jbay comments on Confused as to usefulness of 'consciousness' as a concept - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (229)
It sometimes seems to me that those of us who actually have consciousness are in a minority, and everyone else is a p-zombie. But maybe that's a selection effect, since people who realise that the stars in the sky they were brought up believing in don't really exist will find that surprising enough to say, while everyone else who sees the stars in the night sky wonders what drugs the others have been taking, or invents spectacles.
I experience a certain sense of my own presence. This is what I am talking about, when I say that I am conscious. The idea that there is such an experience, and that this is what we are talking about when we talk about consciousness, appears absent from the article.
Everyone reading this, please take a moment to see whether you have any sensation that you might describe by those words. Some people can't see colours. Some people can't imagine visual scenes. Some people can't taste phenylthiocarbamide. Some people can't wiggle their ears. Maybe some people have no sensation of their own selves. If they don't, maybe this is something that can be learned, like ear-wiggling, and maybe it isn't, like phenylthiocarbamide.
Unlike the experiences reported by some, I do not find that this sensation of my own presence goes away when I stare at it. I do not even get the altered states of it that some others report.
I am also aware that I have no explanation for the existence of the phenomenon. Some philosophers have claimed that the apparent impossibility of an explanation proves that it does not exist, like a student demanding top marks for not having a clue in the exam. But for me, contemplating the seeming impossibility of the matter does not make the actual experience go away.
Here are some ideas about things that might be going on when people report that they have discovered they have no self. Discount this as you wish from typical mind fallacy, or compare it with your own experience, whatever it may be.
If you stare directly at a dim star in the night sky, it vanishes. (Try it.) Nevertheless, the star continues to exist.
If you stare directly at the sun all day, then for a different reason, you will experience disturbances of vision, and soon you will never be able to see it again. Yet it continues to exist, and after-images and blindness are not signs of enlightenment.
The sun appears to circle the Earth. When it was found that the Earth circles the sun, I doubt that anyone concluded that the sun does not exist, merely on the grounds that something we believed about it was false. (However, I would be completely unsurprised to find philosophers arguing about whether the sun that goes round the Earth and the sun that is gone round by the Earth are one thing or two.)
In the 19th century, Auguste Comte wrote that we could never know the constitution of the stars. Was any philosopher of the time so obtuse as to conclude that the stars do not exist?
This doesn't make sense to me. I have nothing to compare this experience of consciousness to. I know, logically speaking, that I am often unconscious (e.g. when sleeping), but there is no way -- by definition -- I can experience what that unconsciousness feels like. Thus, I cannot compare my experience of being conscious with the experience of being unconscious.
Am I missing something ? I think there are drugs that can induce the experience of unconsciousness, but I'd rather not take any kind of drugs unless it's totally necessary...
Maybe you're on to something...
Imagine there were drugs that could remove the sensation of consciousness. However, that's all they do. They don't knock you unconscious like an anaesthetic; you still maintain motor functions, memory, sensory, and decision-making capabilities. So you can still drive a car safely, people can still talk to you coherently, and after the drugs wear off you'll remember what things you said and did.
Can anyone explain concretely what the effect and experience of taking such a drug would be?
If so, that might go a long way toward nailing down what the essential part of consciousness is (ie, what people really mean when they claim to be conscious). If not, it might show that consciousness is inseparable from sensory, memory, and/or decision-making functions.
For example, I can imagine an answer like "such a drug is contradictory; if it really took away what I mean by 'consciousness', then by definition I couldn't remember in detail what had happened while it was in effect". Or "If it really took away what I mean by consciousness, then I would act like I were hypnotized; maybe I could talk to people, but it would be in a flat, emotionless, robotic way, and I wouldn't trust myself to drive in that state because I would become careless".
I can almost picture it.
Implicit memories -- motor habits and recognition still work. Semantic and episodic memories are pretty separate things. You can answer some factual questions without involving your more visceral kind of memory about the experience later. Planning couldn't be totally gone, but it would operate at a much lower level so I wouldn't recommend driving...
That doesn't make any sense to me. If you were on that drug and I asked you "how do you feel?" and you said "I feel angry" or "I feel sad" ,,, that would be a conscious experience. I don't think the setup makes any sense. If you are going about your day doing your daily things, you are conscious. And this has nothing to do with remembering what happened -- as I said in a different reply, you are also conscious in the grandparent's sense when you are dreaming, even if you don't remember the dream when you wake up.
Jbay didn't specify that the drug has to leave people able to answer questions about their own emotional state. And in fact there are some people who can't do that, even though they're otherwise functional.
I wasn't limiting it to just emotional state. If there is someone experiencing something, that someone is conscious, whether or not they are self-aware enough to describe that feeling of existing.
Good! I'm glad to hear an answer like this.
So does that mean that, in your view, a drug that removes consciousness must necessarily be a drug that impairs the ability to process information?
Yes. Really to be completely unconscious you'd have to be dead. But I do acknowledge that this is degrees on a spectrum, and probably the closest drug to what you want is whatever they use in general anesthesia.
I think my opinion is the same as yours, but I'm curious about whether anybody else has different answers.