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SisterY comments on A "Holy Grail" Humor Theory in One Page. - Less Wrong
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I highly recommend Daniel Dennett's (and a couple other guys') Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-engineer the Mind (MIT Press 2011).
Hurley, Dennett, & Adams argue that humor is not coterminous with laughter, and is very much post-verbal and inextricably connected with the human faculty for abstraction and imagination. In short, the authors propose that humor is a reward mechanism for catching errors in abstractions imagined and projected by the mind. We have become connoisseurs of this reward our brains give us for a necessary cognitive cleaning function. Hurley et al. are the ones to beat and if you haven't read the book you definitely should.
This appears to be the same claim as the "misplacement" part of the above theory (errors in patterns vs. errors in "abstractions" which in the link that was provided is referred to as "patterns").
The key difference which stands out now, though (before I see it applied to various forms of evidence and humor) is that this version appears to be less elegant, less clear, and has less connection with our common experiences and understanding of humor, so it doesn't fit any of my own criteria for what would make it better as a hypothesis. I also notice this a lot when it comes to Dennett.
In what way is it less elegant or clear? When I read that book, I found the idea of humour being a reinforcement method for getting us to update our mental models to be extremely elegant and insightful, so I would be interested to hear why you don't agree.
I should add, my general impression of your theory is that it has a lot in common with Hurley et al's except that you think everything should be reducible to status while they think that status isn't anything special
Well, firstly, this isn't a big deal, but I'll describe it because you asked. In terms of clarity, Dennett has a habit of using unnecessarily complex language, as well as burying his leads and dancing around his points. The end result is that most people don't bother and so he doesn't communicate what may at its core be an interesting thought. A lot of the same happens when people describe his ideas (you don't need to say "coterminous" when you can just say "humor is not the same as laughter," for one example, and be more specific about how they aren't the same if or when it becomes necessary.) Specificity where it isn't needed is a common problem in academic writing. (rather than tell someone that it's "time to go," you could show them a multi-decimal readout from an atomic clock that would accomplish nothing additional).
I find it inelegant because it doesn't fit neatly with our common experiences of humor. For example in the book abstract, it's stated essentially that humor rewards us for fixing our mental models. I agree that we have mechanisms that reward us for that, as I've stated in the past that there's a pleasure chemical released in the brain when we make a new connection. But we don't laugh in all those circumstances. (the classic example being "Eureka!" That's that, but not a laugh).
What's important is that the new discovery not match your expectation. If it was just about updating your model, it would seem clearly that you'd laugh in the "Eureka" situation too. But we don't. The theory I'm proposing draws a clear distinction between those two moments of mental connection, and offers a (hopefully) logical reason WHY that distinction is there, including other traits associated with laughter, like why we laugh in a way that other people can hear and so on.
Lastly, regarding things being reducible to status. Let me be clear that that's the purpose of it, but the instinct triggers in its own way. Similar to how men might be attracted to large breasts for reasons that are reducible to reproductive ability in the woman, but that instinct is triggered in its own way, solely by breast size/shape etc, which means in modern times, there are situations where it's triggered without the intended purpose being fulfilled (like with breast implants).
I hope this is clear. If not I apologize and will try to use different terms.
I find that book not just clear, but positively lucid. Your description of it seems so wrong I find it impossible to imagine you've actually read that book.
And by the way: Hurley wrote most of this book, Adams did much of the rest. Dennett just helped polish it and promote it (using his status as one of the world's most influential living philosophers) because it is so obviously deserves that.
When did I say i'd read the book? There are hundreds of humor theories and as I've said I haven't been able to review all of them, which is why I asked people to detail what they think is relevant so it can be discussed. Similarly, I didn't ask anyone to review all of my papers, but have pointed out and described the relevant points here specifically for people to see.
The descriptions I see of the material all fit the style that Dennett uses, which I don't enjoy for reasons I've offered. You're welcome to make a substantive reply with actual points from the book or addressing the points I made. Bald assertions aren't that.