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Kaj_Sotala comments on Open thread, 3-8 June 2014 - Less Wrong
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I don't think it's physically impossible for someone to predict my behavior in some situation with a high degree of accuracy.
If I wanted to thwart or discredit pseudo-Omega, I could base my decision on a source of randomness. This brings me out of reach of any real-world attempt at setting up the Newcomblike problem. It's not the same as guaranteeing a win, but it undermines the premise.
Certainly, anybody trying to play pseudo-omega against random-decider would start losing lots of money until they settled on always keeping box B empty.
And if it's a repeated game where Omega explicitly guarantees it will attempt to keep its accuracy high, choosing only box B emerges as the right choice from non-TDT theories.
It's not a zero-sum game. Using randomness means pseudo-Omega will guess wrong, so he'll lose, but it doesn't mean that he'll guess you'll one-box, so you don't win. There is no mixed Nash equilibrium. The only Nash equilibrium is to always one-box.