With regards to your skydiving example, how about you be a good chap and link the appropriate lesswrong description for ludicrously weak analogy.
I don't believe there is one. Also, it's on the strong side as analogies go - it's a risky behavior that is a lot of fun, specifically from going very fast. What would be a better analogy, going fast in speedboats?
Third, one third of american teenage deaths are in motor vehicles.
Maybe I'm misreading, but it looks to me like a little over 35%. That said, I don't see how it's relevant. If one teenager died every 20 years and 1/3 of them were in motor vehicles, would that imply anything? How does the 1/3 of deaths relate to anything about proper analysis of risks, and is anything similar implied by the 13% that die from homicide? Should teens stop going to places where there are other humans, even though it's enjoyable, because someone there might kill them?
When I first read the words above—on August 1st, 2003, at around 3 o’clock in the afternoon—it changed the way I thought. I realized that once I could guess what my answer would be—once I could assign a higher probability to deciding one way than other—then I had, in all probability, already decided. We change our minds less often than we think. And most of the time we become able to guess what our answer will be within half a second of hearing the question.
How swiftly that unnoticed moment passes, when we can’t yet guess what our answer will be; the tiny window of opportunity for intelligence to act. In questions of choice, as in questions of fact.
The principle of the bottom line is that only the actual causes of your beliefs determine your effectiveness as a rationalist. Once your belief is fixed, no amount of argument will alter the truth-value; once your decision is fixed, no amount of argument will alter the consequences.
You might think that you could arrive at a belief, or a decision, by non-rational means, and then try to justify it, and if you found you couldn’t justify it, reject it.
But we change our minds less often—much less often—than we think.
I’m sure that you can think of at least one occasion in your life when you’ve changed your mind. We all can. How about all the occasions in your life when you didn’t change your mind? Are they as available, in your heuristic estimate of your competence?
Between hindsight bias, fake causality, positive bias, anchoring/priming, et cetera, et cetera, and above all the dreaded confirmation bias, once an idea gets into your head, it’s probably going to stay there.
1Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky, “The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence,” Cognitive Psychology 24, no. 3 (1992): 411–435.