 05:10:17AM
7 points
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Mildly interesting challenge:
There is a new internet community game taking off called Twitch Plays Pokemon. The concept is simple: set up a server that takes the next properly formatted input ("up", "down", "a button") from a chat window, and apply it - in order, with no filtering - to a copy of Pokemon Red.
This is going about as well as can be expected, with 90,000 players, about a third of whom are actively attempting to impede progress.
So, a TDT style challenge: Beat the game in the shortest number of steps
If there are no trolls, but you cannot communicate with other players
If some percentage p of players are trolling and the timeless plan must be adjusted to be robust.
Comment author:palladias
19 February 2014 03:48:49PM
37 points
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A simple reframe that helped jumpstart my creativity:
My cookie dough froze in the fridge, so I couldn't pry it out of the bowl to carry with me to bake at a party. I tried to get it out, but didn't succeed, and had basically resigned myself to schlepping the bowl on the metro.
But then I paused and posed the question to myself: "If something important depended on me getting this dough out, what would I try?"
I immediately covered the top of the bowl, ran the base under lukewarm to warm water, popped it out, wrapped it up, and went on my way.
Comment author:Yvain
20 February 2014 08:15:30PM
*
26 points
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After reading the third paragraph, I had already decided to post the following similar story:
It snowed a few weeks ago and my car was stuck in the driveway. Parts of the wheels had gotten ice/snow kind of frozen/compacted around them. I was breaking up the ice with one of those things you use to break up ice, but a lot of it was too hard and a lot of it was underneath the car and I couldn't get to it. I was pretty close to being late to work. So I thought "I need to make some kind of desperate rationalist effort here, what would HPJEV do?". And I sat and thought about it for five minutes, and I got a big tub, filled it with hot water, and poured it around the wheels. This melted/softened enough of the compacted ice that I was able to break up the rest and make it to work on time.
Then I read your fourth paragraph and saw your story was also about hot water.
I don't know if there's some kind of moral to this episode, like that the most rational solution to a problem always involves hot water, but I guess I'll raise it a little higher on my list of things to think about in various situations.
120 gibberish papers were in journals for up to 5 years. They were found as a result of a test for one kind of gibberish.created by a program called SCIgen.
Comment author:eggman
24 February 2014 06:18:09AM
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18 points
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I just want to thank all of you, as both individuals, and as a community, for being a decent place for discourse. In the last few months, I've been actively engaging with Less Wrong more frequently. Prior to that, I mostly tried asking for opinions on an issue I wanted analyzed on my Facebook. On Facebook, there has been typically been one person writing something like 'ha, this is a strange question! [insert terrible joke'here]. Other than that, radio silence.
On Less Wrong, typical responses are people not thinking I'm weird because I want to analyze stuff outside of the classroom, or question things outside of a meeting dedicated to airing one's skepticism. On Less Wrong, typical responses to my queries are correcting me directly, without beating around the bush, or fearing of offending me. All of you ask me to clarify my thinking when it's confused. When you cannot provide an academic citation, you seem to try to extract what most relevant information you can from the anecdotes from your personal experiences. I find this greatly refreshing.
I created this open thread to ask a specific question, and then I asked some more. Even just from this open thread, the gratification I received from being taken seriously has made me eager to ask more questions, and read other threads in discussion. Reading responses to posters besides myself, and further responses to my comments, have made me feel the samey way. For all I know, there are big problems with Less Wrong to be fixed. However, I'm surprised I found somewhere this non-awful on the Internet at all. So, thanks.
Comment author:Qiaochu_Yuan
25 February 2014 09:32:28PM
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3 points
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Many people I know report having much lower-quality experiences on Facebook than mine. The algorithm for improving the quality of the Facebook experience is fairly straightforward: if someone posts content you don't want to see, hide them. If someone makes comments on your statuses you don't want, unfriend them. Repeat. At some point you may need to find new friends, or at least follows.
Comment author:Tedav
23 February 2014 08:36:36PM
2 points
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Is anyone else bothered by the word "opposite"?
It has many different usages, but there are two in particular that bother me:
"The opposite of hot is cold" "The opposite of red is green"
Opposite of A is [something that appears to be on the other side of a spectrum from A]
"The opposite of hot is not-hot" "The opposite of red is not-red"
Opposite of A is ~A
These two usages really ought not to be assigned to the same word. Does anyone know if there are simple ways to unambiguously use one meaning and not the other that already exist in English?
(Basically, are there two words/phrases foo and bar so that one could say
"The foo of hot is cold, but the bar of hot is not-hot")
Comment author:shminux
24 February 2014 08:18:15PM
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0 points
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Often when people want to emphasize that what they mean is not the complement of the referent, they say "diametrically opposed" or "direct opposite" or "antipode": "the complement of hot [in the set of all temperature perceptions] is not-hot, but the direct opposite of hot is cold".
Comment author:TheOtherDave
23 February 2014 09:14:12PM
2 points
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I sometimes use "negation of X" to refer to the logical operator NOT-X.
The other-side-of-a-continuum relationship I don't have a single word for. I might say that the "complement" of green is red, but that's specific to color. I often use "opposite" when I want a generic term here, with the understanding that I'm using it colloquially.
Comment author:Tedav
24 February 2014 02:48:02AM
1 point
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My sense of the word complement is that if two things are complements, they sum to 1, or some equivalent.
A is the complement of ~A because P(A or ~A) = 1
Red and green are considered to be complementary colors because together they contain all primary colors of pigments.
[although, that is based on the societal understanding that the primary colors are Red, Yellow and Blue. This is actually incorrect. For pigments, the primary colors are really Magenta, Yellow, and Cyan. For light, they are Red, Green, and Blue.]
Comments (454)
Anyone seen that 'her' film yet, the one with Joaquin Phoenix in the lead and directed by Spike Jonze? It's a film about a guy falling in love with an AI. Is it any good?
Edit: to summarize, Robin Hanson thinks it works very well as a Pixar-ish whimsical sentimental movie, but not as a realistic interpretation of how a world with that kind of AI would work, despite getting a couple of things right. Other posters, having seen other Spike Jonze projects, and knowing the lead actor's antecedents, suspect the film might be a bit of a prank.
I feel even more interested in watching it now.
Been discussed here several times. GIYF.
Well he's beng a rather aloof and unhelpful friend right now; I've done site searches for 'Joaquin Phoenix' and 'Spike Jonze' and neither turned up anything. If you know it has been discussed here several times, could you be so kind as to direct me to them? 'Samantha' is likewise useless, mostly because we have a user who has 'Samantha' for a handle, and because it's a rather generic name. As for 'her', I didn't even bother.
Well, yeah, it's not the easiest title to search for. And Google is not being helpful even with link: and site: keywords included.
Still, here is a couple:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/jlu/february_2014_media_thread/ahdf
http://lesswrong.com/lw/jij/open_thread_for_january_17_23_2014/ae5x
There were at least one or two more threads which I can't find after trying for 10 min or so.
Why is this OT in Main?
Dilbert, on cryonics.
PhD comics explains Higgs (and quantum physics in general).
Arthur Chu was discussed here previously for his success with Jeopardy using careful scholarship to develop strategies that he knew had worked in the past for other people.
In the comments section here he makes a much more extreme case against LessWrong's policy of not censoring ideas than Apophemi did a while back. Frankly he scares me*. But on a more concrete note, he makes a number of claims I find disturbing:
1) Certain ideas/world-views (he targets Reaction and scientific racism) are evil and therefore must be opposed at all costs even if it means using dishonest arguments to defeat them.
2) The forces that oppose social justice (capitalism, systematic oppression) don't play nice, so in order to overcome those forces it is necessary to get your hands dirty as well.
3) Sitting around considering arguments that are evil (he really hates scientific racism) legitimizes them giving them power.
4) Carefully considering arguments accomplishes nothing in contrast to what social justice movement is doing which at least is making progress. Hence considering arguments is contrary to the idea of rationality as winning. (This seems extreme, I hope I am misreading him)
5) Under consequentialism, if intellectual dishonesty and rhetoric (the dark arts) are capable of advancing the causes of people that are good and opposing the forces of evil, then intellectual dishonesty and rhetoric are good.
There is some redundancy there but whatever.
*I mean this literally, I am actually physically frightened.
Frankly, he has my sympathies, and I say this speaking as one who is now officially and technically a fucking scientific racist, and is hating every minute of it. The increase in knowledge doesn't even seem worth the sacrifice; we're talking about differences in average IQ between 95, 105, 110, 115. For one such as I, who's got an IQ of 168, this degree of difference seems unimpressive, and, frankly, worth ignoring/not worth knowing.
"You're telling me all these massive groups of people have these slight differences in average between them? About one standard deviation? Of what use could this information possibly be?" "Let's forbid entrance to my particular country to immigrants from the inferior races, namely, people of 'african' and 'hispanic' ancestry; it's cheaper than giving everyone an IQ test. Is this not a clever idea that advances my nation's interest and saves taxpayer money?"
And then I sigh at the stupidity of people with high IQ's, myself included.
Nevertheless, pianoforte, you're definitely overreacting. Do give your friend Arthur some references on Ethical Injunctions and remind him of our Litanies. Even if you did nothing, I do not expect Arthur, or any lesswronger for that matter, to present a level of threat worth having actual cold sweats over.
