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Douglas_Reay comments on What should a friendly AI do, in this situation? - Less Wrong
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Let me offer another possibility for discussion.
Neither of the two original powerpoints should be presented, because both rely on an assumption that should not have been present. Albert, as an FAI under construction, should have been preprogrammed to automatically submit any kind of high impact utility calculations to human programmers without it being an overridable choice on Albert's part.
So while they were at the coffee machine, one of the programmers should have gotten a text message indicating something along the lines of 'Warning: Albert is having a high impact utility dilemma considering manipulating you to avert an increased chance of an apocalypse.'
My general understanding of being an FAI under construction is that you're mostly trusted in normal circumstances but aren't fully trusted to handle odd high impact edge cases (Just like this one)
At that point, the human programmers, after consulting the details, are already aware that Albert finds this critically important and worth deceiving them about (If Albert had that option) because the oversight committee isn't fast enough. Albert would need to make a new powerpoint presentation taking into account that he had just automatically broadcasted that.
Please let me know about thoughts on this possibility. It seems reasonable to discuss, considering that Albert, as part of the set up, is stated to not want to deceive his programmers. He can even ensure that this impossible (or at least much more difficult) by helping the programmers in setting up a similar system to the above.
Would you want your young AI to be aware that it was sending out such text messages?
Imagine the situation was in fact a test. That the information leaked onto the net about Bertram was incomplete (the Japanese company intends to turn Bertram off soon - it is just a trial run), and it was leaked onto the net deliberately in order to panic Albert to see how Albert would react.
Should Albert take that into account? Or should he have an inbuilt prohibition against putting weight on that possibility when making decisions, in order to let his programmers more easily get true data from him?
Indeed, it is a question with interesting implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument
If we are in a simulation, would it be immoral to try to find out, because that might jinx the purity of the simulation creator's results, thwarting his intentions?
It might jinx the purity of them, but it might not, maybe the simulator is running simulations of how fast we determine we are in a simulation. We don't know, because the simulator isn't communicating with us in that case, unlike in Albert's case where Albert and his programmers are openly cooperating.