CoffeeStain comments on Confused as to usefulness of 'consciousness' as a concept - Less Wrong
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It sometimes seems to me that those of us who actually have consciousness are in a minority, and everyone else is a p-zombie. But maybe that's a selection effect, since people who realise that the stars in the sky they were brought up believing in don't really exist will find that surprising enough to say, while everyone else who sees the stars in the night sky wonders what drugs the others have been taking, or invents spectacles.
I experience a certain sense of my own presence. This is what I am talking about, when I say that I am conscious. The idea that there is such an experience, and that this is what we are talking about when we talk about consciousness, appears absent from the article.
Everyone reading this, please take a moment to see whether you have any sensation that you might describe by those words. Some people can't see colours. Some people can't imagine visual scenes. Some people can't taste phenylthiocarbamide. Some people can't wiggle their ears. Maybe some people have no sensation of their own selves. If they don't, maybe this is something that can be learned, like ear-wiggling, and maybe it isn't, like phenylthiocarbamide.
Unlike the experiences reported by some, I do not find that this sensation of my own presence goes away when I stare at it. I do not even get the altered states of it that some others report.
I am also aware that I have no explanation for the existence of the phenomenon. Some philosophers have claimed that the apparent impossibility of an explanation proves that it does not exist, like a student demanding top marks for not having a clue in the exam. But for me, contemplating the seeming impossibility of the matter does not make the actual experience go away.
Here are some ideas about things that might be going on when people report that they have discovered they have no self. Discount this as you wish from typical mind fallacy, or compare it with your own experience, whatever it may be.
If you stare directly at a dim star in the night sky, it vanishes. (Try it.) Nevertheless, the star continues to exist.
If you stare directly at the sun all day, then for a different reason, you will experience disturbances of vision, and soon you will never be able to see it again. Yet it continues to exist, and after-images and blindness are not signs of enlightenment.
The sun appears to circle the Earth. When it was found that the Earth circles the sun, I doubt that anyone concluded that the sun does not exist, merely on the grounds that something we believed about it was false. (However, I would be completely unsurprised to find philosophers arguing about whether the sun that goes round the Earth and the sun that is gone round by the Earth are one thing or two.)
In the 19th century, Auguste Comte wrote that we could never know the constitution of the stars. Was any philosopher of the time so obtuse as to conclude that the stars do not exist?
When I myself run across apparent p-zombies, they usually look at my arguments as if I am being dense over my descriptions of consciousness. And I can see why, because without the experience of consciousness itself, these arguments must sound like they make consciousness out to be an extraneous hypothesis to help explain my behavior. Yet, even after reflecting on this objection, it still seems there is something to explain besides my behavior, which wouldn't bother me if I were only trying to explain my behavior, including the words in this post.
It makes sense to me that from outside a brain, everything in the brain is causal, and the brain's statements about truths are dependent on outside formalizations, and that everything observable about a brain is reducible to symbolic events. And so an observation of a zombie-Chalmers introspecting his consciousness would yield no shocking insights on the origins of his English arguments. And I know that when I reflect on this argument, an observer of my own brain would also find no surprising neural behaviors.
But I don't know how to reconcile this with my overriding intuition/need/thought that I seek not to explain my behavior but the sense experience itself when I talk about it. Fully aware of outside view functionalism, the sensation of red still feels like an item in need of explanation, regardless of which words I use to describe it. I also feel no particular need to feel that this represents a confusion, because the sense experience seems to demand that it place itself in another category than something you would explain functionally from the outside. All this I say even while I'm aware that to humans without this feeling, these claims seem nothing like insane, and they will gladly inspect my brain for a (correct) functional explanation of my words.
The whole ordeal still greatly confuses me, to an extent that surprises me given how many other questions have been dissolved on reflection such as, well, intelligence.