Here's another argument you can give him; social justice seeks to achieve just ends, and to do so requires just means, an image of justice as well as a just system. To seek social justice is to seek righteousness, and to seek to be right; it demands that you be scrupulously rational. Since You Provably Can't Trust Yourself, you should not, cannot allow yourself to employ the methods of evil, of which irrationality, stupidity and incoherence are the very essence. Throughout my life, I have been in contact with all kinds of people who invested huge amounts of effort in struggling for the betterment of mankind, and, whenever they started thinking in martial terms, of Us Versus Them (see Robbers-Cave experiment), of a struggle where one allows oneself all dirty tricks because so does "the other side", Arguments Are Soldiers, and they lose themselves and their ability to identify the truth when it doesn't fit their narrative. And that's a huge handicap.
Keeping a clear mind and remaining open to the truth, no matter how inconvenient, is, I think, the only way to live through one's life, and remain sane to the very end. Once you forfeit your sanity, no matter your successes, you have lost.
I don't actually know him (I didn't comment on that thread), and I'm not claiming my fear is rational. Yes, the result of blinding yourself is that you run the risk of making the world worse and hurting people in the process, including the people that were trying to help.
If you're unhappy with being a scientific racist (I hate that term - if it describes the way the world is then its just science) then maybe you should take a look at the other side of the debate. Then again, some people might accuse Kees Jan Kan of being racist for acknowledging the IQ differences, even if he argues against genetic causes.
The knowledge matters because people have been trying for decades to equalize outcomes for different groups - in terms of achievement and crime. If this is not possible, and there are casualties in the cross fire (say teachers getting fired for not getting minorities to perform at the same level) then we need to change our approach. If you could acknowledge that the causes of violent crime are biological in nature and then suggest biological interventions (someone on LessWrong recently suggested fish pill oils to correct for micronutrient deficiencies), how many lives would be saved? How many people would be spared a life of crime? If you could acknowledge that culture problems and social multipliers have huge effects on adult criminality and success, and make policy decisions based on that (although this problem is very difficult) how many more lives could be saved? If the political climate only allows you to say that different outcomes are the result of the discriminatory schooling system, those nasty racists and the prejudiced authorities - then your interventions aren't going to work and there will be needless casualties. The knowledge certainly does matter.
For a moment there, I feared you'd speak of genetics and eugenics, but then
if you mean something as prosai as dietetics, I can totally get behind that; I find it easy to believe that crappy food induces cranky mood (and that, in the US, crappy cheap food is remarkably deleterious).
Is this not acknowledged? Nay, is this not common knowledge?
Putting the full blame on them is as absurd as fully absolving them. What insane political climate do you live in, that you'd have to settle for either fallacy?
I remain unconvinced that this is exactly the case, and, even though I can accept its provisional validity, with many caveats and reservations, I'm pretty sure the actual reality is more interesting than "blacks and latinos are born dumber, White-Jews and White-Asian nerds are born smarter, and White-Christians are born a little bit smarter than average".
Assuming this particular piece of knowledge matters, what are we supposed to do about it? Be more forgiving of teachers' inability to enable black students to reach some average standard? Allocate Jewish and Asian kids less resources and demand that they meet higher standards? Should we treat kids differently, segregating them by race or by IQ? What practical use do we even have for scientific racism?
For someone who claims an IQ of 168 you asked, frankly speaking, a stupid question.
I never shied away from those; they tend to be useful.
Not this kind -- ones to which a variety of answers become apparent after spending a minute thinking about it...
The question he literally asked may well be stupid, but I think it's charitable to interpret it as asking what practical use we have for scientific racism that wouldn't violate some ethical injunctions. Likewise, if someone asked how to kill all the fleas on a cat I'd assume they mean that the cat must remain alive and in good health (example taken from here).
It would be a long stretch.
In any case, I would have normally let it slide if not for a particular sentence in a {grand}parent post...
By the way, do you have a rational argument for why we shouldn't speak of genetics and eugenics?
Generics are great. We need more of those. Patented drugs are way overpriced.
As for eugenics, depends on what we're talking about. Is it "eugenics" as in "let's genome-test embryos for horrible congenital diseases" or is it "eugenics" as in "let's castrate every physically and mentally handicapped person whose disease is inheritable"? When I said "I feared you'd speak of genetics and eugenics", I meant "I feared that you'd suggest the latter as policy".
Isn't the latter the "right thing to do" (tm) according to a utilitarian calculation? (Disclaimer, I am not a utilitarian.)
I wouldn't know; neither am I. I tend to find that utilitarian calculations are above my competence. As Dr. Manhattan said to Ozymandias, when he asked him if he did the right thing in the end; "Nothing ever ends."
For starters we can stop concluding that an outcome that correlates with race means that the process was racially biased. In particular, eliminate affirmative action and disparate impact.
What's desperate impact? And not all affirmative action is racial. The kind I'm familiar with consists basically of scholarships for smart kids from poor families to go to prestigious schools and reach their full potential, regardless of racial background. And women's parity quotas, which are a clumsy-as-heck-policy that annoys everyone, women included. What kind are you familiar with?
Sorry, typo. I meant disparate.
Good, I'm glad you see that this is a bad idea.
The kind where universities admit unqualified minority kids in order to have a "diverse student body".
Do they get qualified along the way, or do they actually prove themselves to be persistently and irredeemably incompetent?
They tend to wind up dropping out.
Regardless of why this is so, wouldn't this outcome make the policy ineffectual and not worth continuing?
Also why in the world did that comment get a down-vote? Is there someone here lurking, down-voting my posts on principle?
Doesn't that mean that the ones who don't drop out aren't that less ... than ... ?
In US political debates about affirmative action, the term usually is meant to imply an overt lower admissions or hiring standard for the group that the affirmative action is supposedly helping.
Scholarships for smart kids from poor families are uncontroversial, and therefore don't come up much in political discourse.
That's an interesting moniker.
So, you think that the humanity is divided into Whites and Blacks, it's just that there are White-Caucasians, White-Asians, etc...?
Hardly. I myself change colour all the time, depending on how much sun I get. But it would appear that the races "scientific racism" as I understand it classifies as smarter, are all of paler disposition overall; "whites" in the traditional sense, european jews, and east asians. Calling them all White-X is a way of drawing attention to this strange fact. Is there something about sunlight deprivation that sharpens the mind?
I'm not sure about that. I don't have statistics, anecdotally dark skinned Indians appear to be comparable to East Asians.
Indians have very varied skin tones, ranging from the very very dark all the way to the very very pale.
East Asians (and specifically Han Chinese) were never called White.
No, but I suspect that the necessity to survive the winter led to increased evolutionary pressures.
I would hardly consider places like the valley of the Congo or Australia or the Sahara to be evolutionarily soft.
Evolution can push development into different directions. Winters promote long-term thinking and planning. The Congo basin probably promotes resistance to parasites and infections....
Perhaps, on the other hand the places where civilizations first developed, i.e., Egypt, the Fertile Crescent, the Indus Valley, Central America, don't have harsh winters; I'm not sure about the Yellow River, but my brief Googling suggested their winters aren't that harsh either.
The best geography/climate to develop a civilization is not necessarily the best geography/climate to produce high intelligence. Early civilizations arose in places where agriculture was productive enough to generate significant surplus.
It's not even that we would need to use it, just that denying it would be harmful.
Without taking sides on the object-level debate of whether it's true or not, let me sketch out some ways that, if scientific racism were true, we would want to believe that it was true. In the spirit of not making this degenerate further, I'll ignore everything to do with eugenics, and with partisan issues like affirmative action.
(1) Racial differences tend to show up most starkly on IQ tests. This has led to the cultural trope that IQ is meaningless or biased or associated with racism. This has led to a culture in which it is unacceptable (borderline illegal depending on exactly how you do it) to use IQ tests in situations like employment interviews. But employers continue to want highly intelligent employees.
This encourages credentialism - the use of prestigious college degrees as a marker for intelligence. This means everyone needs to get a prestigious college degree. This means someone who wants to practice Law or Marketing needs to go $120,000 in debt and waste four years of their life getting a degree in Art History to present at their interview.
This decreases social mobility since poor people aren't going to be able to get into Harvard at the same rate as rich people.And it leaves everyone hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt, forcing them to optimize for high-paying jobs like finance rather than socially productive ones. And it sticks our economy precariously on top of an even bigger mountain of debt than before.
(2) If scientific racism is true but everyone insists violently that it is false, we can't explicitly describe this state of affairs: "Psssst, all that racist stuff we're attacking is actually true, but you're not supposed to talk about it. Pass it on."
But we would expect smart and intellectually honest people who study science and understand statistics to eventually figure out it is true. For whatever reason, smart and intellectually honest people seem unusually bad at picking up non-explicit social norms, so they're likely to respond with "HEY! GUYS! ALL THAT SCIENTIFIC RACISM WE'VE BEEN VIOLENTLY ATTACKING AS ACTUALLY TRUE! WEIRD, ISN'T IT?" Everyone will then violently attack them as racist and they will be traumatized.
The end result is that a lot of the smartest and most intellectually honest people hate the rest of society and are hated by them in turn. The dumber and less intellectually honest you are, the more likely you are to remain unostracized and end up being a "thought leader".
(3) If scientific racism were true, we would expect the fields of academic intelligence research and population genetics to know about it and generally believe it. We would then expect those fields to either be loathed and discredited by the general population for this reason, or else retreat to a hedgehogesque defensive posture, or else exist in a constant low-grade civil war.
All of these things seem to be true to a degree. Just to give one example, Arthur Jensen, whom everyone including his enemies agrees was smart and nice and intellectually honest, who helped pioneer the intelligence research field - got literally burned in effigy, had people threaten to kill his children, and eventually had to hire bodyguards just to go around campus. This seems like it might disincentivize people to study intelligence.
