Maintaining trade relationships with other European countries wasn't really much beneficial for 1938-era Germany, and in fact it could be argued that it was actively harmful, given the huge foreign debt from WW1 reparations.
All remaining German WW1 reparations were cancelled in 1932, and were under moratorium since before then. They had nothing to do with the beginning of the war in 1938.
The German economy through the 1930s was suffering from a foreign trade imbalance - it relied on crucial imports while not having enough exports to earn the trade balance to pay for them. This remained true even after the annexation of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia. If Germany had not conquered such a large territory in 1938-1940, if the war had merely become another stalemate with trenches and mostly stable fronts (as many military thinkers predicted), Germany would have run out of supplies in less than half a year and collapse. (This was why much of the German army leadership quietly opposed Hitler's plans until the Battle of France.)
Expanding trade and avoiding a French-British blockade and a US embargo seemed to be top economic priorities for Germany in 1938-1939. It turned out that making war was a bigger one.
My source: The Wages Of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, Adam Tooze.
The US wasn't that much interested in European affairs back then. Certainly there wasn't anything comparable to the NATO.
The US withdrew from European affairs during the Great Depression. But by 1938 it was back and it was clear that in another European war, while it may not participate, it would supply Britain and France with arms, loans and everything else it could, if only to make sure they could repay their remaining loans from WW1.
I agree it was less clear that the US would enter the war. In fact Hitler declared war on the US for a reason that looks laughably trivial in retrospect. Then again, he believed war with the US was inevitable anyway; I don't remember right now what his reasons were for believing that.
Also, nuclear weapons didn't exist in 1938.
I don't think that makes such a big difference. Today several actors have nuclear weapons, which balances things out. In 1938 nobody did, but the US still had the biggest economy in the world (although it would take a few years to get up to speed for war) and could decisively tilt the balance in any war it intervened in at full capacity.
Except that he had written a book detailing his deranged political plan that he had then been following to the letter.
Could you point out what was deranged about it, exactly? (Parenthetically: It's hard to have a discussion when you use an emotionally charged term like deranged without making any actual descriptive statements.)
All remaining German WW1 reparations were cancelled in 1932, and were under moratorium since before then.
Didn't know that, thanks.
Could you point out what was deranged about it, exactly?
"The stronger must dominate and not mate with the weaker, which would signify the sacrifice of its own higher nature. Only the born weakling can look upon this principle as cruel, and if he does so it is merely because he is of a feebler nature and narrower mind; for if such a law did not direct the process of evolution then the higher development of organic li...
Some of the comments on the link by James_Miller exactly six months ago provided very specific estimates of how the events might turn out:
James_Miller:
Me:
"Russians intervening militarily" could be anything from posturing to weapon shipments to a surgical strike to a Czechoslovakia-style tank-roll or Afghanistan invasion. My guess that the odds of the latter is below 5%.
A bet between James_Miller and solipsist:
I will bet you $20 U.S. (mine) vs $100 (yours) that Russian tanks will be involved in combat in the Ukraine within 60 days. So in 60 days I will pay you $20 if I lose the bet, but you pay me $100 if I win.
While it is hard to do any meaningful calibration based on a single event, there must be lessons to learn from it. Given that Russian armored columns are said to capture key Ukrainian towns today, the first part of James_Miller's prediction has come true, even if it took 3 times longer than he estimated.
Note that even the most pessimistic person in that conversation (James) was probably too optimistic. My estimate of 5% appears way too low in retrospect, and I would probably bump it to 50% for a similar event in the future.
Now, given that the first prediction came true, how would one reevaluate the odds of the two further escalations he listed? I still feel that there is no way there will be a "conventional battle" between Russia and NATO, but having just been proven wrong makes me doubt my assumptions. If anything, maybe I should give more weight to what James_Miller (or at least Dan Carlin) has to say on the issue. And if I had any skin in the game, I would probably be even more cautious.