Cyan comments on The Problem with AIXI - Less Wrong

24 Post author: RobbBB 18 March 2014 01:55AM

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Comment author: RobbBB 12 March 2014 05:16:58AM *  5 points [-]

I saw your comment; the last section ('Beyond Solomonoff?') speaks to the worry you raised. Somewhere in AIXI's hypothesis space is a reasoner R that is a reductionist about R; AIXI can simulate human scientists, for example. But nowhere in AIXI's hypothesis space is a reasoner that is a native representation of AIXI as 'me', as the agent doing the hypothesizing.

One way I'd put this is that AIXI can entertain every physical hypothesis, but not every indexical hypothesis. Being able to consider all the objective ways the world could be doesn't mean you're able to consider all the ways you could be located in the world.

AIXI's hypothesis space does include experts on AIXI that could give it advice about how best to behave like a naturalist. Here the problem isn't that the hypotheses are missing, but that they don't look like they'll be assigned a reasonable prior probability.

Comment author: Cyan 13 March 2014 06:57:42PM *  0 points [-]

It seems worth saying at this point that I don't have an objection to loading up an AI with true prior information; it's just not clear to me that a Solomonoff approximator would be incapable of learning that it's part of the Universe and that its continued existence is contingent on the persistence of some specific structure in the Universe.