But I think intelligence research and associated areas are some of the most important fields that exist! These are the people who discovered we could increase IQ five to ten points by iodizing salt! These are the people who noticed that lead decreases IQ and very likely also executive function and so probably was responsible for like the entire giant crime wave of the latter half of this century which we successfully reversed by banning lead. These are people so awesome that I strongly suspect if we took a billion dollars away from the physicists and gave it to the intelligence researchers, then in thirty years we would have more intelligence research and probably also more physics.
And so we should be trying encourage them to continue doing good work, and one way we might do this is by not threatening to kill their children.
If scientific racism is true, then believing it is true will make us less likely to do things like threaten to kill the children of intelligence researchers because they are engaged in disproving it.
(You may say "But we could argue with them without using violence!" But how exactly do you think you are going to prevent a true thing from coming out, for all time, without using desperate measures?)
(4) Tiny advantages in mean or variance magnify with every standard deviation you go from the center of the bell curve. So if scientific racism were true, we would expect high-IQ communities to come from disproportionately high-IQ groups. The Southern Baptist Church would be laudably diverse, but the atheist community would be full of nerdy white/Asian/Jewish/Indian men, easily abbreviate to "nerdy white dudes".
If it is assumed that all differences in group membership are because groups are racist, exclusionary, or bullying, this means that all high-IQ groups will be accused of racism, exclusion, and bullying and be considered bad people. No doubt there will be some genuine incidents of such in these groups (as there are in all groups) and these will be seized upon as proof.
So high-IQ groups will once again end up either loathed by the general population, in defensive hedgehog postures, or in a state of low-grade civil war (cf: the modern atheist movement)
But presumably high-IQ groups are smart and have ideas worth listening to. When they get ignored and marginalized, that either gives comfort to false or harmful ideas like evangelical religion, or creates this really creepy situation where very powerful people who help shape the world are suspected by, and suspicious of, everyone else (like what seems to be developing with Silicon Valley tech culture).
(5) If scientific racism is true, then we need to use dark side epistemology to deny it.
For example, a lot of people's chosen strategy is to just deny that race exists or that genes can differ systematically across human populations. But the drug carbamazepine is a safe and effective anticonvulsant in white and black people, but has a significant risk of causing a fatal skin reaction in Asian people.
So we have to manage this complicated balancing act where we must get everybody to intone that Genes Cannot Differ Systematically Across Human Populations, except doctors, whom we tell For God's Sake Genotype All Your Asian Patients Before Giving Them Carbamazepine. One hopes this works.
Other people's chosen strategies to deny scientific racism are to make bringing up problems involving certain races taboo. For example, my experience (is it yours?) is that if someone talks about "inner city crime" or "urban decay", someone else will interject "You're just using 'inner city' and 'urban' as euphemisms for black people, you racist!"
But inner city crime and urban decay are real problems, and ones that disproportionately victimize poor people and minorities.
The most convincing explanation I have heard for these problems is that inner cities massively overconcentrate lead, which is neurotoxic and causes crime/impulsivity. This is a highly solvable problem. But solving it would require us to say things like "the population of inner cities is neurologically disturbed", which would require discussing the problem, which is something that we have to prevent people from doing in order to discourage scientific racism.
One final Dark Side strategy people use is to say "If we admitted scientific racism, we would have to commit genocide against these supposedly inferior populations, which we don't want to do."
Never mind that this wouldn't actually happen. Think about people with Down Syndrome.
Our culture's not perfect at tolerating them, but it's as good as it is at tolerating any other group, and this success didn't require claiming they had exactly equal IQ or were exactly equal along any other dimension except basic human dignity, which is not and shouldn't be a scientifically testable claim.
The truth is robust. Lies are flimsy. If we go with lies, we might accidentally back ourselves into a corner where our stated position commits us to thinking people with Down Syndrome are inferior human beings without any basic human rights.
If we honestly and openly declare we really think - "We can leave the field of small population differences to the scientists, but everyone deserves to be treated compassionately regardless of what they find" - then we are freed from the complicated task of keeping our lies straight, and we might find it has some knock-on benefits somewhere down the line.
That's one explanation, I'm curious why you find it the most convincing.
Edit: if it is just lead, how come the correlation between race and IQ seems to persist across countries?
Various explanations aren't necessarily mutually exclusive.
Your comment seems to make many good points. However, I identified a few evident falsehoods in areas I know something about, which leads me to suspect a similar laxity with the truth in areas I know less about.
For instance:
If you want to practice law, you're best served by studying lab sciences, math, or government in undergrad. (Those are the undergraduate majors with the highest admittance rate to law school.) Then you go to law school, which is where you incur the goatloads of debt.
The fact that you can't get admitted to the bar (in most of the U.S.) without going to law school is not a result of anyone's ideology about intelligence. This policy change was adopted explicitly by states in response to pressure by the American Bar Association beginning in the 1890s. IQ testing didn't even exist then. (And for what it's worth, scientific racism was at that time deemed progressive.)
The lead-crime link was brought to public attention by a prominent liberal journalist, writing in a prominent liberal/progressive magazine. As far as I'm aware, there was no huge outcry about this. In fact, the article was widely linked and praised in the liberal blogosphere. I am pretty sure that Drum and the editors at Mother Jones would denounce scientific racism quite vigorously if asked about it. So I think you are overestimating the "chilling effect" produced by a taboo against scientific racism.
"About 92% of pregnancies in the United Kingdom and Europe with a diagnosis of Down syndrome are terminated. In the United States termination rates are around 67%" Wikiepdia
So what would be the analogous behaviour w.r.t. races?
No analogy with respect to voluntary (via the mom) abortions, but one with many members of society being comfortable with significantly reducing the population size of the group.
Come now, you know how normal distributions work. Small differences in means cause over-representation at the extreme ends of the scale. From your IQ I can predict a ~30-40% chance of you being Ashkenazi, despite them being a global minority, just because of a "slightly" higher mean of 110. This is an important thing.
(EDIT: This calculation uses sd=15, which may or may not be a baseless assumption)
Plus, maybe there's a reverse-"Level above mine" effect going on here. The difference between someone at 90 and someone at 110 might not seem big to you, but it might just be your provincialism talking.
(Agreed about the immigration rationalization though)
Um, as far as immigration. You may have noticed that some countries are much nicer places to live then others, i.e., some have low crime and highly functioning economies and others are poor crime filled hell-holes. Why is that? Is it that something about being north of the Rio Grande magically makes people more productive and less prone to commit violent crimes? <\sarcasm>
The main reason is the people and culture of those countries. Thus if you import too many people from a different country, the pleasantness of the country to live will depend on the the nature of the new people. Notice that this argument assumes nothing about the role of nature versus nurture.
Both Koreas are ethnically and culturally the same. What makes one a SF near-utopia and the other a starving disgrace is the accident of having fallen within opposite spheres of influence during the Cold War and the subsequent development of radically different political systems. One could argue something similar happened with pre-unification Germany. I've read somewhere that the relative poverty in rural Southern Italy and wealth in industrial Northern Italy mirror the North-South dynamics of Reconstruction USA.
You seem to not know what culture means
In fairness to your criticism, I must say: That downvote did not come from me.
Well, if productivity and proneness to commit violent crimes depended only of nurture, the children of those people would resemble people from the country where they're growing up, rather than their parents, so the problem would only exist for first-generation immigrants.
Most people are raised largely by their parents, so the parents would have a large effect on how the children are nurtured.
I took “nurture” to refer to socialization, and it turns out that parents are much less important than same-age peers (e.g. people who grow up in a different place than their parents did end up with the accent of the former), but I had forgotten that of course literal nurture also matters.
This is only true if we enforce strict integration of immigrant families, but where there are large populations of immigrants they tend to form enclaves where their social circles consist of other immigrants. Hence little tokyo, chinatowns, and whatnot.
As it turns out, I'm a green-eyed, pale-skinned but tan-capable Arab from North Africa. I've got several uncles that look downright East Asian (round face, slanted eyes, pale-skinned), and another side of my family looks south-asian, and another looks downright black, and we have blue-eys blondes, an the traits skip generations and branches, and I find the whole notion of "race" to be laughably vague.
If, like in the US, you put a bunch of Scandinavians, Southwest Africans, and East Asians right next to each other, without miscegenation between their descendants, and with a very distinct social stratification between them, I can see how words like "Hispanic" might sound like they might be meaningful, but in lands like Brazil or Morocco where everyone got mixed with everyone and you got a kaleidoscope of phenotypes popping up in the most unexpected places, the "lines" start looking decidedly more blurry, and, in particular, no-one expects phenotype to be in any way correlated with personality traits, or intelligence, or competence.
And let us not get started on the whole notion of "Ashkenazi" from a genetic standpoint; in fact, the very result that they get the highest IQ results makes me place my bet on a nurture rather than nature cause for the discrepancy. I'm willing to bet actual money on this outcome.
Fair enough. I would still contest that the "nurture" component of these outcomes is smaller than is commonly suggested (Ashkenazim in particular) and that I too would bet money on it.
(Also I'm sorry if I came off as rude before)
You didn't, as far as I am concerned.
(How would we go about making such bets official?)
I don't know how exactly to translate two difference subjective probabilities to a bet structure, but before that we ought to agree on what exactly we're disagreeing over and what the correct answer would look like to determine who wins.
