I would like an explicitation for the reasons why it seems to be false. In particular I fail to see how computational account would be against it. You can compute with levers, transistors and a large array of different things. And actually there is no things you can't compute with. Thus you can compute with anything. So anything is "computy" which is another way of saying it's "mindy". But ofcourse that everything can be used in computing doesn't mean the computations are of equal value/complexity. Thus a genuine difference between rocks and people. But that it still allows that there is "what it feels to be a rock inside". Granted it probably isn't anything grand or interesting. However it would be really weird if there was a clear division where "feeling" began and "cold" motion stopped.
I would like to note that an abstraction where we disregard "feelings" and focus on technical public impact with the environment can lead to a "cold" conceptation of the world. However when used as a worldview (that is outside of tracking positions and mechanics) it is quite erroneus. In an extreme extrapolation you are just a robot and should be "cold". This kind of non-psychisim has the loudest counterevidence there is available - you do feel (crossing fingers that you are not a zombie). Whether the psychisims extends beyond you is an open question. If you can get around the problem of other minds that is existence of psychisims like you why would you assume that there are only feelers like you? Ie there is an analog problem of mindness of other, given that you could not directly experience the feelings of rocks why would you assume they don't have them?
If the answer is purely because you are used to abstract that facet of them away because of practical needs that doesn't answer the theorethical question. It is the same that a psychopath would treat fully fledged people - to him it doesn't matter what people are on the inside only what he can do with them. In that way the "cold" and "feely" way of relating to your surroundings don't disagree what the mechanics are. But why insist that the "feely" way is false or inferior?
Anything is potentially computy.which is analogous to panPROTOpsychism.
So I just wound up in a debate with someone over on Reddit about the value of conventional academic philosophy. He linked me to a book review, in which both the review and the book are absolutely godawful. That is, the author (and the reviewer following him) start with ontological monism (the universe only contains a single kind of Stuff: mass-energy), adds in the experience of consciousness, reasons deftly that emergence is a load of crap... and then arrives to the conclusion of panpsychism.
WAIT HOLD ON, DON'T FLAME YET!
Of course panpsychism is bunk. I would be embarrassed to be caught upholding it, given the evidence I currently have, but what I want to talk about is the logic being followed.
1) The universe is a unified, consistent whole. Good!
2) The universe contains the experience/existence of consciousness. Easily observable.
3) If consciousness exists, something in the universe must cause or give rise to consciousness. Good reasoning!
4) "Emergence" is a non-explanation, so that can't be it. Good!
5) Therefore, whatever stuff the unified universe is made of must be giving rise to consciousness in a nonemergent way.
6) Therefore, the stuff must be innately "mindy".
What went wrong in steps (5) and (6)? The man was actually reasoning more-or-less correctly! Given the universe he lived in, and the impossibility of emergence, he reallocated his probability mass to the remaining answer. When he had eliminated the impossible, whatever remained, however low its prior, must be true.
The problem was, he eliminated the impossible, but left open a huge vast space of possible hypotheses that he didn't know about (but which we do): the most common of these is the computational theory of mind and consciousness, which says that we are made of cognitive algorithms. A Solomonoff Inducer can just go on to the next length of bit-strings describing Turing machines, but we can't.
Now, I can spot the flaw in the reasoning here. What frightens me is: what if I'm presented with some similar argument, and I can't spot the flaw? What if, instead, I just neatly and stupidly reallocate my belief to what seems to me to be the only available alternative, while failing to go out and look for alternatives I don't already know about? Notably, it seems like expected evidence is conserved, but expecting to locate new hypotheses means I should be reducing my certainty about all currently-available hypotheses now to have some for dividing between the new possibilities.
If you can notice when you're confused, how do you notice when you're ignorant?