This is the bit I don't understand - if these agents are identical to me, then it follows that I'm probably a Boltzmann brain too...
In UDT you shouldn't consider yourself to be just one of your clones. There is no probability measure on the set of your clones: you are all of them simultaneously. CDT is difficult to apply to situations with clones, unless you supplement it by some anthropic hypothesis like SIA or SSA. If you use an anthropic hypothesis, Boltzman brains will still get you in trouble. In fact, some cosmologists are trying to find models w/o Boltzman brains precise to avoid the conclusion that you are likely to be a Boltzman brain (although UDT shows the effort is misguided). The problem with UDT and Goedel incompleteness is a separate issue which has no relation to Boltzman brains.
I was meaning in the sense of measure theory. I've seen people discussing maximising the measure of a utility function over all future Everett branches...
I'm not sure what you mean here. Sets have measure, not functions.
I imagine a better approach would be to add the satisfying function to the time-discounting function, scaled in some suitable manner. This doesn't intuitively strike me as a real utility function, as its adding apples and oranges so to speak, but perhaps useful as a tool?
Well, you still got all of the abovementioned problems except divergence.
...actually I was talking about alpha-point computation which I think may involve the creation of daughter universes inside black holes.
Hmm, baby universes are a possibility to consider. I thought the case for them is rather weak but a quick search revealed this. Regarding performing an infinite number of computations I'm pretty sure it doesn't work.
CDT is difficult to apply to situations with clones, unless you supplement it by some anthropic hypothesis like SIA or SSA.
While I can see why there intuitive cause to abandon the "I am person #2, therefore there are probably not 100 people" reasoning, abandoning "There are 100 clones, therefore I'm probably not clone #1" seems to be simply abandoning probability theory altogether, and I'm certainly not willing to bite that bullet.
Actually, looking back through the conversation, I'm also confused as to how time discounting helps in...
Cross-posted from my blog.
Yudkowsky writes:
My own projection goes more like this:
At least one clear difference between my projection and Yudkowsky's is that I expect AI-expert performance on the problem to improve substantially as a greater fraction of elite AI scientists begin to think about the issue in Near mode rather than Far mode.
As a friend of mine suggested recently, current elite awareness of the AGI safety challenge is roughly where elite awareness of the global warming challenge was in the early 80s. Except, I expect elite acknowledgement of the AGI safety challenge to spread more slowly than it did for global warming or nuclear security, because AGI is tougher to forecast in general, and involves trickier philosophical nuances. (Nobody was ever tempted to say, "But as the nuclear chain reaction grows in power, it will necessarily become more moral!")
Still, there is a worryingly non-negligible chance that AGI explodes "out of nowhere." Sometimes important theorems are proved suddenly after decades of failed attempts by other mathematicians, and sometimes a computational procedure is sped up by 20 orders of magnitude with a single breakthrough.