I think that this would necessarily have to be a long-term thing - maybe the scientific consensus X years from now?
One reason why small differences in average IQ might matter are social amplifier models. The discussion in this paper talks about it a bit.
I think we have to be careful with our mathematics here.
By definition IQ is distributed normally. But if we use this definition of IQ then we don't know how IQ is distributed within each population. In particular even if we assume each population is normal, we don't know they all have the same variance. So I think there's little we can say without looking at the data themselves (which I haven't done).
In this instance it might be better to try to measure intelligence on an absolute scale, and do your comparisons with that scale. I don't know how well that would go.
(I'm using the anonymous account (Username and password are "Username" and "password") since I just want to make a statistical point and not associate myself with scientific racism.)
Yeah that's the tricky part that I forgot to add, we don't know the variance. I used sd=15 but for all I know it could be smaller or larger. Edited to amend.
Oh. I always assumed that was a pseudonymous account of one specific individual.
About 75% of the posts on this account from the past year are from one user (me). I can't decide on a good moniker for a username so I've been putting off creating a main account.
But yes, feel free to use it as a throwaway.
One of the comments it made early on describes it as a "community throwaway account". Plus it has a super-stupid password.
Where did you get your IQ tested?
Unless you just stepped out of a time machine, I highly doubt that you are actually a scientific racist. You might be a race realist, but "scientific racism" specifically refers to the views one usually finds e.g. in 19th century and early 20th century sources, that were clearly plagued by massive ingroup/outgroup biases. Just because it had "scientific" in the name does not mean it was actually science-based in any real sense, any more than Karl Marx's socialism was.
So it's like rationalism in the Carthesian sense as opposed to the Yudkowskian? That's a relief. Now how do I stop people from confusing me with those balls back a measuring phrenologists?
"Race realism" is what proponents of the view call it. Opponents don't call it that, for obvious reasons. Many of them do actually refer to the view as "scientific racism".
If you could erase your knowledge of racial IQ differences would you? Assume you also erase the specific urge to rediscover it later.
Why? Besides enabling my enemies to call me a racist in much the same way a segregationist would call MLK a criminal, it leaves me right where I started. The initial emotional turmoil is offset by the anecdote utility: "Would you believe that I was once talked into becoming a freaking racist? Me?" This goes straight on my "hilarious misadventures" files, right next to "almost drowned in a lake"' "fell in love with a one-night-stand, suffered horribly, now we're BFF's"' and "that one time I was slipped ecstacy".
So you don't like having low status true beliefs?
Eugine, at the risk of stating the obvious, I don't like that being known to have those true beliefs lowers my status and gets in the way of me doing good. I think it's unfair, and I find it frustrating.
well except without the mental anguish you seemed to have about it.
Water under the bridge.
Am I getting downvotes for my ability to get over my anguish in accepting inconvenient truths? Cause I don't know how else to interpret this.
Your holding these beliefs is not entirely in the past, and it doesn't seem like there's any reason to think the consequences of holding these beliefs are entirely in the past, making it impossible for you to have gotten over them.
I've gotten over my emotional distress over acquiring them, and am now dealing with them and the consequences of holding them in a more practical manner. The anguish is gone, replaced with mild annoyance.
The clearest statement of Chu view (from the comment thread) seems to be: "As a very tentative general heuristic ... major ideologies that attempt to validate some form of the just-world fallacy should be terminated with extreme prejudice." He correctly names sexism ("Men have all the power because they're just better!") and racism ("Europeans have all the power because they're just better!") as examples.
But the obvious problem is, if you buy the neo-reactionary model of how "the Cathedral" works, then social-justice progressivism is a clear-cut example of a massive just-world-fallacy in action! What's more, I'd hardly expect Moldbug or other neo-reactionaries to take the view that "the world is inherently fair" seriously, even as hidden, low-level implication. And whether Moldbug's worldview is right about the Cathedral is an empirical question that would seem to require serious, rational investigation, not just faith-based political commitment.
This is not just world fallacy, in fact for specific values of "better" these are empirical statements. Or would he (and/or you) consider statements along the lines of "I defeated him in the fight because I was stronger" an example of "just world fallacy". What about "being rational helps me achieve my goals"?
No, the "just world fallacy" is a belief that the world always reaches morally "fair" outcomes. So "better" here has to mean that they deserve such outcomes in a moral sense. My guess is that many people here would reject these claims and find them quite objectionable, but it's hard to deny that some followers of the Dark Enlightenment (albeit perhaps a minority) seem to be motivated by them. The just world fallacy (in addition to other biases, such as ingroup tribalism) provides one plausible explanation of this.
Ok, so which moral theory are we using to make that determination?
Someone who behaves more rationally is more likely to achieve his goals. Do you consider this a "fair" or "unfair" outcome?
I suppose this does mean that no-one should believe any claims he makes before checking them first.
Why are you physically frightened of a random Internet blowhard?
Is there a quick way to quickly go to the last comment page of a user? (Myself in this case.)
The comments pages of a user have urls of the form
I'm not quite sure how they work, but the last 4 characters seem to give the index of the last comment on the page before (i.e. later than) the one it shows you (in base 36 or something), so you can try binary searching through these.
I think the link I gave is your earliest comments.
You could try simply loading all your comments: http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/lesswrong_user.php?u=falenas108
I need new T-shirts. I can never find ones I like, so I'm resorting to making my own slogan T-shirts on the usual design sites. So far I've ordered "NO POEMS FOR YOU, GNOMEKILLER!". What shall I get next?
Word of God: SMBC's Zach Weiner does indeed read Eliezer's work, if not this forum.
Does anyone have heuristics for when it's worthwhile to upvote, or downvote, a post? I've had an account on Less Wrong for a while now, but it's only recently that I've started using it on more than a weekly basis, so I suspect I'll be engaging with this online community more. So, I'm wondering what is the up-and-up on, i.e., courteous method of, upvoting/downvoting. I'm aware that this might be a controversial issue, so let's not use this thread for debates. I'm only looking for useful, or appropriate, heuristics for (understanding) voting I might have missed. For the record, as of this comment, I've never downvoted anyone.
This is what I've surmised so far:
Users downvote posts or comments which are about signaling value of their particular monkey tribe. This often seems to be newcomers, or people who don't interact with the Less Wrong community very communally, bragging about who they identify their in-group as. They state things like "I've finally found a community committed to reason. Incidentally, this ideology is totally reasonable, so you should get on board with it. Trust me, I've read lots of stuff about it, so it checks out. It is not unlike [my ideological opponents], who are unreasonable/stupid/crazy/whatever. I hope you guys aren't like [my ideological opponents], because then you're unreasonable, too".
Users who, in one way or another, are ignorant of topics the Less Wrong community believes they've already reached a consensus conclusion on in a straightforward, slam-dunk manner, receive downvotes. These types of posts which seem to have an agenda which the Less Wrong community would also find disagreeable seem to be less well-received. Ignorant posts where the submitter seems to be genuinely trying to start, or add to, a conversation in good spirit still get downvoted, but also tend to have comment which attempt to helpfully correct the submitter.
Posts, or comments, which are seen as trolling are downvoted. Posts, or comments, which take a meta-contrarian/intellectual-hipster stance, or go against the grain of the majority/plurality opinion(s) on Less Wrong will be volatile, but tend to get more downvotes. A recent post on life-extension and death is an example. An exception to this tendency is if the post, or comment, in question is executed very well.
How Less Wrong as a community which polices itself by dishing out downvotes, it works efficiently a majority of the time. By the time I get to wreckage of a flame war to catch the juicy details, there isn't much point to myself as an individual actor dishing out further downvotes.
I upvote a comment on at least one of two bases. The first basis is if I believe the comment provides information which answers a question, or clarifies a problem I have. Partial answers and solutions also work as well. This is a proxy for my interlocutor increasing the epistemic quality of the conversation. The second basis is if I believe the comment of my interlocutor provides information which is instrumentally valuable. This is a proxy for instrumental rationality. I also do this for comments in conversations I'm not a part of. If I perceived an inverse of either of the two cases I've presented occurring, I would consider that grounds for downvoting the comment in question.
I'm not confident with how to proceed in upvoting posts that already have lots of karma. By the time a post of decent quality already has several upvotes by the time I read it, I tend not to upvote it, so as not to give it undue importance. If I believe a post, or comment, is exceptionally well-written, or -executed, I might upvote it regardless of however many votes it has now to increase its visibility.
I'm sometimes worried about my votes being biased in the sense that they go to posts, or comments, which increase the visibility of things I only value personally, rather than being reflective of how much a given post, or comment, increases, or decreases, the quality of the discourse on Less Wrong. I'm especially worried these biases in my voting patterns might be, or could become, unconscious.
So, have I missed anything? Additionally, what are the reasons for, or against, keeping my own record of liked/upvoted, and disliked/downvoted, posts, and comments, hidden?
I can never predict how my comments would be rated, so I gave up on looking for voting criteria and do what feels right at the moment.
This app has been demonstrated to successfully improve visual acuity in baseball players and performance in game. (Works on the brain, not the eyes.)
Popular press
Purchasable:
Original paper:
^ Link formatting is weird, so just copy-paste (Edit: fixed thanks to PECOS-9)
I don't think I understand what distinction you're making here.
Gurkenglas & ShardPhoenix are correct, and the reason the distinction is practically important is because it will not alter your eye-glass prescription or function as a replacement for glasses.
