Manfred comments on Overcoming the Loebian obstacle using evidence logic - Less Wrong

4 Post author: Squark 14 March 2014 06:34PM

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Comment author: Manfred 16 March 2014 11:57:31PM *  0 points [-]

it assigns high probability to sentences with short evidence in favor and long evidence against, which is what we want to happen for UDT to work.

Interesting. I'm not convinced that that's required (e.g. for the 5 and 10 problem). If you read Ingredients of TDT with an eye towards that, I think there's a strong case that using causal surgery rather than logical implication solves the problem.

What do you mean "violate it"? How can you violate a theorem?

Fair enough - I meant that if you prove R-+(s,1), then for a consistent set of axioms, I think you violate the consistency condition set by Löb's theorem if say "If Pmin(s)=1, then s." Hmm. I guess this is not really a problem with the content of your post - it's more about the form of the additional axiom "GL".

Comment author: Squark 19 March 2014 07:46:47PM 1 point [-]

Interesting. I'm not convinced that that's required (e.g. for the 5 and 10 problem). If you read Ingredients of TDT with an eye towards that, I think there's a strong case that using causal surgery rather than logical implication solves the problem.

As far as I know, TDT was mostly abandoned in favor of UDT. In particular I don't think there is a well defined recipe how to describe a given process as a causal diagram with pure-computation nodes. But I might be missing something.

Fair enough - I meant that if you prove R-+(s,1), then for a consistent set of axioms, I think you violate the consistency condition set by Löb's theorem if say "If Pmin(s)=1, then s."

I'm not sure what you're saying here. The usual notion of consistency doesn't apply to my system since it works fine for inconsistent theories. I believe that for consistent theories the energy minimum is always 0 which provides a sort of analogue to consistency in usual logics.