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VAuroch comments on Six Plausible Meta-Ethical Alternatives - Less Wrong
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Comments (36)
I would characterize Eliezer's metaethics slightly differently; I'd say he believes that 'moral facts' as conceived of by humans are a human-specific notion with no relevance to any other type of mind, but that they exist, and that he would place it between 2 and 3. Or more specifically, he'd endorse 3 with the caveat that if you restrict the domain of 'everyone' to humans, 2 would also be true.
I'd tentatively agree but don't feel informed enough to have a strong opinion or motivated to form one.
The reason I said 3 or 4 is that it's not clear to me to what extent Eliezer thinks there are facts about how one ought to translate non-preferences into preferences (in a sense that is relevant to everyone, not just humans). I don't know if he has taken any position on this question.
Yes, assuming you mean to also restrict the domain of "most intelligent beings" to humans. However I think he would deny 2 as written.
You are of course correct about the intended domain-restriction.
I'd be surprised to hear an argument for how 4 was compatible with CEV or something like it, since lack of rigid general preference-creation would make convergence on a broad scale fairly implausible. And that conclusion does seem at odds with statements he's made. But I do see your point.