Well, I suppose I picked a form of compatibilism I find appealing and called it 'traditional'. It's not really traditional so much as slightly old, and related to a very old compatibilist position described by Kant. But there are lots of compatibilist accounts, and I do think EY's probably counts as compatibilist if one thinks, say, Hobbes is a compatibilist (where freedom means simply 'doing what you want without impediment').

A simple explanation of a version of compatibilism:

So, suppose you take free will to be the ability to choose between alternatives, such that an action is only freely willed if you could have done otherwise. The thought is that since the physical universe is a fully determined, timeless mathematical object, it involves no 'forking paths'. Now imagine a scenario like this, courtesy of a the philosopher who came up with this argument:

Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones's plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened.

The thought is, Jones is responsible for shooting Smith, he did so freely, he was morally responsible, and in every way one could wish for, he satisfied the notion of 'free will'. Yet there was no 'fork in the road' for Smith, and he couldn't have chosen to do otherwise. Hence, whatever kind freedom we're talking about when we talk about 'free will' has nothing to do with being able to do otherwise. This sort of freedom is wholly compatible with a universe in which there are no 'forking paths'.