That was a wonderful comment. I hope you don't mind if I focus on the last part in particular. If you'd rather I addressed more I can accommodate that, although most of that will be signalling agreement.

To assert P is equivalent to asserting "P is true" (the deflationary theory in reverse). That is still true if P is of the form "so and so works". Pragmatism is not orthogonal to, or transcendent of, truth. Pragmatists need to be concerned about what truly works.

I'll note a few things in reply to this:

• I'm fine with some conceptual overlap between my proposed epistemology and other epistemologies and vague memes.
• You might want to analyse statements "P" as meaning/being equivalent to "P is true," but I am not going to include any explication of "true" in my epistemology for that analysis to anchor itself to.
• Continuing the above, part of what I am doing is tabooing "truth," to see if we can formulate an epistemology-like framework without it.
• What "truly works" is more of a feeling or a proclivity than a proposition, until of course an agent develops a model of what works and why.

What is right is contextual truth.

I agree with you here absolutely, modulo vocabulary. I would rather say that no single framework is universally appropriate (problem of induction) and that developing different tools for different contexts is shrewd. But what I just said is more of a model inspired by my epistemology than part of the epistemology itself.