A bit late, but I think this part of your article was most relevant to the Monty Hall problem:

Our impression is that subjects’ conservatism, as revealed by the prevalence of the constancy assumptions, is a consequence of their external attribution of uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). The parameters L0 and/or S0 are apparently perceived as properties that belong to the desk, like color, size and texture. Subjects think of these parameters in terms of “the probabilities of the desk”, whereas the Bayesian view would imply expressions like “my probability of the target event”. Thus, subjects fail to incorporate the additional knowledge they acquire when given successive search results.

People probably don't distinguish between their personal probability of the target event and the probabilities of the doors. It feels like the probability of there being a car behind the doors is a parameter that belongs to those doors or to the car - however you want to phrase it. Since you're only given information about what's behind the doors, and that information can't actually change the reality of what's behind the doors then it feels like the probability can't change just because of that.