When doing a Bayesian calculation to find out the posterior for a hypothesis, one does not compare the hypothesis against a particular competing hypothesis; one compares the hypothesis against the entirety of alternative hypotheses.
Yes, but in the case of "the totality of the theories of the mind", this is impossible. You cannot possibly calculate P("poorly conducted, unpublished case studies"| not CT) to get a likelihood ratio. Plus, if you admit more than two competing hypothesis, you lose the additivitiy of log-odds and make the calculations even more complicated.
If you want any hope to get a real Bayesian analysis of CT, the only possible way is to compare it against the best possible alternative.
It appears that you may have a skewed idea of how Bayesian reasoning works.
I think you underestimated my understanding of how Bayesian reasoning works or that I underestimated the inferential distances for Bayesian calculations done in a real case.
So, yes, if the only two hypotheses are CT and FT, and the evidence supports FT more than CT, then it's evidence against CT.
Which is exactly what I said.
I’m a member of the Bay Area Effective Altruist movement. I wanted to make my first post here to share some concerns I have about Leverage Research.
At parties, I often hear Leverage folks claiming they've pretty much solved psychology. They assign credit to their central research project: Connection Theory.
Amazingly, Connection Theory is never something I find endorsed by even a single conventionally educated person with knowledge of psychology. Yet some of my most intelligent friends end up deciding that Connection Theory seems promising enough to be given the benefit of the doubt. They usually give black-box reasons for supporting it, like, “I don’t feel confident assigning less than a 1% chance that it’s correct — and if it works, it would be super valuable. Therefore it’s very high EV!”. They do this sort of hedging as though psychology were a field that couldn’t be probed by science or understood in any level of detail. I would argue that this approach is too forgiving and charitable in situations when you can instead just analyze the theory using standard scientific reasoning. You could also assess its credibility based on standard quality markers or even the perceived quality of the work going into developing the theory.
To start, here’s some warning signs for Connection Theory:
I don't know about you, but most people get off this crazy train somewhere around stop #1. And given the rest, can you really blame them? The average person who sets themselves up to consider (and possibly believe) ideas this insane, doesn't have long before they end up pumping all their money into get rich quick schemes or drinking bleach to try and improve their health
But maybe you think you’re different? Maybe you’re sufficiently epistemically advanced that you don't have to disregard theories with this many red flags. In that case, there's now an even more fundamental reason to reject Connection Theory: As Alyssa Vance points out, the supposed "advance predictions" attributed to Connection Theory (the predictions being claimed as evidence in its favor in the only publicly available manuscript about it), are just ad hoc predictions made up by the researchers themselves on a case by case basis -- with little to no input from Connection Theory itself. This kind of error is why there has been a distinct field called "Philosophy of Science" for the past 50 years. And it's why people attempting to do science need to learn a little about it before proposing theories with so little content that they can't even be wrong.
I mention all this because I find that people from outside the Bay Area or those with very little contact with Leverage often think that Connection Theory is part of a bold and noble research program that’s attacking a valuable problem with reports of steady progress and even some plausible hope of success. Instead, I would counsel newcomers to the effective altruist movement to be careful how much you trust Leverage and not to put too much faith in Connection Theory.