The Doctrine of Academic Freedom, Let’s give up on academic freedom in favor of justice from the Harvard Crimson
This already describes the reality on the ground, though to see it announced explicitly as a good and noble goal, by the upcoming generation, is disturbing. And people like Steven Pinker let are getting old. I'm now updating my trust for the conclusions of academic institutions and culture when they happen to coincide with their political biases downward further.
Ironically enough, it's somewhat surprising that The Crimson didn't censor this article, as it was bound to attract negative press.
I'm hoping the fact that this is just an opinion piece, and that the article is currently in circulation on the internet as an example of what's wrong with academia, and that all the comments are opposed to it, is a sign that this is just the internet bringing the worst things to my attention, and that such thinking will never actually be reflected in any formal policy...if not, I've got some updating to do.
Well, in many ways what this article describes is already the informal policy in many places.
Also, a lot of the bad ideas currently implemented in universities started out as widely mocked editorials and proposals, for example, the currant moral panic about rapists with its ever widening definition of "rape" and "sexual harassment" and its ever shrinking protections for the accused started out as widely mocked proposals.
On the other hand, the most-upvoted comments on the article are encouraging. :)
I think "from the Harvard Crimson" is a misleading description.
One of their undergraduate columnists had a very silly column. Undergraduates do that sometimes. Speaking as a former student newspaper columnist, often these columns are a low priority for the authors, and they're thrown together in a hurry the night before they're due. The column might not even represent what the author would think upon reflection, let alone what the editorial board of the Crimson as a whole believes. So I wouldn't read too much into this.
(For non-US readers: The Harvard Crimson is the student-produced newspaper of Harvard University. The editors and writers are generally undergraduates and they don't reflect any sort of institutional viewpoint.)
Well, the observation is that the Crimson is willing to print crazy left-leaning articles. They are certainly not willing to print crazy right-leaning articles. Or even non-crazy right-leaning articles. That tells you something about the overall sociopolitical climate at the university.
Are you sure they don't? I can tell you from personal experience that their peer papers, the Cornell Sun and the Daily Princetonian definitely have some right wing cranks to offset the left-wing ones. For the Sun in particular, I think the political spectrum of opinion columnists was a pretty fair proxy for the campus as a whole. And every so often there's a barnburner of an opinion piece in the Prince about how premarital sex is the devil's work.
That's not really true. Several of their contributors lean right. A few of one of these contributors' articles:
Affirmative Dissatisfaction: Affirmative action does more harm than good
Lessons from the Iron Lady: A tribute to the most polemic figure of post-war Britain
General Petraeus Should Not Have Resigned: What if all cheating men quit their day jobs?
Now it is certainly true that conservative writers are the minority, just as conservatives are a minority in the college as a whole. But the Crimson doesn't discriminate on the basis of political orientation when approving writers.
I feel like those articles are very weak counterevidence to my argument. They're more like token, limp-wristed right-leaning contributions that the Crimson has to trot out every now and then to give the impression that they're impartial.
By the way, this is stupid even from the "we only care about the 'good' people (women, black, trans, etc.)" viewpoint, because the consequences sometimes look like this:
1) Someone suggests there could be biological differences between men and women. Angry screams, research abandoned.
2) Medical research done on volunteers (the expendable males) finds a new cure.
3) It appears that the cure works better for men, and may be even harmful for women (because it was never tested on women separately, and no one even dared to suggest it should be). Angry screams again -- unfortunately no reflection of what actually happened; instead the usual scapegoat blamed again.
More meta lessons for the LW audience: The world is entangled, you can't conveniently split it into separate magisteria. If you decide to remove a part of reality from your model, you don't know how much it will cost you: because to properly estimate the cost of X you need to have X in your model.
A side note to your otherwise excellent comment:
As someone from the other side of the fence, I should warn you that your model of how liberals think about social justice seems to be subtly but significantly flawed. My experience is that virtually no liberals talk or (as far as I can tell) think in terms of "good" vs. "bad" people, or more generally in terms of people's intrinsic moral worth. A more accurate model would probably be something like "we should only be helping the standard 'oppressed' people (women, black, trans, etc.)". The main difference being that real liberals are far more likely to think in terms of combating social forces than in terms of rewarding people based on their merit.
I don't think he's surprised to hear that claim. How would you distinguish the hypotheses? Perhaps you should hold the question in mind for a week as you think as a liberal and listen to liberals.
My model is that it's: "we want to help everyone who is suffering" but also: "the only real suffering is the suffering according to our definitions".
Or more precisely: "the suffering according to our definitions influences millions of people, and anything you said (assuming you are not lying, which is kinda dubious, considering you are not one of us) is merely one specific weird exception, which might be an interesting footnote in an academic debate, but... sorry, limited resources".
I understand that with given model of reality, this is the right thing to do. But unfortunately, the model seems to suffer horribly from double-counting the evidence for it and treating everything else (including the whole science, if necessary) as an enemy soldier. A galaxy-sized affective death spiral. -- On the other hand, this is my impression mostly from the internet debates, and the internet debates usually show the darker side of humanity, in any direction, because the evaporative cooling is so much easier there.
(Off-topic: Heh, I feel I'm linking Sequences better than a Jehovah's Witness could quote the Bible. If anyone gets a cultish vibe from this, let me note that I am translating the whole thing these days, and I have just finished the "Politics is the Mindkiller" part, so it's all fresh in my memory.)
Okay, your model is better than I thought. Sorry for nitpicking your hyperbole :-)
It's good to sometimes say the obvious things explicitly. (Also, some other person could have said the same thing non-hyperbolically.)
My model of how liberals think, based on teaching at a left wing college, is that liberals find "politically incorrect" views disgusting.
Since "politically incorrect" in this context basically means "most views that liberals disagree with", it's hardly surprising that they're repulsed by views in that category.
That still doesn't explain why they can't disagree with a view in a civil manner.
Most people, independent of political faction, can't have civil political disagreements. This effect tends to be exacerbated when they are surrounded by like-minded people and mitigated when they are surrounded by political opponents. Conservatives in elite academic environments are usually in the latter category, so I do think they will tend to be more civil in political disagreements than their liberal counterparts. However, I suspect that this situation would be reversed in, say, a military environment, although I have no experience with the military.
You could look at Fox News, where conservative contributors are generally far more bombastic and partisan than their liberal counterparts. Many liberals allege that Fox News deliberately hires milquetoast liberals in order to make liberalism look bad, but I don't think we need to posit a top-down agenda to explain the "Fox News liberal" phenomenon. It's simply the case that people are much less comfortable expressing their political views vigorously when they see themselves as being in enemy territory, especially if they need to make a home in that territory, rather than just briefly visiting it.
There's a difference between being bombastic and declaring that you're opponents shouldn't have the right to express their opinion.
Are you claiming that there is a significant proportion of liberals who declare that their opponents have no right to express their opinion? I'm pretty sure that's false.
Maybe not a significant portion, but it happens more often than you might think. On the other hand, I highly doubt that this kind of disruptive rhetorical behavior is more common on one side of the left-right spectrum than on the other.
I thought the research was that liberals didn't have purity axis of morality (Haidt, is it?).
Yes, but I don't believe it. As a test, imagine someone offers to give $1 billion to a city if it makes one public water fountain white's only. I bet most liberals would be horrified at the idea of the city accepting the offer.
I imagine that most people in the US would find such a transaction rather unnerving, regardless of political leanings, so this is not a good test of liberal views. Do you have a better example of a correlation between valuing political correctness and liberal views?
Hate speech. The liberal response to what Larry Summers said about women and math seems motivated by disgust.
I don't think it matters of it's racial. The general principle of having someone try to buy out a government's espoused moral principles sounds Very Bad. The reasoning is that if the government can be bought once, it can be bought twice, and thus it can be bought in general and is in the control of moneyed donors rather than the voting populace, proof by induction on the naturals -- so to speak.
Lobbyists and their money already have massive influence over governments. Plus, whether it's a good or bad idea, my claim is that most liberals would find the idea disgusting.
Economics being what it is, this is evidence that your hypothetical segregationist throwback is expecting to get more than a billion dollars of value out of the deal. That doesn't quite establish that someone's trying to screw the city, but it does gesture pretty emphatically in that direction; actual political sentiments hardly enter into it, except insofar as they provide exploitable tensions.
(If I were the mayor, I'd take the money and then build the fountain as part of a practical exhibit in a civil rights museum.)
Haidt acknowledges that liberals feel disgust at racism and that this falls under purity/sacredness (explicitly listing it in a somewhat older article on Table 1, pg 59). His claim is that liberals rely on the purity/sacredness scale relatively more often, not that they never engage it. Still, in your example, I'd expect the typical reaction to be anger at a fairness violation rather than disgust.
But since the harm is trivial, no one is being treated unfairly absent disgust considerations.
You're familiar with the idea of anthropomorphization, right? Well, by analogy to that, I would call what you did here "rationalistomorphization," a word I wish was added to LessWrong jargon.
This reaction needs only scope insensitivity to explain, you don't need to invoke purity. Though I actually agree with you that liberals have a disgust moral center.
How so?
Haidt's claim is that liberals rely on purity/sacredness relatively less often, but it's still there. Some of the earlier work on the purity axis put heavy emphasis on sex or sin. Since then, Haidt has acknowledged that the difference between liberals and conservatives might even out if you add food or environmental concerns to purity.
Maybe it's about rationalization. The same feeling could be expressed by one person as: "this is a heresy" (because "heresy" is their party's official boo light) and by another person as: "this could harm people" (because "harming people" is their party's official boo light). But in fact both people just feel the idea is repulsive to them, but can't quickly explain why.
