Simulating a brain in silico is an eventually-achievable method to extensively test almost any hypothesis we could develop.
You just assume that's true. Before we actually do run that simulation in practice we don't know whether that's true.
When I say consciousness is emergent I'm saying that I believe neuroscience will eventually be able to pinpoint the mechanisms of almost any type of higher-order thought
Yes, and other people do believe in souls and God. We don't have evidence that proves either hypothesis.
An example non-emergent explanation of consciousness would be "the brain is an antenna for ethereal souls", which would be hard to test but would have to be given consideration if the program I outline above completely fails to fully account for thoughts and experiences above a certain complexity.
Yes, and the brain as an antenna hypothesis is basically what parapsychologists like Dean Radin advocate these days. We don't have yet evidence to prove it wrong.
Saying we could in theory run experiments that if those experiments turn out a certain way would prove our theory right is not the same thing as arguing that there evidence for your theory.
Science lives from distinguishing what you know and what you don't know.
I am making predictions, but they are predictions that a concrete, existing program of research (the field of neuroscience) is trying to test.
I obviously can't conjure this evidence out of thin air, because it doesn't yet exist (and, sure, may never exist). But I am outlining why I believe that calling consciousness emergent is a perfectly valid, predictive hypothesis in the context of neuroscience (saying 'phenomena X is emergent' is, I believe, not an empty statement at all but instead more-or-less equivalent to saying "The question 'What singular e...
So I just wound up in a debate with someone over on Reddit about the value of conventional academic philosophy. He linked me to a book review, in which both the review and the book are absolutely godawful. That is, the author (and the reviewer following him) start with ontological monism (the universe only contains a single kind of Stuff: mass-energy), adds in the experience of consciousness, reasons deftly that emergence is a load of crap... and then arrives to the conclusion of panpsychism.
WAIT HOLD ON, DON'T FLAME YET!
Of course panpsychism is bunk. I would be embarrassed to be caught upholding it, given the evidence I currently have, but what I want to talk about is the logic being followed.
1) The universe is a unified, consistent whole. Good!
2) The universe contains the experience/existence of consciousness. Easily observable.
3) If consciousness exists, something in the universe must cause or give rise to consciousness. Good reasoning!
4) "Emergence" is a non-explanation, so that can't be it. Good!
5) Therefore, whatever stuff the unified universe is made of must be giving rise to consciousness in a nonemergent way.
6) Therefore, the stuff must be innately "mindy".
What went wrong in steps (5) and (6)? The man was actually reasoning more-or-less correctly! Given the universe he lived in, and the impossibility of emergence, he reallocated his probability mass to the remaining answer. When he had eliminated the impossible, whatever remained, however low its prior, must be true.
The problem was, he eliminated the impossible, but left open a huge vast space of possible hypotheses that he didn't know about (but which we do): the most common of these is the computational theory of mind and consciousness, which says that we are made of cognitive algorithms. A Solomonoff Inducer can just go on to the next length of bit-strings describing Turing machines, but we can't.
Now, I can spot the flaw in the reasoning here. What frightens me is: what if I'm presented with some similar argument, and I can't spot the flaw? What if, instead, I just neatly and stupidly reallocate my belief to what seems to me to be the only available alternative, while failing to go out and look for alternatives I don't already know about? Notably, it seems like expected evidence is conserved, but expecting to locate new hypotheses means I should be reducing my certainty about all currently-available hypotheses now to have some for dividing between the new possibilities.
If you can notice when you're confused, how do you notice when you're ignorant?