I've suggested on LW before that most attempts at physics experiments are wrong, if one counts physics students' attempts. The standard reaction to a student getting a counterintuitive result is, "well, obviously they messed up the experiment". I notice I feel OK with that response in the case of physics but don't like Mitchell trying it for psychology.
(I wonder whether biology students have to count chromosomes.)
Students are particularly bad at experimentation (which is why they have to take those labs in the first place), and the experiments they do are selected for being particularly fundamental and well-understood (in particular, they have already been replicated lots of times). I think this is a more important difference than physics versus psychology.
Jason Mitchell is [edit: has been] the John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences at Harvard. He has won the National Academy of Science's Troland Award as well as the Association for Psychological Science's Janet Taylor Spence Award for Transformative Early Career Contribution.
Here, he argues against the principle of replicability of experiments in science. Apparently, it's disrespectful, and presumptively wrong.
This is why we can't have social science. Not because the subject is not amenable to the scientific method -- it obviously is. People are conducting controlled experiments and other people are attempting to replicate the results. So far, so good. Rather, the problem is that at least one celebrated authority in the field hates that, and would prefer much, much more deference to authority.