Vaniver comments on This is why we can't have social science - Less Wrong
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I don't think this is true at all. His points against replicability are very valid and match my experience as a researcher. In particular:
This is a very real issue and I think that if we want to solve the current issues with science we need to be honest about this, rather than close our eyes and repeat the mantra that replication will solve everything. And it's not like he's arguing against accountability. Even in your quoted passage he says:
Now, I think he goes too far by saying that no negative findings should be published; but I think they need to be held to a high standard for the very reason he gives. On the other hand, positive findings should also be held to a higher standard.
Note that there are people much wiser than me (such as Andrew Gelman) who disagree with me; Gelman is dissatisfied with the current presumption that published research is correct. I certainly agree with this but for the same reasons that Mitchell gives, I don't think that merely publishing negative results can fix this issue.
Either way, I think you are being quite uncharitable to Mitchell.
I disagree. Let's look at this section again:
Contrast this to:
From here, linked before on LW here.
The first view seems to have the implied assumption that false positives don't happen to good researchers, whereas the second view has the implied assumption that theories and people are separate, and people should follow the facts, rather than the other way around.
But perhaps it is the case that, in social psychology, the majority of false positives are not innocent, and thus when a researchers results do not replicate it is a sign that they're dishonest rather than that they're unlucky. In such a case, he is declaring that researchers should not try to expose dishonesty, which should bring down opprobrium from all decent people.
The goal is to set up the experiments to make it solely about the results and not about colleagues. If 'scientific integrity' means sloppy, porous experimental setup, then impugning this is not a bad thing. Ideally the experimental design and execution should transcend the question of the researchers' motives.