I think this could be generalized into a model with predictions: If we suppose that it's easier to get people to nominally than actually abandon one of Haidt's moral axes (from Wikipedia, to save people some lookups: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Liberty/oppression, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation), we should expect that people who disclaim one of the axes will find ways to relabel violations of that axis to make it sound like it's violating a professed axis.
To be specific, if you have a group that officially disclaims the fairness/cheating axis, I expect they'll be quick to explain how cheating is a form of harm. Or drop the care/harm axis, and we'll probably hear about how harm is a form of oppression. And so forth.
Related: Fake Morality
Yeah, environmentalist attitudes towards e.g. GMOs and nuclear power look awfully purity-minded to me. I'm not sure whether I want to count environmentalism/Green thought as part of the mainline Left, though; it's certainly not central to it, and seems to be its own thing in a lot of ways.
(Cladistically speaking it's definitely not. But cladistics can get you in trouble when you're looking at political movements.)
I would guess this approach is much more female than male.
I do teach at a women's college.
By the way, here is a recent example of just such a bad consequence for women. Basic summery:
1) Latest extreme sport added to olympics.
2) The playing field and obstacles will be the same for men and women; otherwise, it would be sexist and besides its cheaper to only build one arena. (We will of avoid thinking about why we have separate women's and men's competitions.)
3) Women wind up playing on the area designed for men and frequently get seriously injured at much higher rates.
Thoughts about having leagues/categories based on measured potential rather than male/female?
1) How do you reliably measure potential? You could have leagues based on ability (similar to the way major/minor league baseball works today). But notice that no one cares about the minors.
2) You do realize the practical effect of this in most sports would be that all the levels above amateur would be massively male dominated?
3) In more violent sports you'd have to deal with the cultural taboo against male on female violence. (You could eliminate that taboo, but somehow I'd don't think the feminists would be happy with that outcome.)
4) The feminists are likely to cry bloody sexism over (2) and (3) above.
You can't reliably measure potential, though there's been some work on genes and sports.
Weight (and possibly height) classes would be a start. Not the gender issue, but I think there should be an anti-dehydration standard for sports with weight classes.
I'm not even sure if the article is serious or just a linkbait.
Going more meta: I think the students should have the right to fire professors whose political opinions they dislike. The customer is always right.
The problem is separating the "customer" aspects of the situation from the "non-customer" aspects, so the customer does not exercise more rights than they should have as a customer. For example in teaching, the student is a customer; in research they are not. Therefore students should have a right to prevent professors from teaching; not necessary university-wide, because other students may have different preferences; they should just have a right to avoid their lessons. But students shouldn't have a right to prevent professors from doing research. As a logical consequence, teaching and research should be separated. Because it seems that having the same person doing both research and teaching is a good idea for various reasons, I would just make both parts optional (and if the professor does less of one part, they have to do more of the other part).
The idea is: students saying "I don't want to hear this" shouldn't affect research. Although the students should have a right not to hear what they don't want to hear. And the university should have a right to choose how much of this "not hearing" is acceptable with getting a diploma there; again, each university should be freee to chose differently.
Well, googling the author suggests she is serious.
Harvard isn't primarily funded by tuition. The large majority of students receive some aid, and most receive a lot of aid. The real customers are the alumni who build up the endowment. And those people are quite effectively represented in institutional governance, via the board of trustees ("the Harvard Corporation").
I'm also not sure quite how you would envision changing things. The students are perfectly free to take whatever courses and attend whatever lectures they want. However, if they want a Harvard degree, they need to meet the requirements of the College and of their department, and that might mean passing a required course with a professor the student dislikes.
I can't quite picture a "customer is always right" university. I could imagine a system in which a university has no degree requirements that a student would find objectionable, but I don't think the students would want or benefit from such a thing. Part of the signaling value of a degree is that subject experts are attesting that the student has acquired a breadth and depth of knowledge.
Faint memory-- weren't medieval French universities run by students? I think they hired the professors.
I believe you're thinking of medieval Italian universities.
That's pretty easy -- imagine a fourth-rate university the only interest of which is extracting as much money from students (and the federal government) as they can.
Yes, fair enough. I was being hyperbolic about "can't imagine" -- I should have said, "a university run purely for the preferences of the students would be very far from modern American universities, which are accountable to accreditors and donors, and which have a long tradition of faculty governance.."
I would put it much more simply: students have a right to refuse to attend lecture, and professors have a right to give students a failing grade for doing so. And employers and grad-schools have a right to filter for students who actually learned something at school.
Thus, everything adds up to normality.
Undergrad publications print the craziest shit imaginable and sometimes even mean it. I wouldn't expect them to "think" the same way a few years after graduation, though.
Depends on what they do after graduation. If they go out into the real world, they will generally get over it. On the other hand, if they stay in academy, they're likely to become even crazier. (Unfortunately, it is the latter who will set future university policy.)
Can one detect intelligence in retrospect?
Let me explain. Let's take the definition of an intelligent agent as an optimizer over possible futures, steering the world toward the preferred one. Now, suppose we look at the world after the optimizer is done. Only one of the many possible worlds, the one steered by the optimizer, is accessible to retrospection. Let's further assume that we have no access to the internals of the optimizer, only to the recorded history. In particular, we cannot rely on it having human-like goals and use pattern-matching to whatever a human would do.
Is there still enough data left to tell with high probability that an intelligent optimizer is at work, and not just a random process? If so, how would one determine that? If not, what hope do we have of detecting an alien intelligence?
This is isomorphic to the problem (edit: not impossibility) of coming up with a fully mind-neutral definition of information entropy, is it not?
I found a watch upon the heath.
Anyway, I think there are enough instrumental goals that even without human-like goals we should be able to recognize crafted tools like watches, hammers, and whatnot.
That's pattern-matching to humanity, something I explicitly asked not to rely upon. Unless you can show that instrumental goal convergence is inevitable and independent from terminal goal or value convergence. Can you?
How do you know the hammer is crafted while the hammer fish isn't?
I've lost 30 pounds since September 17th, 2013*. Interestingly, I've noticed doing so caused me to lose a lot of faith in LW.
In the midst of my diet, discussion in the comments on this series of posts confounded me. I'm no expert on nutrition or dieting(I do know perhaps more than the average person), but my sense is that I encountered a higher noise-to-signal ratio on the subject here at LW than anywhere else I've looked. There seemed to be all sorts of discussion about everything other than the simple math behind weight loss. Lots of super fascinating stuff—but much of it missing the point, I thought.
I learned a few interesting things during the discussion—which I always seem to do here. But in terms of providing a boost to my instrumental rationality, it didn't help at all. In fact, it's possible LW had a negative impact on my ability to win at dieting and weight management.
I notice this got me wondering about LW's views and discussions about many other things that I know very little about. I feel myself asking "How could I rationally believe LW knows what they are talking about in regard to the Singularity, UFAI, etc. if they seem to spin their wheels so badly on a discussion about something as simple as weight loss?"
I'm interested to hear others' thoughts on this.
Have you ever lost confidence in LW after a similar experience? Maybe something where it seemed to you people were "talking a big game" but failing to apply any of that to actually win in real life?
(*Note: To be clear, I've lost 30 pounds since Sept 17th, but only ~15-18 lbs since my "diet" began on Jan 1, 2014. I'm not really bragging about losing weight—I wish it weren't the case. I injured my neck and could no longer use my primary method of exercise (weightlifting) to stay in shape. After eating poorly and lying around for a couple months, I started—on Jan 1—to do consistent, light treadmill work & light core work, as well as cutting my calorie consumption pretty dramatically.)
I lost around 40 pounds using low carb methods. Should this make me less confident in anything you say when you promote other ways to lose weight?
Low carb method = less calories.
That was the point that strangely failed to prevail in the discussion of the post series I linked.
Avoid fatty foods diet, avoid carbs diet, don't snack diet, etc. all = less calories "method".
That explains why when I tried cutting calories I had headaches and tiredness constantly and no weight loss but somehow magically was able to cut calories once I decided to cut carbs
OH WAIT NO IT DOESN'T. Even if you're correct that the way the diet works is by functionally cutting calories, SOMETHING is needed to explain why it works better for people than trying to cut calories. don't pretend it's the same thing.
Weight loss isn't as simple as you think.
Sure it's all about burning more than you eat, but for a lot of people "just eat less and exercise more!" isn't advice they can follow. You seem to have "lucked out" on that front.
The far more interesting and useful question is "what factors determine how easy it is to eat less and exercise more?". This is where it gets nontrivial. You can't even narrow it down to one field of study. I've known people to have success from just changing their diet (not all in the same way) as well as others who have had success from psychological shifts - and one from surgery.
I don't consider LW to be the experts on how to lose weight either, but that doesn't signal incompetence to me. Finding the flaws in the current set of visible "solutions" is much easier than finding your own better solution or even grasping the underlying mechanisms that explain the value and limitations of different approaches. So if you have a group of people who are good at spotting sloppy thinking who spend a few minutes of their day analyzing things for fun, of course you're going to see a very critical literature review rather than a unanimously supported "winner". Even if there were such a thing in the territory waiting to be found (I suspect there isn't), then you wouldn't expect anyone on LW to find it unless they were motivated to really study it.
Yes, and no.
There are significant differences between some individuals' BMR. And some people are just better at managing will power. And some likely people experience much greater physiological responses to food than others.
In those ways, you're exactly right. I'm apparently wired to be able to white knuckle my way to a successful ~6 week diet where some others cannot.
But that wasn't really the thrust of the argument in the discussion I linked. Rather, it was all sorts of back and forth about the viability of popular dieting methods.
I agree dieting isn't easy to do for all sorts of reasons. But it is simple. And that seemed to be completely lost on a group of people that are way smarter than me.
It made me think twice about LW's views on all sorts of things that aren't easy or simple.
-- Eliezer Yudkowsky
So yes, dieting is simple!
Consider the following story:
I would have at least three qualms with such an attitude:
First, there are different kinds of low mood. Some differences are obvious; some people are less depressed than others, or depressed for much shorter time periods. But it could also be that there are no visible differences between two people, but that for hidden reasons one person's depression will respond to some quick exercise and social activity, and another person's won't.
Second, even interventions that are known to always work can be hard to task-ify. Exercise is indeed often a very effective treatment for depression, but when you tell a depressed person "just go and exercise", they usually won't do that because they're too depressed. Having a good social support network can be helpful in depression, but depressed people can be unable to make friends because deep down they assume everyone hates them. Part of treating depression is bringing people to the point where they're able to do the simple interventions. If you get a depressed person who does have the motivation to exercise and make friends, great, but it's not a point against psychiatry that they sometimes discuss how to help people who don't.
A third problem is general anti-scientificness. Yeah, sure, you don't need to understand exactly how neurogenesis occurs in order to treat depression. But it's neat to know. And in fact exercise may treat depression by increasing neurotrophic factors, so you're not disagreeing with the scientists, just looking at it from a different angle. And for certain people it might be, in a weird way, sort of inspirational to know the science and help them figure out why they're doing what they're doing. If they want to study it, why complain?
I think most of the same issues generalize to your comment.
I would also add one more, which is that it is generally much easier to lose weight on a diet than to keep the weight off for more than a year or two. For example, of people who lost (hey, look at that!) thirty pounds on a diet, one year later they had on average gained back fifteen of them. Longer followups usually find even more of the weight regained; see for example Mann 2007. So you're declaring something simple before you've even started the hard part.
I like the analogy, because I can personally relate to depression. I don't know that it is a great one, though.
We know very well how to cause weight loss. It's a calorie deficit issue, and we could force it to occur. That is, we can will weight loss.
It has not been my experience that people can will happiness—not even for a short time. They can (sometimes) will themselves to be productive, and smile, and go to work, and even drudge through exercise. But willing happiness is not a possibility I am aware of.
It isn't my argument that we should "force" weight loss, only that we can. We should be as sciency as we can be in order to come up with more convenient and reasonable ways to help be lose weight. I gamified it. I used some LW-ish principles.
Questions:
I assume you do not consider depression a choice. That is, depressed people cannot chose to become undepressed. They may choose to engage in behaviors that alleviate depression, but certain people are so severely depressed that they cannot summon the will to even engage in the depression-alleviate behaviors. Is this an accurate summary?
If someone's caloric balance were 100% controlled so that they had a 300 kcal daily deficit, what would happen to that persons weight over the course of 30 days? 90 days? 1 year? What would happen to their appetite? Metabolism? BMI? Assume they are given a careful balance adequate nutrients. Assume they are given freedom to exercise and be active to their heart's content. An exact 300 kcal deficit is alwasy 100% enforced. What would result?
I think you've rescued the rule that depressive people can't just decide to feel happy. But by your theory, they should still be able to go to work, maintain all their relationships, and otherwise behave exactly like a non-depressed person in every way. In practice this seems very hard for depressed people and a lot of the burden of depression is effects from not being able to do this. The metaphor that just as this is a hard problem and worthy of scientific attention, so weight loss can be a hard problem and worthy of scientific attention still holds.
But why stick with depression? I could just as easily move to obsessive-compulsive disorder. Can't they just "force" not washing their hands too often? Or social phobia - can't they just "force" themselves to go out and socialize when appropriate?
Probably the best example is substance abuse - can't people just "force" themselves not to drink alcohol? And yet not only do therapy-type interventions like Alcoholics Anonymous appear to work, but purely biological interventions like Vivitrol seem to work as well. I am pretty happy that these exist and the more of them people can think up for weight loss, the better.
I didn't interpret your original point that way. You said "There seemed to be all sorts of discussion about everything other than the simple math behind weight loss. Lots of super fascinating stuff—but much of it missing the point, I thought...they seem to spin their wheels so badly on a discussion about something as simple as weight loss" It sounded to me like you had negative opinions about the tendency to discuss non-forcing strategies for weight loss. Am I misinterpreting?
But my main objection here would be the word "can". This word is useful in everyday speech but horrible in subtle philosophical discussions about willpower because it imports a series of assumptions that are exactly what we should be trying to discuss.
It is written: "It's easy to run a marathon. All you have to do is start running, and not stop until you've gone 26.2 miles." As far as I know this could be correct - whenever I've stopped running before reaching a goal, it hasn't been because my body has literally collapsed, it's been because I felt really tired and uncomfortable and so decided to stop. I guess it's possible that if I could ignore that, my body would literally shut down before the 26.2 mark, but I've never been able to get that far and my bet is neither have you.
So is it true that I "can" run a marathon but I just don't "want to"? My guess is that a lot of how inability works is that when your body is getting upset about something, it makes doing that thing more and more unpleasant until doing it passes beyond anyone's conceivable pain/willpower threshold and that person stops. If that's true, then looking at things in terms of "could have kept running" is going to totally fail to capture what's going on.
This answers your first question.
The answer to your second question is that their body would become upset because it's not getting the calories it needs. It might respond by limiting physical activity, either by making the person involved so tired that they don't exercise as much as they used to, and thus cutting their caloric expenditure by 300. It might decrease invisible metabolic things to make up for some of the deficit, like making the person fidget less and decreasing body temperature. Between these two things it might be able to balance its caloric budget again.
If that didn't happen, in healthy people where everything is working properly it would start making adipose tissue release fat to make up the shortfall (I am going to assume these people's diets are perfectly balanced other than the caloric deficit). I have heard many smart people claim that in some people, this process is deranged, adipose tissue does not release fat effectively, and the body would be forced to go to its backup plan of cannibalizing muscle and vital organs, which over long periods is not compatible with life. I have not investigated this thoroughly enough to see if it is true. In either case they would lose weight.
So by the end of [time period], my current best understanding is that the subjects would either be the same weight, lower weight, or dead, depending on whose theories are correct, what diet they were put on, individual differences, and what the time period was. Sorry I can't be more specific.
I think you missed my point, or I threw it by you poorly. I don't think they "should", I think they sometimes can. I sometimes can, and though I know from LW that not all minds are alike, it's safe to assume I'm also not wholly unique in my depression.
As you go on to point out, there is some baseline threshold for which people cannot will themselves out of depression or other psychological issues, just as there are weight loss diets and exercise programs they cannot succeed at.
To your analogy of the marathon: There is a right answer to whether you can run X miles in Y minutes and not physically injure yourself. I'd imagine the majority of people never come close to knowing that answer because they do not posses the ability to refrain from rationalizing themselves out of the optimal result as discomfort begins during their run. I'm aware that I'm personally really bad at this—my first .5 mile I'm telling myself I'm Usain Bolt; by mile 2 I'm coming up with manifold reasons to stop pushing. No doubt some are good and rational reasons, but others are bullshit that I need only train my mind to recognize as such in order to push through and be successful.
That's not really what I was asking. Maybe I asked poorly.
Can you instead imagine a scenario where a controlled calorie deficit was administered to a person where they received a balanced diet with all the nutrients they needed? 300 kcal was arbitrary. Pick any number. Isn't there some number that would be negligible in terms of the utility of its nutritional value and yet provide a calories deficient sufficient to lead to weight loss?
My point was that depression seems to have no such scenario. You cannot engineer a situation to "make" people be happy. Without excess food, or alcohol, you cannot get to obesity or alcohol addiction, right? Depression has no such outside variable.
I agree that they sometimes can. I also agree people can sometimes lose weight. As far as I was concerned, our disagreement here (if one exists) isn't about whether it's possible in some cases.
Are you willing to agree to a statement like:
"Weight loss is possible in some cases, and in fact very easy in some cases. In other cases it is very hard, bordering in impossible given the marathon-analogy definition of impossible below. This can be negated by heroic measures like locking them in a room where excess food is unavailable and ignoring their appetite and distress, but in the real world you cannot do this. Because of these difficult cases, it is useful to explore the science behind weight loss and come up with more effective strategies.
If so, we agree, but then I'm confused why you were criticizing the Less Wrongers in your original statement. If you don't agree, please let me know which part we disagree about.
If we are debating the extremely academic point of whether someone with your muscular structure can complete a marathon in X hours, okay. But suppose we find that of a thousand people who in theory are anatomically capable of completing the marathon, zero actually finish the marathon, due to discomfort. If our goal is to get them to successfully complete marathons, what percent of our resources do you think should be invested in proving they are physically capable of doing so right now and exhorting them to do this, versus coming up with things like training schedules and better diets and better shoes that will make it easier for them?
I felt like your original point was a complaint that we are trying the equivalent of coming up with training schedules rather than the equivalent of telling people they should be able to just keep going 26.2 miles unless their legs collapse, whereas I think this is probably a better strategy. Am I interpreting your complaint correctly, and do you disagree that the former strategy is better?
I think we're definitely misunderstanding each other somewhere. I think we may be working off some different assumptions about how the biology here works.
I weigh 185 pounds - plugging this into a metabolism calculator, my weight will stay stable at 2200 calories per day. Suppose I weighed 500 pounds. My weight would stay stable at about 4500 calories per day.
If the 500 pound guy got only 4200 calories per day, it doesn't matter how balanced the diet is or how many nutrients he has, his body has a caloric deficit and doesn't have enough energy to live. Hopefully it takes care of that by burning some of his stored fat. If it can't do that, he's going to be in big trouble.
I may be wrong about this, but I don't think the body can actually operate a a true caloric deficit. It WILL make up the deficit (or die, which also technically resolves the deficit). All it can do is do so in more or less problematic ways. The less problematic ways are things like burning fat. The more problematic ways are things like increasing appetite, decreasing exercise, and catabolizing organs.
I think your question corresponds to "But what if the body did just operate at a caloric deficit?", and I am really getting out of my knowledge comfort zone here but I don't think that's possible. Our analogy to economics here fails - we're not talking money where you can run a loss for a while and just have to worry about the bank coming after you, we're talking thermodynamics where it's physically impossible.
Weight loss is caused not by operating at a caloric deficit per se, but by the body avoiding caloric deficit by burning fat or other bodily tissues.
I could be totally wrong about this.
Dieting is one of many topics discussed on this forum where the level of discourse is hardly above dilettante. Applied rationality and AGI friendliness research is done by several people full-time, which brings the discussion quality up in these areas, mostly. So it would not be fair to judge those by the averages. Everything else is probably subreddit-level, only more polite and on-topic.
Sure. That makes really good sense.
But couldn't it also be said that dieting is pretty simple subject matter? (It also happens to be a pretty integral part of life—so it makes sense for people interested in "winning" and optimizing their rationality to have a solid understanding of how to maintain a top-flight diet.)
It's hard for me to grasp how people could be at "subreddit-level" understanding af something that is so simple while making such bold assertions about hyper-complex stuff in the cosmologically distant future.
With no disrespect, your reply reads to me a bit like this: "You can't expect a graduate-level philosophy professor to know how to long divide...it's not his area of expertise."
Dieting is anything but simple. It is still an open problem. Human body and mind is an extremely complicated system. What works for one person doesn't work for another. Eliezer put in some significant time into figuring out his weight issues, to no avail, and is apparently desperate enough to resort to some extreme measures, like consuming home-made gloop. Many people are lucky to be able to maintain a healthy weight with only a few simple tweaks, and you might be one of them. If you want a more fair comparison, "You can't expect a graduate-level philosophy professor to know how to design a multi-threaded operating system". No, that's not quite enough. "...how to solve an unsolved millennium problem" is closer.
I think we have a misunderstanding in regard to the definiton of "simple". Likely my fault for adding this aside:
I'm not saying actually executing a good diet is easy. I'm saying understanding what needs to be done to lose weight is simple.
Consuming fewer calories is very challenging—it can lead to fatigue, mood changes, etc., etc. Likewise, exercising consistently is easier said than done.
Add to that that some people have slow metabolisms, the fat-shaming that overweight people deal with in many cultures, the availabity of superstimulus foods everywhere. Maintain a healthy weight isn't easy.
But the fundamental causal mechanism at play is very simple.
Sure, calories in vs calories out... Except it is not helpful when you cannot effectively control one or both without reducing the real or perceived quality of life to the level where people refuse to exercise this control. This is where most diets eventually fail. And you seem to agree with that, while still maintaining that "understanding what needs to be done to lose weight is simple", where it is anything but, since it includes understanding of the actual doable actions one has to perform and still enjoy life. And this all-important understanding is sorely lacking in a general case.
As a stats / machine learning person, a lot of the "Bayesian statistics" talk around here is pretty cringe-inducing. My impresion is that physicists probably feel similarly about "many-worlds" discussions. I think LessWrong unfortunately causes people to believe that being a dilettante is enough to merit a confident opinion on a subject.
One of the most annoying things to me about Eliezer is how much is writing style is bombastic and hyperconfident and how it's encouraged here to talk like that despite the entire point of probabilistic reasoning being to NEVER be 100 percent certain of things.
Mildly interesting challenge:
There is a new internet community game taking off called Twitch Plays Pokemon. The concept is simple: set up a server that takes the next properly formatted input ("up", "down", "a button") from a chat window, and apply it - in order, with no filtering - to a copy of Pokemon Red.
This is going about as well as can be expected, with 90,000 players, about a third of whom are actively attempting to impede progress.
So, a TDT style challenge: Beat the game in the shortest number of steps
A simple reframe that helped jumpstart my creativity:
My cookie dough froze in the fridge, so I couldn't pry it out of the bowl to carry with me to bake at a party. I tried to get it out, but didn't succeed, and had basically resigned myself to schlepping the bowl on the metro.
But then I paused and posed the question to myself: "If something important depended on me getting this dough out, what would I try?"
I immediately covered the top of the bowl, ran the base under lukewarm to warm water, popped it out, wrapped it up, and went on my way.
After reading the third paragraph, I had already decided to post the following similar story:
It snowed a few weeks ago and my car was stuck in the driveway. Parts of the wheels had gotten ice/snow kind of frozen/compacted around them. I was breaking up the ice with one of those things you use to break up ice, but a lot of it was too hard and a lot of it was underneath the car and I couldn't get to it. I was pretty close to being late to work. So I thought "I need to make some kind of desperate rationalist effort here, what would HPJEV do?". And I sat and thought about it for five minutes, and I got a big tub, filled it with hot water, and poured it around the wheels. This melted/softened enough of the compacted ice that I was able to break up the rest and make it to work on time.
Then I read your fourth paragraph and saw your story was also about hot water.
I don't know if there's some kind of moral to this episode, like that the most rational solution to a problem always involves hot water, but I guess I'll raise it a little higher on my list of things to think about in various situations.
Duh, hot water helps when something's frozen.
Well, Hufflepuff bones aren't always available.
But if they were, you could try using them as levers.
Another academic hoax
120 gibberish papers were in journals for up to 5 years. They were found as a result of a test for one kind of gibberish.created by a program called SCIgen.
I just want to thank all of you, as both individuals, and as a community, for being a decent place for discourse. In the last few months, I've been actively engaging with Less Wrong more frequently. Prior to that, I mostly tried asking for opinions on an issue I wanted analyzed on my Facebook. On Facebook, there has been typically been one person writing something like 'ha, this is a strange question! [insert terrible joke'here]. Other than that, radio silence.
On Less Wrong, typical responses are people not thinking I'm weird because I want to analyze stuff outside of the classroom, or question things outside of a meeting dedicated to airing one's skepticism. On Less Wrong, typical responses to my queries are correcting me directly, without beating around the bush, or fearing of offending me. All of you ask me to clarify my thinking when it's confused. When you cannot provide an academic citation, you seem to try to extract what most relevant information you can from the anecdotes from your personal experiences. I find this greatly refreshing.
I created this open thread to ask a specific question, and then I asked some more. Even just from this open thread, the gratification I received from being taken seriously has made me eager to ask more questions, and read other threads in discussion. Reading responses to posters besides myself, and further responses to my comments, have made me feel the samey way. For all I know, there are big problems with Less Wrong to be fixed. However, I'm surprised I found somewhere this non-awful on the Internet at all. So, thanks.
Many people I know report having much lower-quality experiences on Facebook than mine. The algorithm for improving the quality of the Facebook experience is fairly straightforward: if someone posts content you don't want to see, hide them. If someone makes comments on your statuses you don't want, unfriend them. Repeat. At some point you may need to find new friends, or at least follows.
Is anyone else bothered by the word "opposite"?
It has many different usages, but there are two in particular that bother me: "The opposite of hot is cold" "The opposite of red is green" Opposite of A is [something that appears to be on the other side of a spectrum from A]
"The opposite of hot is not-hot" "The opposite of red is not-red"
Opposite of A is ~A
These two usages really ought not to be assigned to the same word. Does anyone know if there are simple ways to unambiguously use one meaning and not the other that already exist in English?
(Basically, are there two words/phrases foo and bar so that one could say "The foo of hot is cold, but the bar of hot is not-hot")
Slightly off-topic, but the actual complement of red is cyan, and the complement of green is magenta.
Often when people want to emphasize that what they mean is not the complement of the referent, they say "diametrically opposed" or "direct opposite" or "antipode": "the complement of hot [in the set of all temperature perceptions] is not-hot, but the direct opposite of hot is cold".
I sometimes use "negation of X" to refer to the logical operator NOT-X.
The other-side-of-a-continuum relationship I don't have a single word for. I might say that the "complement" of green is red, but that's specific to color. I often use "opposite" when I want a generic term here, with the understanding that I'm using it colloquially.
The antonym of hot is cold.
The negation of hot is not-hot.
"Complement" is sort of a word for the second one.
I think complement can mean both too. E.g. red and green are complementary colors, whereas the sets "red" and "not-red" are complements.
My sense of the word complement is that if two things are complements, they sum to 1, or some equivalent.
A is the complement of ~A because P(A or ~A) = 1
Red and green are considered to be complementary colors because together they contain all primary colors of pigments. [although, that is based on the societal understanding that the primary colors are Red, Yellow and Blue. This is actually incorrect. For pigments, the primary colors are really Magenta, Yellow, and Cyan. For light, they are Red, Green, and Blue.]
How do I get Philadelphia on the nearest meetups list?
Add a meetup with Philadelphia in the location field?